The Hindu : Nuclear neighbours

Online edition of India's National Newspaper
Tuesday, Dec 23, 2003

Opinion

Opinion - Leader Page Articles

Nuclear neighbours

By V.R. Raghavan

One effective institutional arrangement is the creation of a nuclear risk reduction centre each in India and Pakistan.

INDIA AND Pakistan have announced a series of measures to improve bilateral relations. They augur well for an atmosphere of greater confidence between the leadership and officials of the two countries. It is interesting that both New Delhi and Islamabad have called these initiatives Confidence Building Measures (CBMs). The emphasis on CBMs is indicative of a new realisation in both capitals that an atmosphere of mutual confidence is an important first step in the process of engaging each other. That serious engagement in the form of negotiations and dialogue cannot start without confidence in each other's commitment to a peaceful environment is a new element on the South Asia scene.

There is despite the CBMs so far announced considerable scepticism about the sustainability of the mood created by them. That in essence is the challenge of the CBMs in themselves and for those who rush to announce them. Such initiatives require both time and political commitment before they begin delivering measurable results. They can have no life of their own without visible results. Such results are both the rationale and requirement of meaningful CBMs. Those CBMs that are offered and set up as political favours, or, as populist measures are also the first to be pulled down in moments of tension and crisis. This has also been the experience of CBMs between India and Pakistan. The requirement therefore is for CBMs operated through mutually agreed structures and institutions, which continue to operate and deliver useful outcomes even in periods of disagreements and crisis. The confidence that CBMs will not be jettisoned despite political and other compulsions is the critical element in the dynamic of building and sustaining confidence.

India and Pakistan are viewed as two states that are most likely to have a nuclear conflict. This is a belief in international expert and lay circles from which few are willing to resile. Neither Indian nor Pakistani assurances, nor claims to political maturity in both countries, have been enough to reduce these fears. The anxieties and fears on the South Asian nuclear scene are sustained by many factors. First, the political leaderships in both states have shown themselves prone to threatening public posturing on nuclear issues. This was seen many times since the two sides tested nuclear weapons in 1998. This was particularly evident during the two military crises of Kargil and 2002. There is a considerable body of evidence built up listing such threats issued — particularly during military standoffs and conflict — by Indian and Pakistani personages in responsible positions. It serves little purpose in arguing that such rhetoric is only so much hot air. It is worse to sidestep the issue by saying that political leaders and officials on the subcontinent are not to be taken too seriously in nuclear matters.

The second factor that raises serious fears is the habit, almost a tradition, of closing all channels of official communications between the two Governments when tensions build up. New Delhi and Islamabad have been equally at fault on this count. There is also evidence to show that in times of tension and confusion, even existing CBMs such as military hotlines have not been used. Nuclear weapons have a far-reaching impact beyond the countries that possess them or threaten to use them. The deliberate discontinuing of communication channels in conflict and crisis conditions builds up international fears. This continues to disturb and create fears about future conflicts long after the crisis.

The third reason for continuing fears of a nuclear conflagration is the unwillingness so far of joining in a nuclear-related dialogue by India and Pakistan. Neither country is willing as yet to engage in a nuclear issues-related discussion with the other. There are substantial areas of doubt and misgivings in terms of nuclear doctrine and decision-making. India, for example, has a declared nuclear doctrine while Pakistan has not announced one. That has not prevented Islamabad and other Pakistani interlocutors from dispensing opinions on what the doctrine might be. The circumstances under which Islamabad would use nuclear weapons, or its Red Lines, as they are termed in nuclear threat assessments, are unclear. It can be argued that ambiguity in such matters is a desirable attribute. That begs the question whether this opacity is intended to make a nuclear conflict more likely. In matters of use of nuclear weapons India has pledged a no-first-use policy. Pakistan claims it neither trusts such a pledge nor would it be willing to consider it as policy. The nuclear command set-up in India is firmly in political control. That in Islamabad has been and will continue to remain in military control despite some civilian elements built into it. Neither India nor Pakistan has demonstrated the desire or the urgency to obtain clarity on these important issues.

The most important reason for international apprehensions on the South Asian nuclear scene is the complete absence of institutional arrangements to respond to nuclear emergencies. Nuclear emergencies include nuclear plant accidents whose impact will be felt over large geographic zones and over long time. An emergency can take the form of a major blast in one country, which is immediately perceived as a nuclear detonation. This can set in motion a chain of dangerous responses if the misperception is not immediately and effectively set at rest. An emergency can come about during a military standoff such as that in 2002, by a nuclear device detonating accidentally and is then perceived as a nuclear strike by the adversary state. A terrorist-led nuclear event, even if it only sets out radiation effects, can have catastrophic human and administrative impact, and in turn lead to reactions which further compound the situation.

The need therefore is for institutional arrangements that continue to operate effectively even in and despite the presence of conflict situations. Such an initiative between India and Pakistan will assist greatly in assuaging anxieties in South Asia and internationally. Such willingness was demonstrated soon after the tests of 1998. In the Memorandum of Understanding that was part of the Lahore Declaration there was agreement on taking a series of measures that would reduce risks that could accrue from the presence of nuclear weapons. The memorandum specifically referred to the question of taking steps to overcome misperceptions arising out of incidents and events relating to nuclear weapons.

One effective institutional arrangement that can cover a wide range of nuclear risk related matters is the creation of a Nuclear Risk Reduction Centre (NRRC) each in India and Pakistan. What would an NRRC attain in the India-Pakistan context? It would be manned by scientists, military personnel, missile specialists and bureaucrats from the nuclear related ministries. They would have secure and reliable communication with relevant nuclear nodes such as nuclear power plants, defence services headquarters, Ministries of Defence and Atomic Energy, strategic forces headquarters and with the National Security Adviser or his equivalent. The NRRCs in New Delhi and Islamabad would be linked by reliable and fast communication links for rapid sharing and communicating of critically required crisis management information. The two NRRCs would keep a 24-hour watch on developments likely to lead to accidents, misperceptions and rumours. As a wholly specialist organisation, its assessments would be authoritative and carry conviction. The NRRC would function as part of the National Security set-up and not independent of it.

A precedent exists for the creation of NRRCs by India and Pakistan. The United States and the Soviet Union had operated such Centres during the Cold War. The U.S.-Soviet NRRCs demonstrated that despite many issues of ideological and military contention, both sides were partners in a common interest. The determination to avoid a nuclear war was demonstrated in the creation of NRRCs. In fact, it came about by legislative action initiated in the U.S. by Senators Sam Nunn and John Warner. A similar sagacity was demonstrated by Atal Bihari Vajpayee and Nawaz Sharif in 1999 when they signed the Lahore Declaration. Then came Kargil, which so emphatically changed the political landscape in Pakistan. Mr. Vajpayee and Pervez Musharraf are now both leading towards rebuilding a troubled relationship between themselves and their two countries. The time is now ripe to go beyond the well-trodden tracks of diplomacy and put into effect a major nuclear CBM such as the NRRC.

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