The Hindu : The General's burden

Online edition of India's National Newspaper
Sunday, Jan 11, 2004

Opinion

Opinion - News Analysis

The General's burden

The latest 'deal' with India rests entirely on the shoulders of Pervez Musharaff. B. MURALIDHAR REDDY on the Pakistan scene.

HAS PAKISTAN finally made a u-turn on its Kashmir policy? If it has, is it tactical or permanent? Most important, can it be sustained in the long run given the stakes in the Kashmir issue of various vested interests within and outside the establishment?

In the answers to these questions lies the future of the latest endeavour by India and Pakistan to settle their differences. As things stand, there are no clear-cut answers; it will take at least six months before any conclusions can be made.

After all, both sides have been down this road several times before. Of course, one crucial difference is that this is the first major initiative in the post-9/11 scenario in which the United States has sought to define a new world order.

Logically, Pakistan's Kashmir policy should have witnessed a shift once it abandoned the Taliban in Afghanistan under pressure from the U.S. and joined it in the so-called global war against terrorism. But everything does not operate on logic. Caught between its new friend, India, and old ally, Pakistan, the Bush administration could not go beyond a point in pressuring Islamabad to re-work its Kashmir and India policy.

Immediately after 9/11 there was a realisation in the Pakistani military establishment that it would not be long before the world focus turned on its policy of jihad as an instrument of foreign policy and its activities in Kashmir. At the same time, there was no way the Pakistan President, Pervez Musharraf, could have reversed the Kashmir policy particularly when his regime was busy putting out the fires stoked by the u-turn on Afghanistan.

Then came the October 1, 2001, Jammu and Kashmir Assembly attack and the December 13 Parliament attack and the unprecedented Indian pressure on Pakistan.

This changed the dynamics of power play in South Asia and made it one of the world's most volatile regions in 2002 as the two nuclear neighbours engaged in an eyeball-to-eyeball confrontation for eight long months.

India made two demands: a permanent end to infiltration from across the border, and dismantling of the terrorism infrastructure. It is these two issues that dominated the discourse in efforts by the U.S. and its interlocutors to bring India and Pakistan to the negotiating table. The fact that it took over two years to find a formulation that satisfied the concerns of India and Pakistan is a reflection of the complex nature of their differences.

A glance at the 153-word joint press statement issued after the 65-minute meeting between the Prime Minister, Atal Bihari Vajpayee, and Gen. Musharraf shows that Islamabad has made serious commitments in return for commencement of a composite dialogue on all outstanding issues, including Jammu and Kashmir. It is a complete reversal of its earlier position that resolution of the Kashmir issue was imperative for the betterment of relations with India.

The joint press statement quoted Mr. Vajpayee as telling Gen. Musharraf that dialogue could progress only if violence, hostility and terrorism were ended. Gen. Musharraf re-assured him that territory under Pakistan's control would not be allowed to be used to support terrorism in any manner and stressed the need for productive and sustained dialogue on all issues. In other words, the commencement of dialogue is conditional. It can be halted anytime India believes Pakistan is sponsoring terrorism.

Political and diplomatic observers in Islamabad were taken aback when Gen. Musharraf, in an unexpected press conference, declared that "history has been made." It led to speculation that the two sides had worked out a behind-the-scenes deal they were not revealing for the moment.

In contrast to the heightened expectations created by Gen. Musharraf, the tone and tenor of the briefing by the External Affairs Minister, Yashwant Sinha, was matter of fact.

Gen. Musharraf's decision to make himself `available' to the media for well over an hour led to an interpretation that he was not prepared to let go the opportunity to steal the limelight in the presence of a large international and Indian media contingent. The moot question is: does a strong leader require the platform of a press conference to make it known that he is the boss and in command of things?

There is a growing perception in Pakistan that under pressure from the U.S., the Government has changed its Kashmir policy.

The very fact that Gen. Musharraf deemed it necessary to meet representatives of political parties from Pakistan-occupied Kashmir and assure them that there was no `secret deal' with New Delhi on Kashmir was an indication of the misgivings. Carefully avoiding any reference to the United Nations resolutions on Kashmir, mainstay of Pakistan's Kashmir policy for half a century, Gen. Musharraf told the PoK leaders that their wishes would be kept in mind in a dialogue with India.

For some time now there have been rumblings within Pakistan and PoK over some of the actions of the Government, particularly since last April's peace initiative of Mr. Vajpayee. Fears are growing that like Afghanistan, Pakistan might abandon its Kashmir policy.

For instance, Gen. Musharraf's statement to Reuters in the course of an interview a few days ago that Pakistan had `left aside' the United Nations resolutions on Kashmir came as a big shock. Coupled with it, people see a pattern in the actions against jihadi organisations such as the Jaish-e-Mohammad.

Then there are larger questions. There is consensus within and outside Pakistan that the military has emerged as the final arbitrator on all state matters because of its indispensability as `protector of the Islamic identity' of the country and the Kashmir issue has played a key role in it. Could the military afford to show flexibility beyond a point on Kashmir and hope to retain its total grip on the state?

The latest `deal', to borrow a phrase from Gen. Musharraf, with India rests entirely on the shoulders of the uniformed President.

Of course, Gen. Musharraf is chief of one of the most disciplined armies in the world and the institution is under his command.

Gen. Musharraf has vowed to take off his uniform by the year-end. Is there a guarantee that the Pakistan Army minus Gen. Musharraf will honour his commitments? Unlike Mr. Vajpayee for whom the effort could be a good election plank, the stakes for Gen. Musharraf are higher. Mr. Vajpayee, who is on record as having said that this is his last effort, could in the worst case say, "I tried and failed." However, in Pakistan, the buck stops with Gen. Musharraf.

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