The Hindu : Moving from crisis to nuclear safety

Online edition of India's National Newspaper
Thursday, Feb 05, 2004

Opinion

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Moving from crisis to nuclear safety

By Michael Krepon

Prime Minister Vajpayee and President Musharraf now have a rare opportunity to engineer a shift from recurring crises to nuclear safety.

IN THE 15 years since acquiring nuclear weapons, India and Pakistan have experienced recurring crises. The last five years of this stretch have been the worst. After testing nuclear weapons in 1998, India and Pakistan fought a limited, high-altitude war, and in 2002, their armies spent most of the year ready for battle.

Before outsiders pass judgment on this record of brinksmanship, it is worth recalling that the first 15 years of the nuclear standoff between the United States and the Soviet Union were also very harrowing. The two superpowers looked directly into the nuclear abyss during crises over Berlin and Cuba. After this extremely dangerous passage, Washington and Moscow were finally ready to take steps to reduce nuclear dangers. Only after the Cuban missile crisis did the superpowers agree to establish a "hotline" for secure communication in crisis, and negotiate an end to nuclear testing in the atmosphere. Thereafter, the nuclear rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union was eventually tamed by a long and difficult process of negotiating confidence-building measures, arms control, intrusive verification, and finally, deep cuts in nuclear forces.

Prime Minister Vajpayee and President Musharraf now have a rare opportunity to engineer a similar shift from recurring crises to nuclear safety. How might this transition occur, and what can the U.S. do to help?

Nuclear dangers in South Asia have been linked to Kashmir in several ways. To begin with, there is a significant concentration of Indian and Pakistani forces stationed near the Kashmir divide, where they have regularly engaged in artillery exchanges and minor skirmishes. In addition, Pakistan's Kashmir policy has relied greatly on militant groups to punish and to leverage India. Consequently, escalation control on the subcontinent has depended heavily on two risky assumptions: first, that jihadi groups would refrain from such horrendous acts of violence as to spark a war; and second, that the Indian Government would refrain from attacking Pakistan in response to lesser grievances.

Nuclear safety cannot possibly rest on these two assumptions. Since escalation control and nuclear risk reduction begin along the Kashmir divide, this is a key area for Pakistan and India to focus their efforts. Prospects for nuclear safety are now brighter because there is a ceasefire along the Kashmir divide and because the level of infiltration across this divide by jihadi groups based in Pakistan is way down.

The pursuit of nuclear safety on the subcontinent therefore requires that the Government of Pakistan sustain the current ceasefire and continue to refrain from providing military and intelligence support for infiltration. The parallel pursuit by the Government of India to engage disaffected Kashmiris is also essential — not just to demonstrate respect for their honour and dignity, but also to lay a firm foundation for nuclear stabilisation.

In addition, it is crucial for the Government of Pakistan to change its past practice of holding nuclear risk-reduction measures hostage to a satisfactory resolution of the Kashmir issue. Instead, Pakistan can demonstrate responsible nuclear stewardship by negotiating and properly implementing measures to reduce nuclear dangers. It is equally crucial for the Government of India to demonstrate responsible nuclear stewardship by engaging in substantive and sustained dialogue with Pakistan over the Kashmir issue.

What can the U.S. do to help in this regard? The U.S. can provide more, and more expedient, technical assistance to the Governments of India and Pakistan to secure their borders. In addition, the U.S. can provide financial assistance, if both Governments so desire, for initiatives that provide humanitarian, developmental, and other assistance to those who have greatly suffered over the past 15 years of violence. This would require a change in Indian Government policy, which is now hypersensitive to U.S. humanitarian and developmental assistance to Jammu and Kashmir. The U.S. can also provide technical assistance, if the Governments of India and Pakistan so desire, to monitor agreements they might choose to reach regarding the pullback of conventional military equipment, forces, and training facilities away from the Kashmir divide.

Nuclear risk reduction begins, but certainly does not end, in Kashmir. The first act of nuclear terrorism will be a momentously bad event. Even though such an act might produce relatively few casualties, it could disable a commercial centre and generate panic. The crossing of this nuclear threshold is also likely to trigger copycatting. In tense regions like South Asia, the detonation of a "dirty bomb" could scuttle a peace process and generate severe pressures for escalation.

Material that can be used to make dirty bombs resides in many poorly guarded hospitals and civilian research labs in India and Pakistan. These facilities are very susceptible to "insider" threats, such as a security guard or a hospital worker who is sympathetic to an extremist group and who aids in the theft of this material. This is not a hypothetical or trumped-up threat: according to public reports, a significant theft of radiological material occurred last August at a research lab in Jharkhand.

The U.S. is also very vulnerable to threats of nuclear terrorism. India, Pakistan and the U.S. have common interests to cooperate to prevent such acts. One way for the U.S. to help would be to expand the scope of its cooperative threat reduction programmes to safeguard dangerous materials that could be used for nuclear terrorism. This is not being done sufficiently in the U.S. or in India and Pakistan. While upgrading security at its non-military and non-atomic energy-related facilities, the U.S. could provide Pakistan and India with similar help if they so desire. New Delhi and Islamabad might see the wisdom of cooperating with Washington for security upgrades at facilities that have no role in national security, but nonetheless could become the target of nuclear terrorists.

The U.S. could also offer wide-ranging technical assistance to India and Pakistan to guard against the entry of radiological materials at border crossings and maritime ports of entry. U.S. initiatives along these lines are now being carried out at home and in key entry and exit points in the former Soviet Union. Nuclear smuggling pathways, like the old silk routes, make their way from Central Asia toward the subcontinent. Security against illicit entry of dangerous materials lies in having multiple barriers consisting of well-trained and well-equipped border and customs guards. The chances of interception can be increased if border monitoring in the former Soviet Union is reinforced with U.S. technical assistance to improve border monitoring in India and Pakistan.

Aside from Kashmir and nuclear terrorism, what else could be done to reduce nuclear dangers on the subcontinent and to reinforce positive momentum in India Pakistan talks?

Experts in both countries have thought a great deal about nuclear risk-reduction measures that could be negotiated and implemented quickly, once political conditions permit. My sense is that much could be accomplished in this regard if, as I hope, Pakistan stops holding these measures hostage to a Kashmir settlement, and if India engages Pakistan and dissident elements in Kashmir on a serious and sustained basis.

More specifically, government officials and non-governmental analysts in South Asia have indicated that they can demonstrate responsible nuclear stewardship by establishing nuclear risk reduction centres. There is also a pressing need to negotiate and properly implement measures to reduce risks associated with ballistic missile flight tests, particularly during periods of crisis. Many other items could be added to this minimal list.

Looking further ahead, much could be gained by in-depth discussions of nuclear doctrine, nuclear signalling in crisis, and a broader range of stabilisation measures. In past crises, Indian and Pakistani leaders have felt the need to convey messages to audiences at home, across the border, and abroad, particularly the U.S. It is very hard to convey consistent messages to all three audiences in a severe crisis. This can lead to mixed signals and confusion. Confusion can be compounded if India and Pakistan attach different meanings to the terms they use to address each other in a crisis, and if they do not have the means or the desire to allow transparency of steps taken to increase nuclear readiness during a crisis.

These consultative discussions, which were anticipated at the Lahore summit and which now might finally be possible, cannot be completed quickly. In the meantime, the best insurance policies to reduce nuclear dangers on the subcontinent are improved bilateral relations and the avoidance of another crisis. In addition, improved command and control, the proper implementation of negotiated nuclear risk-reduction measures, and the adoption of preventive measures against nuclear terrorism deserve the highest priority.

(Michael Krepon is founding president of the Henry L. Stimson Center and co-editor of `Nuclear Risk Reduction in South Asia'. He delivered these remarks before the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee on January 28.)

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