The Hindu : Fighting `jehadis' at home

Online edition of India's National Newspaper
Sunday, Dec 28, 2003

Opinion

Opinion - News Analysis

Fighting `jehadis' at home

By Inder Malhotra

According to an old saying, no place is more remote and therefore more unfamiliar than that on the other side of the hill. To an extent this remains true even in this age of instant communication and round-the-clock television coverage. The intense discussion and speculation about the

numerous ramifications of the two attempts, within 11 days, on the life of the Pakistani President, Pervez Musharraf, and that too in the most sensitive and heavily-guarded area of Rawalpindi, the hub of the neighbouring country's military establishment, underscore the point.

On both occasions, the Vajpayee Government was prompt in condemning the dastardly attempts at assassination from which Gen. Musharraf escaped almost literally by the skin of his teeth. Most thinking Indians are likely to share this sentiment which is as things should be. In the subcontinent there has been too much of what the Germans call schadenfreude. Roughly translated, this means drawing comfort from the "other's" misery. There has to be an end to such deplorable pastime.

After the second horrendous incident on Christmas Day, New Delhi did devote some thought to the problem, in the prevailing atmosphere, of the security of the heads of state and government scheduled to go to Islamabad for the SAARC summit next week. But a quick and clear conclusion was that nothing should be done to cause any doubt about the summit being held as planned. In any case, Pakistan has since announced emphatically that it does not want any postponement of the summit.

Even before December 14, when the first attempt to blow up Gen. Musharraf's motorcade was made, the Pakistani Government had told this country that all the Indian security personnel, including commandos, needed for the security of the Prime Minister, Atal Bihari Vajpayee, could

accompany him. These arrangements might be made more elaborate than was planned earlier. Other SAARC countries, whose rulers, too, are being targeted by terrorists of various hues, are expected not to object.

However, some quiet, behind-the-scene consultations between the security agencies of Pakistan and those of other SAARC countries would be needed before all the arrangements are tied up. Understandably, participants in the summit countries would like to know more about the two suicide-bombers whose identities the Pakistani authorities claim to have established but

do not want to make public for "security reasons." After all, there is networking among the terrorist outfits operating in the region. Published reports in Pakistan point the finger of suspicion at the Jaish-e-Mohammed and the Laskhar-e-Jhnagvi. The latter is essentially a sectarian and extremist Sunni organisation but, like JeM, is known to be a supporter of the Taliban and the Al-Qaeda.

New Delhi's reaction to Gen. Musharraf's reaffirmation of his resolve to fight terrorism and Islamic extremism is mixed. All terrorism everywhere has to be condemned and countered, of course. But, as both official sources and analysts point out, in the case of the almost daily terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir, he has consistently been describing it as a "fight for freedom."

By the same token the terrorists trying to kill him may be someone else's "freedom fighters."

Indeed, Pakistan-watchers here emphasise that Gen. Musharraf has banned JeM, reportedly responsible for the murder of the American journalist, Daniel Pearl, and the Harkat-ul-Ansar which, like the JeM, is known for its sympathy for the Taliban. But he has taken no such action against the Markaz-ud-Dawa, the renamed Lashkar-e-Taiba, which has been and continues to be active in Kashmir.

Pakistani officials are loath to admit it but foreign observers agree remarkably that the kind of operations that the terrorists targeting Gen. Musharraf have mounted could not have been possible without the "complicity" of some of those in charge of his security. It is partly at least an "inside" job that raises the alarming question whether the late Zia-ul-Haq's relentless Islamisation of the Pakistani Army, followed by subsequent encouragement to jehadis, has not eroded its traditional

discipline, creating pockets of resistance to Gen. Musharraf's policies after 9/11.

Surprisingly, little notice has been taken here of two remarkable reports in Pakistani newspapers. In one, Dawn, a very responsible newspaper, has disclosed that Gen. Musharaf had told some Kashmiri leaders that the former United States President, Bill Clinton, was "informally mediating" between India and Pakistan over the Kashmir dispute. The General had added that of the 12 "compromise formulas" under discussion, the "Chenab solution" was on "the top." This proposal,

assiduously promoted by Pakistan, with some help from the Kashmir Study Group and others in the U.S., envisages the division of Jammu and Kashmir along religious lines.

Secondly, Kamran Khan, a distinguished correspondent, has reported that the Principal Secretary to Mr. Vajpayee, Brajesh Mishra, had, in a "top-secret letter" expressed displeasure with the CBI and the RAW for their failure to furnish compelling evidence to get the outlaw Dawood Ibrahim extradited.

At the same time, Mr. Khan adds, a Pakistani MP had come to grief for publicly criticising the policy of sheltering any "criminal fugitives." He received a phone call from the ISI warning him that if he did not stop issuing such statements, the result "would not be good."

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Fighting `jehadis' at home