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By V. Suryanarayan
FOLLOWING THE old dictum that the best way of defence is offence, Velupillai Prabhakaran, in his Heroes Day speech, has sharply reacted to the criticisms of the international community that the recent proposals submitted by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) for the establishment of an Interim Administrative Council in the Northeast constitute the basis for a separate state. He has denied the allegation that the LTTE is strengthening itself militarily and preparing for war. He has characterised the power struggle between the President and the Prime Minister as an expression of Sinhala racism, which would lead to a denial of Tamil rights. What is more, the LTTE supremo has held out the warning that if oppression continues, Tamils will have no alternative but to secede and form an independent state, invoking the right to self-determination. `Heroes Day' (November 27) provides an annual opportunity for Prabhakaran to take stock of the political situation and spell out the short term and long term objectives of the Tigers. The day is celebrated on a grand scale in the Tamil areas; it is an occasion to remember and pay tribute to the guerrillas who laid down their lives in the cause of Tamil Eelam. `Lt'. Shankar, the first guerrilla to die in combat, sacrificed his life on November 27, 1982. A close associate of Prabhakaran from his early days, Shankar was seriously injured in an encounter with the Sri Lankan army when a bullet tore through his stomach. Since there were no adequate medical facilities in Jaffna, Shankar was brought to Tamil Nadu by sea. He remained conscious until he was able to speak to Prabhakaran and then succumbed to his injuries. The widespread observance of Heroes Day is intended to remind the faithful in Sri Lanka and abroad about the acts of daring and heroism of guerrillas who transcend fear of death. The Tamil people are exhorted to rededicate themselves to fulfil the unfinished agenda of the struggle, namely the attainment of independent Tamil Eelam. The Tigers are experts in making selective use of Tamil history. No wonder Prabhakaran chose the Tiger as the symbol, for it was the royal emblem of the mighty Chola rulers, under whose leadership Tamil glory spread to South and Southeast Asia. What is more, it is the cult of self-sacrifice and martyrdom that has transformed the Tigers into one of the most ruthless terrorist organisations in the world today. The celebration of Martyrs' Week, the elevation of Karun Puligal (Black Tigers) who died in suicide missions to a supernatural status; the use of terms like Veera Vanakkam (Homage to the Heroes) and Veera Maranam (Martyrdom) have their own inexorable logic. In most LTTE publications, a sole objective finds prominent place Pulikalin Thakam, Tamil Attayakam or "The Tigers thirst for the Motherland of Tamil Eelam." Such a dogmatic stance makes it extremely difficult for the LTTE to consider any settlement within a united Sri Lanka, for any deviation will be seen as `betraying' the `sacrifice' of 17,500 Heroes. Owing to the pressure of circumstances or for tactical reasons, Prabhakaran may adopt different courses at different times including a unilateral declaration, or negotiation of a ceasefire and participation in peace negotiations but the ultimate objective is an independent state of Tamil Eelam. Pushed to the wall by New Delhi following the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement of July 1987, Prabhakaran made a symbolic gesture of surrender of arms. At the same time, in his Sudumalai Amman Kovil speech, he articulated his deep conviction: "The methods of war may change. But the aim of our war will not change." In his 2003 Heroes Day speech, Prabhakaran has underlined the "factual reality" of Sri Lanka today. Large parts of the North-East are already under the "effective administration" of the Tigers. In other words, there is already a de facto Tamil Eelam. What the Tigers hope to accomplish when an Interim Self Governing Authority is in place is to achieve total control over the eight districts of the North-East. Interestingly, the terms federal or confederal do not find any mention in the LTTE proposals. Nor does Prabhakaran concede the unity, integrity and sovereignty of Sri Lanka over the whole island. On the contrary, acceptance of the proposals will confer on the Tigers the much-needed international legitimacy as the `sole representative' of the Tamils. The boundaries of the `Tamil homeland' will be clearly demarcated and, what is more, the Interim Self-Governing Authority will have the powers to negotiate and receive foreign aid. Some Indian observers have aptly characterised the LTTE objective as "one state, two nations". Prabhakaran's references to "critical reviews" from the "Indian media world and from the Indian political analysts" are interesting. The LTTE supremo's assertion that the Tigers are not reinforcing their military prowess does not tally with ground realities. He considers these allegations as part of the President's attempt to "tarnish the credibility" of the Tigers and to "disrupt the peace process". However, Prabhakaran has conceded that the Tigers have been recruiting on a "small scale", since they need "manpower" for "administrative structures". The 20-month-long ceasefire in fact has tilted the military balance in favour of the Tigers. This has obliged Colombo to seek military cooperation arrangements with India, the United States and other external powers. The Sri Lankan journalist, Iqbal Athas, has documented the growing strength of the Tigers. At the time of signing the ceasefire, the LTTE's armed cadre strength stood at 9,390 but today it is about 19,750. Some 30 per cent of the new recruits are child soldiers. The Tigers have constructed 19 new camps in the districts of Batticaloa and Trincomalee. They get regular supplies of military hardware by sea. The Government, on the contrary, is hamstrung by the provisions of the ceasefire agreement. Since there is an emphasis on developmental needs over defence requirements, the procurement of military hardware has remained frozen for a few months. A few weeks ago, Chandrika Kumaratunga alleged that the Army was left only with nine days of ammunition. However, Colombo was able to retrieve the situation with emergency assistance from India. A recruitment drive by the Government for strengthening the armed forces has fallen far short of targets. Desertions continue, adversely affecting the morale of the armed forces. At the same time, the LTTE continues with its policy of annihilating intelligence operatives and political opponents. The demand for conferring de facto naval status on the Sea Tigers and the proposal that the ISGA should have control over, and access to, marine resources have serious security implications for the region. Which federal unit in the world has the right to maintain armed forces and control of the sea? Prabhakaran's claim that "we want peace and we want to resolve our problems through peaceful means" cannot hide the true character of the LTTE. The internationalisation of the ethnic conflict and the increasing interest displayed by the international community is slowly but steadily turning the tide against the Tigers. Prabhakaran has characterised the exclusion of the LTTE from the Donors Conference held in Washington in April 2003 as an attempt to "marginalise" the Tigers. He said the Tigers were "disappointed and saddened" by such humiliation. The "strategic ploy" of Colombo to build up an "international safety net" has caused grave concern in Tiger minds. Apparently referring to statements made by India and the European Union on peace negotiations, Prabhakaran has complained that some countries "have even stipulated parameters within which the Tamil national question has to be settled." The international community increasingly feels that the interim administration should be an integral part of the final settlement; it should be within the framework of a united federal Sri Lanka; it should safeguard the interests and aspirations of all ethnic groups; and Prabhakaran should abjure the path of violence and start respecting human rights and democratic values. The tragedy of Sri Lanka is that the strained relations between the President and the Prime Minister are casting their long shadow over the peace process. Prabhakaran, with a certain amount of justification, has maintained that the power struggle "has shaken the very foundation of the state structure." Over the last fifty years, competitive Sinhala politics had been the main obstacle in the path of a resolution of the ethnic conflict. Continuing differences between the President and the Prime Minister will only benefit Prabhakaran, for he can plausibly claim that in the bitter power struggle Tamils are the main losers. Sri Lanka can ill afford the present political crisis. The writing on the wall reads: those who do not learn from history will be compelled to relive it. (Prof. V. Suryanarayan is former Director, Centre for South and Southeast Asia Studies, University of Madras, Chennai.)
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