The Hindu : India determined to contribute to new nuclear order

Online edition of India's National Newspaper
Thursday, Feb 19, 2004

Opinion

Opinion - News Analysis

India determined to contribute to new nuclear order

By C. Raja Mohan

NEW DELHI, FEB. 18. While India has cautiously welcomed the seven-point nuclear agenda unveiled by the United States President, George W. Bush, last week, concrete cooperation with the U.S. awaits many clarifications from Washington.

As a new nuclear order begins to take shape in response to revelations about Pakistan's proliferation activity, India is determined to contribute. Exactly four decades ago this year, shocked by China's first nuclear weapon test in October 1964, India initiated the international debate on non-proliferation.

But the outcome of that negotiation, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), did not address India's concerns and New Delhi has remained an outsider. India was never impressed with the NPT. But India is not gloating today over its demise for, it always shared the objective of non-proliferation. And India's record shows.

India was informed of the broad thrust of the Bush initiative in advance and its officials have pored over the seven-point agenda outlined by Mr. Bush. On the face of it, India should have few difficulties with the U.S. formulations. But the devil is in the detail.

India's positive response last week to the Bush initiative was presented in general terms without going into the specifics. It highlighted the inadequacy of the present regime, supported the principle of effective non-proliferation and called for consultations on the new Bush initiative.

The first proposal from Mr. Bush relates to the expansion of the Proliferation Security Initiative that was initiated last year and has steadily gained international support. The PSI calls for interdiction of international traffic in sensitive nuclear materials through cooperative action by the naval and air forces of friendly nations.

Mr. Bush wants to extend the lessons from the war on terrorism by drawing in law enforcement agencies to crack down on networks of nuclear smuggling of the type developed by Dr. A.Q. Khan in Pakistan.

Until now, India has neither criticised nor endorsed the PSI. As the victim of clandestine nuclear flows between Pakistan and North Korea, India understands the importance of addressing the challenge of international traffic in sensitive materials.

New Delhi, like Beijing which has now agreed to discuss the PSI with the U.S., wants clarity on the procedures to be adopted and the decision-making in the PSI coalition on whom and when to interdict.

The U.S. is aware of the vital role that the Indian Navy could play in monitoring and interdicting international commercial traffic in the Indian Ocean region. But questions remain to be addressed on the terms and conditions under which India could become a part of the PSI, either formally or informally. India is unlikely to object to the second Bush proposal calling for a United Nations Security Council Resolution criminalising proliferation and strengthening export controls and tightening security over sensitive materials.

With full governmental control over all nuclear-related activity, New Delhi has a record much better than that of many nations in Europe in preventing proliferation. Dr. Khan could not have acquired nuclear weapons for Pakistan and spread the technology around without active cooperation from many companies in Europe.

Third, on dismantling weapons programmes in problem countries and retraining personnel there to civilian research, India with its experience and technological capability could play a useful role.

The fourth proposal relates to a ban on selling "enrichment and reprocessing equipment and technologies to any state that does not already possess full-scale functioning enrichment and reprocessing plants."

India will not be affected by this ban since it already has a fully developed nuclear fuel cycle, including enrichment and reprocessing. More important, operational support from India, which is a potential exporter of these technologies, is critical in making the ban stick.

The fifth proposal from Mr. Bush is trickier. He demands that "only states that have signed the Additional Protocol be allowed to import equipment for their civilian nuclear programmes."

The Additional Protocol designed by the International Atomic Energy Agency applies tighter safeguards on the national nuclear programmes. At the first cut, this could be seen as affecting India's search for international cooperation in producing nuclear electricity.

But there may be options for India to address the issue as a nuclear weapon state and bring its many non-military nuclear facilities under international inspection.

The Prime Minister, Atal Bihari Vajpayee, had made such an offer in his address to the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre in Trombay at the end of 2002.

India could easily work with the U.S. on the last two proposals on reforming the IAEA. India has a permanent seat on the Board of Governors of the IAEA.

In responding positively to the Bush initiative, New Delhi has signalled its intent to be a partner in developing more nuclear rules. It is up to Washington to differentiate between the non-proliferation policies of India and Pakistan and acknowledge New Delhi's role as an equal partner in shaping the new nuclear order.

While there is new common ground with the U.S., India cannot articulate its nuclear policy merely as a response to American initiatives. India needs to develop a comprehensive approach, on its own, to the new challenges from the spread of nuclear weapons and call for a global debate.

(Concluded)

Printer friendly page
Send this article to Friends by E-Mail

Opinion

News Update

Stories in this Section

A FAIR BEGINNING

OVER TO BANGALORE

Women and the law

The subsidy-tariff tangle

India determined to contribute to new nuclear order