The Hindu : Alliance arithmetic

Online edition of India's National Newspaper
Wednesday, Jan 07, 2004

Opinion

Opinion - Leader Page Articles

Alliance arithmetic

By Suresh Nambath

Electoral arithmetic, more than political chemistry, is the decisive factor in the realignment of political forces in Tamil Nadu.

WHEN THE Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam and its junior ally, the Marumalarchi Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam, withdrew from the National Democratic Alliance at the Centre, the parting of ways was free of any rancour. There was a promise of issue-based support to the NDA Government, and praise for the Prime Minister, Atal Bihari Vajpayee. This was in sharp contrast to the manner in which the All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam walked out of the Bharatiya Janata Party-led alliance in 1999 after putting relentless pressure on the Vajpayee Government.

In 1999, the AIADMK alienated all its allies at the time, the MDMK, the Pattali Makkal Katchi and the Tamizhaga Rajiv Congress, by repeatedly threatening to bring down the BJP-led Government for refusing to dismiss the DMK Government in Tamil Nadu. In the end, all the allies of the AIADMK stuck to the BJP. The situation is vastly different now. The MDMK went along with the decision of the DMK. The other ally, the PMK, though it stayed on in the NDA, remained in close touch with the DMK.

The almost painless shift from one camp to the other was made possible by the cold calculations of the DMK president, M. Karunanidhi, based on the vote-bank ledger. As electoral arithmetic, more than political chemistry, was the decisive factor in the realignment, there was little room for any acrimonious rhetoric. To the DMK's 25-plus per cent share of the total votes, Mr. Karunanidhi is hoping to add 10-plus per cent from the Congress, and five per cent each from the MDMK, the PMK and the Left. The combination is then guaranteed to sweep the polls.

After coming to power in Tamil Nadu in 1967, the DMK recorded its worst performance in 1991, losing all the 29 Lok Sabha seats it contested in the sympathy wave following the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi. But even so, it secured 22.7 per cent of the total votes. In the 1984 Lok Sabha election, when it was laid low by the sympathy wave following the assassination of Indira Gandhi, the DMK obtained 25.9 per cent of the votes.

The highs of the party have been well over 30 per cent. In the 1967 Lok Sabha election, it got 35.8 per cent, and in 1971, it got 35.3 per cent. Although there was a slide after the 1972 split that saw the formation of the AIADMK, the party never fell below 22.7 per cent of the vote share except when it gave a large number of seats to an alliance partner as in 1998. The DMK contested only 17 of the 39 Lok Sabha seats in 1998 and got 20.08 per cent of the total votes, but the percentage of votes in the seats contested was quite high at 42.32. In 1999, again when it contested only 17 seats, this percentage was 46.88. Thus, the DMK's committed votes can be safely put at above 25 per cent.

The MDMK, when it went without any major ally in 1996, got 4.5 per cent of the total votes, which is indicative of its true strength. The party is stronger in the southern districts, but otherwise the support base is spread evenly throughout the State.

The PMK, another potential ally of the DMK, is in the same bracket as the MDMK: in 1989, it got 5.8 per cent, and in 1991, 5.1 per cent — both times without the benefit of any alliance. However, the PMK base is concentrated in the northern districts dominated by the Vanniyars who constitute about a third of the population in that belt. In 1989, the party totalled more than 10 per cent of the votes in eight Lok Sabha constituencies. As the DMK and the AIADMK are more or less evenly matched in the Vanniyar belt, the PMK effectively decides the winner though it commands only about a third of the Vanniyar votes.

The Congress vote share can be deduced from its performance in the 1977 and 1989 Assembly elections, when it went without allies. In 1977, it got 17.5 per cent, and in 1989, 20.2 per cent. In 1996, the party split with G.K. Moopanar breaking away to form the Tamil Maanila Congress. Subsequently, in 1998, when the Congress contested the Lok Sabha election without the support of either the DMK or the AIADMK, it managed only 4.78 per cent of the votes. The TMC, however, got 20.19 per cent. With the TMC having merged with it now, the Congress, at the very least, is worth more than 10 to 15 per cent of the votes. The support base of the Congress is evenly spread, and as in the case of the MDMK, slightly thicker in the south than in the north.

The DMK-led front should not find it difficult to accommodate the Congress, the Left parties and the MDMK. The only element of doubt is about the PMK, which might switch sides if denied an adequate number of seats. For the AIADMK, the BJP would only be of minimal help. The last time the BJP contested the Lok Sabha election on its own in Tamil Nadu (in 1996), it got only 2.9 per cent of the votes. In any case, if the fight is bipolar, a large number of BJP sympathisers might vote for the AIADMK.

In the existing situation, for the AIADMK, the PMK is the only potentially useful ally available. But, theoretically at least, an AIADMK-PMK alliance would fall short of a DMK-Congress-MDMK-Left combination by anything between 10 to 15 per cent. In a first-past-the-post system, that would be disastrous.

Printer friendly page
Send this article to Friends by E-Mail

Opinion

News Update

Stories in this Section

STABILISING THE PROCESS

ON TOP DOWN UNDER

Opposition can still do it

Congress and elections