The Hindu : Powell talks: the nuclear agenda

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Monday, Mar 15, 2004

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Powell talks: the nuclear agenda

By C. Raja Mohan

LONDON, MARCH 14. In the talks this week with the visiting U.S. Secretary of State, Colin Powell, India will have an opportunity to discuss two important dimensions of the A.Q. Khan affair that has revealed in graphic detail the sources of worldwide nuclear proliferation in Pakistan.

The first relates to the current diplomacy between Washington and Islamabad on managing the implications of the Khan affair. The other is about the longer-term steps to deal with the privatisation and globalisation of nuclear commerce.

On the American nuclear policy towards Pakistan, Mr. Powell has his task cut out in breaking through the fog of cynicism that has enveloped New Delhi. India has chosen to remain silent on the Khan episode. It certainly did not want to complicate matters for either the Bush Administration or the Pakistan President, Pervez Musharraf. That does not mean India does not want to pose some searching questions to Mr. Powell.

Public proclamations from Washington exonerating Gen. Musharraf and the Pakistan Government from any involvement in the smuggling of nuclear material worldwide convince no one in New Delhi.

India understands the American need to save Gen. Musharraf's face in order that it meets its nuclear objectives in Pakistan. But it cannot fathom the American reluctance to take India into confidence about its nuclear goals in Pakistan and how it plans to achieve them. Mr. Powell will hopefully prevent this gap in communication from developing into a major misunderstanding.

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India shares the declared American objective of rolling up the nuclear smuggling network in Pakistan. But is the U.S. prepared to go the full distance? India has reasons to worry about the nature of the operational objectives of American diplomacy in Pakistan. New Delhi and Washington are aware that there are two sides to the nuclear black market developed with such clinical efficiency by Khan. One aspect, which has raised worldwide concerns, is the sale of nuclear technology for personal or policy gain by Khan and the establishment in Pakistan. The other and the original objective of Khan was to feed the programmes for the production of weapons of mass destruction in Pakistan.

The U.S. says it wants to pressure Pakistan into winding up the nuclear smuggling ring developed by Khan. But Pakistan is unlikely to roll back a system that, in effect, is a lifeline for its own nuclear and missile programmes.

A disconcerting possibility that India might have to take into account is that Washington might choose to wink at Pakistan's clandestine imports in return for a no-exports policy. Such a halfway house might seem to address American concerns but will leave India cold.

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Equally important is the new agenda unveiled by U.S. President George W. Bush last month on strengthening the non-proliferation regime. India, which used to be a strong critic of the global nuclear order, has cautiously welcomed the Bush package and signalled its willingness to discuss the seven proposals in it.

The positive Indian message was reinforced last week by the External Affairs Minister, Yashwant Sinha, in his speech at the India Today conclave. Although not a member of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, Mr. Sinha declared, India supports its broad objectives.

He also underlined the fact that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is a major security threat for India. This might provide a realistic basis for further negotiation with the U.S. on reforming the global nuclear order. India and the U.S. have said they are partners in preventing non-proliferation. It remains to be seen if this sentiment is translated into a productive dialogue.

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The U.S. has made a symbolic move this month to underwrite its commitment to non-proliferation. The U.S. Senate a few days ago ratified the Additional Protocol of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The Additional Protocol tightens the IAEA procedures for inspection of nuclear facilities around the world.

As a nuclear weapons state, the U.S. is under no obligation to subject its own civilian facilities to international inspection. Under pressure from the non-nuclear countries a few years ago, the U.S. decided to make this gesture. The U.S. now has taken one more step.

It is not that the IAEA would want to waste its limited resources on inspecting the civilian facilities in the U.S. The U.S. Senate, nevertheless, has reserved the right to withdraw from the Additional Protocol if its national security interests were to be threatened by the IAEA inspections.

Could India do the same? There has been an interesting debate within the Government over the last few weeks on the various legal aspects of signing the Additional Protocol without giving up its nuclear weapon capabilities. The Additional Protocol is only a model agreement that can be the basis of separate agreements between states in possession of nuclear weapons and the IAEA.

India has one of the largest unsafeguarded civilian nuclear programmes in the world. Any decision by India to put its civilian nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards would be welcomed as an important gain for the global non-proliferation regime and should form an important component of the nuclear dialogue with Secretary Powell.

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Powell talks: the nuclear agenda