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Online edition of India's National Newspaper Tuesday, February 27, 2001 |
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Starving the poor - II
By Jean Dreze
AS THE effects of prolonged drought intensify across the country,
there is an obvious case for using idle food stocks for income-
generation purposes. Aside from helping the poor in drought-
affected areas, income-generation programmes would give farmers
elsewhere some protection against a price crash later in the
year, mitigate the problem of escalating food stocks, and earn
the Government some credit for supporting the people during this
crisis. There are, in principle, good prospects of broad-based
support for such an initiative.
Why, then, is so little being done to use food stocks for drought
relief purposes? There appear to be three basic constraints,
concerned respectively with political, financial and structural
factors. The political constraint is simply that drought relief
is not (at least not yet) a priority in the corridors of power.
The poor have never counted for much in India's lopsided
democracy, and with the growing orientation of economic policy
towards the (so-called) middle class, their concerns have been
further marginalised. Drought, for instance, hardly figures in
ongoing discussions of the upcoming budget.
This political invisibility of drought-related issues struck me
after a recent visit to Rajasthan's State Secretariat in Jaipur.
While some able and public-spirited administrators were hard at
work, the dominant mood was one of complacency and abdication.
The most common attitude was to downplay the drought, if not
blame the victims for their own predicament. One official assured
me that the drought was ``media hype'', and that people were
doing just fine. Another explained to me how he had learnt from
Amartya Sen's work that the first sign of a famine is food
scarcity and a rise in prices, neither of which could be observed
in Rajasthan today. (It is hard to think of a more radical
inversion of Sen's analysis.) Asked about the possibility of
curbing electricity consumption in Jaipur during the drought
period, the Chief Minister proudly told us (P. Sainath and
myself) that he had already done it. As he spoke, the lights of
Jaipur's lavish wedding parties and glittering avenues were
glowing across the evening sky. A similar feedback emerges from
New Delhi's various bhawans (Yojana Bhawan, Krishi Bhawan, etc.).
A senior official at the Finance Ministry, for instance, assured
me that ``people do not have the capacity to absorb more food''
[sic].
Initially, I took it that all these good people were trying to
pull wool over my eyes. It gradually became clear, however, that
they actually believed what they were saying. And to be fair to
them, there is little in Jaipur (let alone Delhi) to remind the
middle classes that they live in the capital of a drought-
affected State. The atmosphere there is one of economic boom and
unprecedented opulence, with plenty of internet cafs, smart
restaurants and fashionable boutiques. The ``social distance''
between Government officials and drought-affected people further
enhances the political invisibility of the latter's predicament.
The second constraint is financial. The coffers of State
Governments are empty, making it difficult for them to bear the
cash costs of income-generation programmes (e.g. the non-wage
component of food-for- work schemes). At the State Secretariat in
Jaipur, ``paise naheen hai'' was a constant refrain. The
Government of Rajasthan is caught in a debt trap, whereby larger
and larger sums of money need to be borrowed simply to cope with
interest payments on outstanding debt. Finding money to pay the
salaries of Government employees is the top priority of the
finance wizards, if not the single priority. Rumour has it that
all kinds of development schemes have been halted, downsized or
postponed for that purpose. Even widow pensions, I was told, have
not been paid for eight months for lack of funds.
The financial constraint is exacerbated by the tendency of
different parts of the public sector (e.g. the Food Corporation
of India, the State Governments, different Ministries) to protect
their own budgets and ``pass the buck''. State Governments, for
instance, currently have to buy food from the Central Government
at the ``BPL price''. Thus, the low social cost of food at this
time of bulging stocks is not reflected in public accounting
practices.
The thought arises, of course, that part of the food stocks could
be sold on the market to generate the required cash resources.
This brings us to the third issue - the structural constraint.
This constraint derives from the primacy of the price-support
objective, discussed in the first part of this article. If food
stocks are released on the market, food prices will fall. This
would undermine the Central Government's commitment to sustain a
``minimum support price'' (MSP). In other words, whatever food
the Government may sell to generate cash resources will, in
effect, have to be bought again to sustain the official MSP.
This problem, incidentally, applies not only in relation to the
``overheads'' involved in organising (say) employment programmes,
but also to wage payments themselves. If wages are paid fully in
kind, market demand for food is bound to decline, compelling the
Government to procure more food if the MSP is to be sustained. In
short, the Government cannot have its cake and eat it: either it
has to generate independent cash resources for drought-relief
programmes, or it has to adopt a lower MSP.
To these three basic constraints, one has to add further
impediments of a more routine nature: bureaucratic inertia,
infrastructural bottlenecks, lack of communication between
Ministries, and so on. The ``blame game'' between the Central and
State Governments is another stumbling block. State Governments,
for instance, complain of inadequate food allotments from the
Centre. The Centre, for its part, blames State Governments for
failing to make full use of their existing allotments.
Constructive efforts to resolve these differences are few and far
between.
In overcoming these constraints, the first step is to ensure that
the welfare of drought-affected people becomes a major political
priority. That, in turn, is unlikely to happen unless drought-
affected people are able to build countervailing power and alter
the prevailing biases of public policy. As it happens, a
redeeming feature of droughts in contemporary India is that they
tend to be periods of intensified political action and popular
mobilisation. The 1970-73 drought in Maharashtra led to growing
social awareness of the right to work, later enshrined in the
State's pioneering ``employment guarantee scheme''. The 1987
drought in Rajasthan gave birth to a powerful movement for the
``people's right to information''. Even the Naxalite movement has
important roots in the devastating droughts of the mid-1960s.
This year, similar processes have already begun in some drought-
affected States. On February 18, for instance, more than 1,000
farmers and labourers from drought-affected districts of
Rajasthan held a public meeting near the State Secretariat in
Jaipur, in a spirited attempt to make their voices heard. Their
startling testimonies exposed the self-satisfied claims of the
administration. In one village of Pali district, people have to
fetch drinking water from a distance of 20 km. In Rajsamand, the
district's largest lake has dried up for the first time in 300
years. In Udaipur district, two starvation deaths have already
been reported. In tribal areas of Chittaurgarh, drought-affected
families are selling their meagre assets to buy food. In some
villages, children are withdrawn from school by impoverished
parents. Distress migration and cattle deaths are widespread. As
for relief programmes, they are virtually non-existent as things
stand: the coverage of relief works is negligible, and even the
public distribution system does not function in many areas.
This meeting was a major wake-up call for the State Government
(and there are early signs of a positive response). Gatherings of
this kind also give a sharp sense of the latent political power
of the underprivileged. The paradox of mounting food stocks
amidst widespread hunger provides a natural rallying point for
popular mobilisation across the country. Therein lies the hope
not only of resolving that paradox but also of achieving more
lasting changes in the balance of political power.
(Concluded)
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