The Hindu : The fast breeder reactor

Online edition of India's National Newspaper
Wednesday, Sep 17, 2003

Opinion

Opinion - Leader Page Articles

The fast breeder reactor

By M.R. Srinivasan

India is the only country in the world that is committed to using thorium as a nuclear fuel and has, over the years, accumulated considerable knowledge on the various steps involved in thorium utilisation.

THE CABINET Committee on Economic Affairs recently approved the proposal of the Department of Atomic Energy to build the Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor (PFBR) at Kalpakkam, near Chennai. The power output of the reactor will be about 500 MW; the estimated cost is about Rs. 3,500 crores and the construction period about eight years. This is one of the biggest technology development projects India will be taking up, comparable to the Integrated Guided Missile Development Programme, the Light Combat Aircraft and the Nuclear Submarine Project. It was almost 50 years ago that Homi Bhabha visualised a three-stage nuclear energy programme to utilise the energy potential of thorium, which India possesses in abundance. All the successive chairmen of the Atomic Energy Commission who followed Bhabha have strongly supported the three-stage programme. The Fast Breeder Reactor (FBR) occupies the second stage. The FBR will use plutonium, formed in the uranium fuel elements of the first stage nuclear power stations, as fuel and convert thorium placed around the FBR core into uranium-233. U-233 can then be used as fuel with thorium, thus deriving energy from thorium. India is the only country in the world that is committed to using thorium as a nuclear fuel. It has, over the years, accumulated considerable knowledge and expertise on the various steps involved in thorium utilisation.

A small fast breeder reactor called the Fast Breeder Test Reactor (FBTR) was built at Kalpakkam and has been in operation from the mid-1980s. The Indira Gandhi Centre for Atomic Research (IGCAR) has extensive laboratory and testing facilities for various aspects of work relating to liquid sodium technology, design of fast reactor components, fuel development, control and instrumentation and so forth. The IGCAR has the lead role in evolving the designs of the PFBR. The Nuclear Power Corporation of India Ltd. (NPCIL), which is building and operating nuclear power units, will be given the project management responsibilities. The Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC), the Nuclear Fuel Complex (NFC) and the Electronics Corporation of India Ltd. (ECIL) will make important contributions in their areas of expertise. So the PFBR will be a major technology development for the DAE as a whole. The FBTR has a design capacity of 15 MW and has so far only operated at less than 5 MW because of a restraint in the availability of fuel. It is a big scale up from the FBTR to the PFBR. The DAE has indeed taken a bold gamble in embarking on the PFBR at this time and the Government of India has been most supportive in clearing this mega project expeditiously.

We should note, however, that the PFBR is a prototype, as the name itself suggests. Realism would imply that it would be unwise to assume that the reactor would start supplying power at the rate of 500 MW once it begins operating. The committee set up by the DAE in the early 1980s to look into the disappointing performance of the Rajasthan Atomic Power Station (RAPS), concluded that it was inappropriate to have assumed that RAPS-1 would be a reliable producer of power as it was indeed prototypical in nature. We should be prepared for the PFBR to take two to three years, or perhaps longer, to stabilise into a reliable operating mode. We should also be prepared for slips in project schedule. Those of us who have managed large engineering projects know only too well that the key to controlling the time schedule is to freeze the designs of the plant and its components before commencing construction and manufacturing activities. This is especially difficult in the case of a prototype where new information from research and testing will have to be incorporated in the designs. There is a similar uncertainty with regard to costs. A look at cost and time overruns of the DAE projects over the past three decades shows that in a number of cases, they have been excessive. These have been due to learning of new technologies, shortage of foreign exchange, which inhibited the import option and embargoes, placed on export of high technology items from a number of advanced countries. In recent years, the NPCIL has demonstrated its ability to contain costs and stick to time schedules on a number of major projects. A factor responsible for this change has been the vastly improved performance of our industries to produce high technology equipment in shorter time frames. Backing this has been the excellent management culture evident in recent years in NPCIL and other DAE units.

The Indian public would like to be informed about the world situation on FBRs. From the 1950s, FBRs have received serious attention of scientists and technologists of the U.S., the USSR and the U.K. The principal appeal of FBRs was that they could, in principle, produce more nuclear fuel than they consumed. This sounds like getting something for nothing. What happens really is that the mass of nuclear fuel gets partly converted to energy and a part appears as new nuclear fuel (either plutonium 239 or uranium 233). Later, France, Germany and India embarked on FBR programmes. Much later, Japan also joined the group. After working on small size experimental FBRs, some of these countries took up work on larger units, as part of the electrical power systems. Some of these early reactors had many technical problems, some related to liquid sodium which is used as a coolant. When Jimmy Carter was the U.S. President, he was concerned about the proliferation risks of plutonium and decided to terminate the U.S. programme on FBRs. The U.K. experienced technical and economic problems with its prototype breeder reactor and abandoned the project. Germany had built its own prototype reactor, which never went into operation because of strong anti-nuclear sentiment, which became unmanageable in the case of the plutonium-fuelled reactor. France had good operating experience with a 15 MW and 250 MW prototypes and sealed up to a 1300 MW unit. The latter encountered various technical and control problems and the French Government declined to give it an operating licence, in spite of a strong recommendation by their nuclear experts. The Japanese abandoned two of their prototypes after they experienced many problems. As of now, only Russia is operating some FBRs successfully and is building some more.

In the light of the unfavourable global experience, is it wise for India to take on this challenging task? We have a unique resource imbalance as far as nuclear fuel is concerned. The presently known natural uranium reserves in the country can support a modest nuclear power capacity of some 10,000 MW. However, if a way can be found to utilise thorium, the latter source can produce more energy than our entire coal reserves.

There have been recent reports about an incident at Kalpakkam when some workers received high doses of radiation. The event occurred in January 2003; senior officers of BARC explained the event in July 2003, only after the media and responsible persons in public life raised a furore. Why the DAE did not come out on its own to inform the public about an accident it admitted was the worst in some five decades and why area radiation monitors were not installed around low level waste storage tanks, which at times inadvertently can receive high level waste, have not been explained. In the context of the FBRs handling large amounts of plutonium, a high level of transparency backed by independent auditing of all safety measures, is essential. It will be unsatisfactory to keep these installations out of the purview of the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board and tag them on the strategic installations, which are covered by an internal safety review procedure. In addition, the DAE must adopt an enlightened policy of keeping the public informed at all times about safety aspects of its installations.

In the past, the DAE largely depended on its own internal experts to solve technical problems in design, construction and operation of its facilities. This was understandable given the absence of expertise elsewhere in the country. The situation now is vastly different. There are many knowledgeable people in nuclear matters among the large number of former DAE personnel who have retired over the years. Similarly, many people in our industry also have considerable first hand experience in the manufacture and servicing of nuclear components. Our academic community, which has been utilised only in a limited way in the past on nuclear work, has become increasingly competent in handling frontline technologies. The DAE should evolve a management pattern wherein all these resource personnel and institutions are utilised effectively so as to enhance the probability of success in all aspects of FBR work and overcome impediments in a timely and effective manner. In addition to internal reviews in the DAE of progress in the PFBR, it is highly desirable that a Peer Review Group of eminent nuclear scientists and technologists reviews the progress, anticipated impediments and solutions to overcome them and safety concerns on a regular periodic basis and reports to the higher levels of Government and indeed to the public at large.

(The writer is former Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission.)

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