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Obligations of peace in Kashmir

By Harish Khare

Now once again, it becomes New Delhi's obligation as well as Kashmiri leaders' duty to seize the moment and explore the potential of the unabated desire for normality and peace.

INITIAL HICCUPS were expected on the way to peace in Kashmir. The All Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC) has so far turned out to be less than enthusiastic about the Centre's offer of talks. The Deputy Prime Minister, L.K. Advani, has invited a retort; perhaps he does not realise that his words carry an added differential now that he has allowed himself to be talked into becoming New Delhi's chosen interlocutor with the APHC. At last, there appears to be a convergence of perspectives and views on what needs to be done in Jammu and Kashmir. Can the latest quest for peace be converted into a workable proposition?

If the Centre offers a dialogue to a consciously and assertively separatist outfit and if that group decides to accept the offer, it can only mean that both sides concede that their respective positions need not be absolutely frozen in unmoving rigidity. If the two sides still shy away from this basic premise, then the latest initiative will not take off. Admittedly, New Delhi has not invited the Hurriyat leaders to talk about the modalities of anointing them sovereigns of an independent kingdom; nor will the APHC come to New Delhi to declare its members to be humble citizens of the Indian republic, happy to be subjected to the same blandishments and inducements as any other citizen in Bihar or Tamil Nadu. The working assumption has to be that both sides concede a possibility of some give and some take.

On the face of it, it is something of a mystery that the Centre has decided to extend a kind of "recognition" to the Maulana Abbas Ansari-led Hurriyat. The mystery is all the more inexplicable because for over a year now the Centre had appeared to be working on a strategy to marginalise the APHC, especially since the last Assembly elections in Jammu and Kashmir. That election saw Mufti Mohammed Sayeed's People's Democratic Party appropriate 90 per cent of the separatists' rhetoric. The dominant view at the Centre was that after the installation of a new Government in Srinagar there was no need to give the Hurriyat the time of the day. On the other hand, the political success notched by the PDP and the international recognition of that development aggravated the Hurriyat's existential crisis. This crisis resolved itself, partly, when Syed Geelani walked out and was promptly "recognised" by Pakistan as the true voice of the people of Kashmir.

The National Conference president, Omar Abdullah, has provided one explanation why the Centre decided to act now vis-à-vis the Hurriyat. The suggestion is that it was New Delhi that had instigated a split in the Hurriyat and having succeeded in doing so, it promptly moved in to ensnare the Ansari group into an insincere effort. Nothing better could be expected from a young man who believes that his family has a proprietary lien on Kashmir; his family must accept the maximum blame for bringing Kashmir to its present bloody state of affairs. A split in the Hurriyat does not mean that leaders like Maulana Abbas Ansari, Abdul Gani Bhat or Mirwaiz Umar Farooq have become or been suborned into becoming New Delhi's stooges. Neither the Maulana nor the Mirwaiz is going to become another Farooq Abdullah.

The only reason for the Centre's offer or the split in the Hurriyat was the Kashmiris' unequivocal desire to live in peace. The first sign of this new mood was a split in the Hizb-ul-Mujahideen, the most dominant indigenous militant outfit. The Hurriyat split was one way for its various disparate elements to come to terms with the new situation after the Assembly polls. A free and fair election challenged one of the prevailing assumptions about an "unjust" New Delhi. Another prevailing assumption fell apart when the new Chief Minister steadfastly refused to become another Farooq Abdullah; even after the militants' attack on the Chief Minister's residence, the Mufti and his equally brave daughter have refused to retreat to the safety of an armed garrison. Not that the Chief Minister does entirely without security protection; it is that he has not allowed the militants to create an ambience of fear. Nor has the Mufti regime given up its search for a humane approach to matters of governance, despite the obvious law and order problem. So much so that a section of the security establishment in New Delhi is not averse to suggesting that the Mufti is extending patronage to Syed Geelani and his Jamat-e-Islami.

All these developments over the last 16 months or so have contributed to a very perceptible desire for peace. It is all very well for the likes of Syed Geelani to keep on invoking the "sacrifices" and "martyrdom" of thousands of Kashmiri youth; perhaps a realisation is dawning on the people of Kashmir that "martyrdom" of another generation of the Kashmiri "boys", at the behest of the likes of Syed Geelani, would bring them no closer to getting rid of India's "occupation army". Just as they have realised to their cost that Pakistan is no position to help get rid of this "occupation army". For the Kashmiri, the idiom of violence has to be replaced by a grammar of dialogue. It was left to a Pakistani Opposition leader, Maulana Fazal-ur-Rehman, to articulate the sentiment: "The ultimate end of every militant struggle is negotiations and now the Kashmiri mujahideen movements should reach that conclusion."

The Prime Minister, Atal Bihari Vajpayee's so-called Srinagar Initiative was rooted in this new mood. But that initiative was allowed to peter out. Now once again, it becomes New Delhi's obligation as well as Kashmiri leaders' duty to seize the moment and to explore the potential of this unabated desire for normality and peace. Engagement is a new challenge to everyone involved in the Kashmir tragedy. It would be unrealistic to assume that all that New Delhi has to do is to indicate its willingness to talk to the Hurriyat and the separatists would present themselves at the double. Similarly, it would do the separatists no good if they think they are going to be doing New Delhi a favour by sitting at the negotiating table.

The Hurriyat-Advani dialogue, as and when, if at all, it comes about, is not going to produce a final solution to the Kashmir problem. Nothing of the kind can come about without Pakistan's open agreement. But such a solution can only be the last leg of a long journey. Yet that journey must begin. Meanwhile, it may be helpful to keep in mind that those who come forward for negotiations have not abandoned separatist aspirations. It would also be useful to remember that those who have broken away from the Geelani Mob are the leaders who have dared to think independently for themselves. Nonetheless, those who choose to come to the negotiating table have the obligation to show courage to be the true Kashmiri nationalists they claim to be. By engaging Messrs Abbas Ansari and others in a dialogue New Delhi would necessarily want to reach out to the separatist constituency.

So far a professional body of separatist leaders — consisting of the political and religious leaders, hired guns, pens for hire, and human rights activists — has monopolised the popular discourse in the Kashmir valley. This entrenched "separatriat" manufactures ideas and emotions, which influence and determine how the Kashmiris think about the unjustness of their lot. Unless New Delhi is able to break this separatriat's monopoly hold over the Kashmiri discourse of grievances, resentments, bitter memories and religious antagonisms, it will not be able to force these professional separatists to come to terms with Kashmiris' desire for peace and normality.

This is a tall order and not without obligations. Those who find themselves having to preside over New Delhi will have to realise that only a democratic, secular and inclusive India will be able to reach out to the alienated people of Kashmir. Moral courage and moral leadership, rather than political cynicism and electoral calculations, would be needed. And moral leadership is not a selective proposition. If Mr. Vajpayee wants to break the emotional stranglehold of the separatriat over the Kashmiri people, and if he wants them to believe that his Government is sincere in its quest for peace, he will have to reclaim the political authority over his own Government. Above all, he will have to discharge the obligation of standing up to the Hindutva voices, which wallow in confrontation at home and abroad.

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