The Hindu : Dialogue and its perils

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Thursday, Jan 22, 2004

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Dialogue and its perils

By Praveen Swami

The real problem is that there are not just two sides to the conflict in Jammu and Kashmir.

IN AT least some senses, the dialogue on Jammu and Kashmir is a little like a bargain between a shopkeeper with no goods to sell, and a customer with no cash in his pocket; and yet, the fact is that this unhappy negotiation is the best chance of peace the State has had in a decade.

In the course of this morning, leaders of the All Parties Hurriyat Conference are scheduled to meet the Deputy Prime Minister, L.K. Advani, and begin the first-ever formal dialogue between secessionist politicians from Jammu and Kashmir and the Union of India. Whatever course the dialogue takes, the fact that it has come about at all marks a significant breakthrough.

Both sides have displayed considerable flexibility. If the Government of India has not insisted that the APHC first endorse the Constitution of India, the secessionist coalition, in turn, has dropped demands that India recognise that Jammu and Kashmir is a disputed territory. Both sides, most important of all, have made clear their commitment to a negotiated end to the conflict. In this commitment, however, is also contained the real problem: there aren't just two sides to the conflict in Jammu and Kashmir.

Broadly, three major challenges confront the peace process. First, terrorist groups based in Pakistan, including the Hizb-ul-Mujahideen and Lashkar-e-Taiba, have already rejected the dialogue process between India and the APHC. Just on January 14, the Jamait-ul-Mujaheddin warned the APHC chairman, Maulvi Abbas Ansari, and his colleagues "not to kneel at the doorsteps of Delhi", or face being "done to death one by one".

Underlying these threats are some unpleasant realities. Terrorist groups have no desire to see the politicians walk away with the spoils of their war. The fact that such threats are being held out by groups based in Pakistan suggests the military and intelligence establishment in that country continues to keep the terror card in reserve. Speaking to journalists on January 15, the Army chief, General N.C. Vij, noted that the volume of signals traffic from terrorists in Jammu and Kashmir to base stations in Pakistan had not declined. This, he pointed out, meant camps in Pakistan were still operational.

A second major problem is that the APHC has no influence over terrorist groups. Even if the Union Government should, at some stage, decide to meet all the APHC's demands, its minimum condition would be a meaningful reduction in levels of violence within Jammu and Kashmir. Mr. Ansari, and other moderate APHC leaders are, quite obviously, in no position to deliver anything of the kind. Most within the APHC privately concede their best hope is that Pakistan will be compelled by the United States to scale back hostilities; the Srinagar religious leader, Mirwaiz Umar Farooq, even claims to be privy to a detailed American road-map.

Pakistani de-escalation, however, is dependent on that country getting what it wants. It is unlikely that Pakistan would be willing to settle for India's maximum offer, internal autonomy and open borders for Jammu and Kashmir. Some in Pakistan have spoken of a partition of Jammu and Kashmir along its internal communal lines as being a possible solution. Even though this idea may find acceptance with the extreme Hindu Right, it is unlikely any government in New Delhi could sell the idea, American-road map or not. Sooner or later, then, Pakistan may again resume using its covert military options.

Third, the APHC moderates are just one faction of secessionist opinion in Jammu and Kashmir. The rival APHC, led by the Islamist hardliner, Syed Ali Shah Geelani, is bitterly opposed to the dialogue process. Mr. Geelani has succeeded in winning the backing of many supposed centrists. Those who attended the Qul post-burial rites of the Hizb's recently killed Jammu and Kashmir field chief, Ghulam Rasool Dar, were treated to the spectacle of lavish tributes being paid to him by the JKLF second-in-command, Javed Ahmad Mir. JKLF leaders have asserted several times that their supposedly-secular organisation was wiped out by the Islamist Hizb in alliance with Indian security forces.

Underlying the peculiar alliance arrayed against the mainstream APHC is the fact that representation of the secessionist movement in Jammu and Kashmir is deeply contested. None of the APHC leaders, moderate or Islamist, hawks or doves, has actually proved his credentials as mass leader in Jammu and Kashmir. Most have influence in limited pockets of the State, but it is far from clear whether even a united APHC could actually come anywhere near winning an election. Hardliners, thus, have a vested interest in avoiding putting their status to test. Their best option is to sit on the sidelines and incite terrorist groups to snipe at the moderates.

What reasons, then, are there for hope? It has passed largely unnoticed that the APHC negotiators include among them Fazl-ul-Haq Qureshi, a politician with no real connection with the coalition. Mr. Qureshi had been chosen by the pro-dialogue Hizb commander, Abdul Majid Dar, to be his negotiator with the Union Government during the abortive 14-day ceasefire of 2000. The ceasefire was withdrawn by the Hizb central command, and Majid Dar himself was assassinated last year. Mr. Qureshi's inclusion in the negotiation team could signal that the APHC has the blessings of at least one section within the Hizb.

Certainly, there have been several signs of warfare within the Hizb through recent months. The organisation has lost a string of top-level commanders over the last year — a sign, some believe, of a blood-feud sparked off by Majid Dar's killing. Ghulam Rasool Dar was just the latest in a string of successful Indian security force hits against the top echelons of the Hizb. In April, the Border Security Force succeeded in eliminating Rasool Dar's predecessor as military commander, Ghulam Rasool Khan. Rasool Dar's deputy, Pakistani national Saif-ul-Rahman Bajwa, was also subsequently killed by the BSF in November. Rasool Khan's killing would have given considerable satisfaction to the Hizb dissidents, since he had ordered the execution of Majid Dar's closest aide, Farooq Sheikh Mirchal. Rasool Dar and Mirchal were members of the Hizb negotiating team that met the Union Home Secretary, Kamal Pande, during the 2000 ceasefire.

The Hizb supreme commander, Mohammad Yusuf Shah, is now struggling to find a new field commander who can push ahead with the task of intimidating the moderates in the APHC. Shortly before his death, Rasool Dar is believed to have personally met the Jamaat-e-Islami chief, Syed Nazir Ahmad Kashani, to demand that the organisation throw its weight behind Mr. Geelani. Rasool Dar's efforts to swing support for Mr. Geelani had met with little success. Even Mr. Geelani's parent organisation, the Jamaat-e-Islami, refused to support his breakaway APHC faction. Notably, Mr. Kashani chose not attend Rasool Dar's burial rites.

Mr. Shah is also confronted with discipline issues within his organisation. Local Hizb units in some areas, notably Budgam and Anantnag, are believed to have entered into profitable protection rackets involving contractors working on the Qazigund-Baramulla railroad. Unfortunately for the Hizb supreme commander, he is open to criticism for having made deals of his own with the Indian state. Mr. Shah has five sons, not one of whom has joined the jihad in Jammu and Kashmir. One, Wahid Yusuf Shah, studies at the Government Medical College in Srinagar, to which he was granted an almost-unprecedented transfer from a privately-run institution in Jammu.

What could the Hizb's options now be? Both Rasool Dar and the Hizb central division commander, Abdul Rashid Pir, had in recent weeks met senior political leaders from the ruling People's Democratic Party, as well as the Opposition National Conference. One meeting, with a top PDP leader, is believed to have taken place only four days before Rasool Dar was eliminated. Rasool Dar is also believed to have met a senior National Conference leader from central Kashmir with substantial support among the Gujjar community. Although mainstream politicians have expressed enthusiastic support for the APHC-Delhi dialogue, they have an obvious long-term interest in seeing it fail: success, after all, would mean an end to the mainstream politicians' own position.

Both New Delhi and the APHC understand their best chance of success is to spend as long haggling as they possibly can, an art all in South Asia are well accustomed do. Other bazaar bargaining rituals — the slow walking away from the shop, the staged huff, the entreaties to return and talk further — are almost certain to be on display in the weeks and months to come. Dozens of questions — including the actual modalities of the dialogue after today — need to be addressed before substantial issues can be addressed. Fortunately, neither New Delhi nor the APHC moderates seem in a hurry to close a deal — if, indeed, they actually have one in mind.

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Dialogue and its perils