The Hindu : An uncertain ceasefire

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Wednesday, Dec 10, 2003

Opinion

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An uncertain ceasefire

By Pran Chopra

Both New Delhi and Srinagar will have to keep a keener eye open for whatever Pakistan may lob up across the Line of Control.

THANKS TO the efforts of successive emissaries from New Delhi, some welcome developments have taken place in Kashmir. The least that they signify is, first, a further setback for armed militancy, and second that New Delhi and the political opponents of the State's present level of accession to India have broken the wall of silence which separated them. It is not time yet to order any celebrations. However, some hopeful but quiet introspection in New Delhi and the State will help ensure that misunderstandings will not once again close the openings made after months of patient effort. That means neither side should confuse the other's real meaning with what each may find convenient to say for local consumption.

Genuinely, Kashmiri militants broke away some years ago from those who operate from or are controlled by Pakistan. Soon after came considerable re-thinking among the political opponents of the State's accession to India, and those who had its interests at heart moved away from both kinds of militancy. Then followed Kashmir's first honest election in a couple of decades, honest enough to persuade some Kashmiri militants also that the time had come to give up the gun. The vote went clearly in favour of the political process, against the gun, and against accession to Pakistan or secession from India. Equally clearly the vote was won by those who had no quarrel with the accession to India but wanted a review of its extent and nature. And now those who had stood away from that election have also, and for the first time, responded positively to New Delhi's invitations to talks.

They have added some caveats. For example, the statement by a former chairman of the All Parties Hurriyat Conference, Abdul Ghani Bhatt, that the conglomerate has a "road map" which it will show to some "foreign embassies" first. He tried to make this position look like a threat. But it makes no difference to the position that New Delhi has clearly and consistently held , that its talks with the Hurriyat or anyone else in or on Kashmir will be purely on a bilateral basis. Nor does it affect the Indian position that the talks and the outcome will be in the context of the Constitution, though that document itself has always been amenable to such changes as may seem desirable to those who are responsible for implementing the outcome. Difficulties will lie elsewhere than in face saving postures. For example, can the Hurriyat demand less than Farooq Abdullah did in what came to be described, perhaps wrongly, as his "autonomy package"? Can New Delhi concede more to the Hurriyat than it denied to the National Conference? What more will the Hurriyat demand by way of its own "healing touch" for Kashmir than Chief Minister Mufti Mohammad Sayeed could get for his stick and carrot approach to the militants?

That takes one to a more intricate question. Is the Hurriyat interested in a real settlement or only in unsettling the present arrangement between New Delhi and Srinagar, which has so far left the Hurriyat out in the cold and put a Congress-PDP coalition in power? If the latter be the case, the Hurriyat' s purpose might only be to make New Delhi hope that it could get a better deal if it changed horses in Srinagar. For helping it serve that purpose, the Hurriyat could tell the people of the State that they were short-changed by the PDP to help its leader, Mr. Sayeed, occupy the throne.

At the least that would persuade the coalition to buy peace with the Hurriyat by bringing it into the Government as a third party. This would give the Hurriyat a chance to play the monkey between two cats when the time comes for the Congress and the PDP to face up to their agreement to rotate the Chief Minister's post between them.

While keeping a keen eye on this ball, both New Delhi and Srinagar will have to keep a keener one open for whatever Pakistan may lob up across the Line of Control. It has some useful tricks up its sleeve, and in playing each is assisted by American willingness to let Pakistan bleed India so long as Islamabad helps Washington deal with the Al-Qaeda. If Pakistan keeps working ever harder to push terrorists into India across the LoC, there will be no option for India but to chase them harder in Kashmir, whatever that may do to the Congress-PDP coalition in the light of the PDP's commitment to "a healing touch." It is not difficult to imagine how that may affect any new or existing understandings between Srinagar and New Delhi, and what effect that may have on Indo-U.S. relations. Similar can be the consequences if India trips up on the ceasefire Pakistan has offered on the LoC. A genuine ceasefire would be invaluable for the security, safety and welfare of the people on both sides of the Line, and for the people of the two countries as a whole if this first step leads on to a more durable peace in the State. But that calls for much more, and more transparent coordination between the two countries than is visible yet.

For instance, when such a ceasefire was first proposed by India, Pakistan put such conditions for accepting it that the intention appeared to be to scuttle the whole idea. Has it attached them now to its own offer or has it dropped them? Or have they been negotiated out of the way? Or are they quietly waiting round the corner like a dangerous pitfall hiding in the grass? Aside from that possibility, another and a more dangerous one stares us more boldly in the face.

The announcement of a ceasefire by the Prime Minister of Pakistan was guardedly, and rightly so, welcomed by India the same day, pending a later and more detailed assessment of Pakistan's intentions. Among those whose opinion must, or should, have mattered a lot is Lt. Gen Hari Prasad, Commander-in-Chief of the Northern Command. This is the largest single Indian Army formation and is posted all along the most sensitive sectors of the Pakistan border, particularly the LoC. As such, it is also the most relevant to any ceasefire arrangement. One assumes that either this assessment showed Pakistan's intentions to be satisfactory or it was concluded that for other reasons it would be more useful to accept the announcement publicly.

But on November 24, Gen. Prasad told the press in Srinagar that Pakistan's camps for training terrorists had been moved closer to the LoC so that they may be more quickly pushed into India. If this is so, the ceasefire cannot last long. Once well-armed terrorists hide on the Indian side of the Line, which is more densely populated, they can only be flushed out in heavy exchange of fire, with serious loss of Kashmiri lives. This will force India to disable the camps as best it may, and deal with the intruders on the wing, whatever that may do to the ceasefire agreement or domestic peace in the Valley. That is the real reason why India insists that intrusions from across the Line must stop if there is to be a cease-fire on the LoC.

Fortunately for India, as it faces these conundrums, the past has already flagged policies which have served India well so far and will continue do so in future if they are followed with greater sincerity and efficiency. It is these policies which have brought Kashmiri separatists and domestic militants as far as they have come, and put intruders from Pakistan and Pakistan itself into a more amenable mood.

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