The Hindu : India and the U.S.-Pakistan alliance

Online edition of India's National Newspaper
Friday, Mar 26, 2004

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India and the U.S.-Pakistan alliance

By C. Raja Mohan

New Delhi needs to develop a credible strategy to influence the American domestic debate on the implications of designating Pakistan a major non-NATO ally.

THE TIMING and the style of the announcement by the United States Secretary of State, Colin Powell, last week to designate Pakistan a "major non-NATO ally" have broken the principle of "no-surprises" that has operated between New Delhi and Washington in the recent period. While this has upset India and undermined the mutual trust and confidence developed so painstakingly over some years, New Delhi's focus must remain riveted on the nature of the political bargain between Washington and Islamabad that underlies the American decision and its consequences for regional stability.

The U.S. President, George W. Bush, finds himself in an early and unexpected tight race for the White House with Senator John Kerry. With the rationale for the Iraq war now being closely questioned and the failure to finish the hunt for Al-Qaeda becoming an issue, Mr. Bush desperately needs a big "success" in Afghanistan. This political gift in an election year can only come from Pervez Musharraf, the President of Pakistan.

The General has agreed to mount unprecedented military operations in the South Waziristan tribal agency bordering Afghanistan. In return for extending the American war on terrorism on to Pakistan's soil, Gen. Musharraf would naturally want favours. As he plans to shed his uniform at the end of the year and still remain in effective control of Pakistan, Gen. Musharraf needs to shore up his position in the armed forces. The U.S., we can infer, has chosen to reward Gen. Musharraf personally and also show the Pakistani Army the benefits of pursuing American political objectives in Afghanistan. Is this a temporary marriage of convenience, or a lasting arrangement? Would it involve substantive transfers of military equipment to Pakistan? How would it influence the Indian security calculus?

The answers to these questions cannot be derived from the formal statements being issued by U.S. officials. They will depend on further bargaining between Washington and Islamabad and how the hunt for Al-Qaeda unfolds. Pakistan can be expected to string out these operations and extract maximum possible gains from the Bush administration, whose need to showcase the capture of a major Al-Qaeda leader would only increase with every passing week. There is no doubt that a new phase has just begun in the complex triangular relationship among Washington, Islamabad and New Delhi.

India has three important interests to protect at this time. The first is to limit American arms sales to Pakistan to a modest level. The second is to ensure that Pakistan is not emboldened by the new alliance with the U.S. to revive its support to cross-border terrorism once summer begins in Jammu and Kashmir. The third is to ensure forward movement on the priority items in the bilateral agenda with Washington.

On the question of U.S. arms sales to Islamabad, India knows it cannot prevent all external inputs into the natural cycle of military modernisation that must soon take place in Pakistan. India is also aware that given the current nuclear balance in the subcontinent, minor variations in the conventional military balance do not have the kind of impact they used to in the past. India also has reason to be confident that its economic resources today outstrip those of Pakistan by a big margin and it can more than match American arms supplies to Pakistan.

Within this broad framework, however, India has every reason to argue in Washington that while it is prepared to live with a modest military modernisation of Pakistan, it will not accept arms transfers that threaten its security. India will also have to underline the dangers of emphasising military assistance to Pakistan at a time when the crying need in that country is for rapid economic modernisation and massive social sector reforms.

More important for India is the impact of designating Pakistan a major non-NATO ally on the current delicately poised peace process in the subcontinent. Given the desperate American need for Pakistani cooperation in the war against Al-Qaeda, it is not inconceivable that the U.S. will lose its stomach for pressing Pakistan against supporting cross-border terrorism in India. The U.S. might continue to verbally support the notion that there can be no double standards in the war against terrorism. But it is entirely possible that the Pakistani military establishment might miscalculate that the alliance with the U.S. gives it the room to renew its support to terrorism on some pretext or the other.

That will be catastrophic for the peace process now under way between India and Pakistan. In his remarks to the India Today Conclave in the capital a few days ago, Gen. Musharraf suggested that the pause in Pakistani support to terrorism is a tactical one. His attempts to break out of the broad framework that was agreed during the Prime Minister, Atal Bihari Vajpayee's visit to Islamabad in January have already drawn strong comments from the Indian side. Gen. Musharraf's obsessive emphasis on Kashmir as the "core issue" with India and the renewed attempt to make the State a tripartite issue are in clear violation of the joint statement issued in Islamabad.

Equally disconcerting is the hint in Gen. Musharraf's statement that things could slide back to square one in Jammu and Kashmir if Pakistan does not gain satisfaction from the talks with India scheduled from May/June. An assessment, mistaken or otherwise, in Pakistan that the external environment for the peace process has shifted in favour of Islamabad, could turn out to be disastrous. It is in that context the American move to designate Pakistan a major non-NATO ally is singularly ill timed.

For years now, the U.S. has sought to promote a peace process between India and Pakistan. Just when it seemed poised for a take-off, the Bush administration has taken a step that could undermine it. India can and must warn the U.S. about the dangers of its new policy towards the region. Whether its arguments are heard in Washington or not, India will now have to fully prepare itself for a possible disruption of the peace process after the summer months. It will have to develop the necessary military options to deal with renewed terrorism from Pakistan. After years of deep distrust about the American approach to problems between India and Pakistan, New Delhi was just beginning to feel comfortable with the notion that the U.S. could in fact be a facilitator in this incipient peace process. If it appears to tilt in favour of Pakistan one more time, the U.S. will have squandered all leverage in India as an honest broker.

Finally, the U.S. has compounded the problem by offering India, as an after thought, the similar status of a "major non-NATO ally.". New Delhi would not want to compete with Pakistan for political equivalence in Washington. India has its own agenda of bilateral relations with the U.S. But American assertions that it will pursue independent relations with India and Pakistan and that they do not constitute a zero sum game are beginning to draw a yawn in New Delhi. There is growing unease in the South Block that the agenda already agreed with the White House is beginning to lose steam. American bureaucracy is dragging its feet in the implementation of the "next steps in strategic partnership" that were outlined with some fanfare in January by Mr. Bush and Mr. Vajpayee. Under this agreement, the U.S. was to ease Indian access to high technologies in return for the Indian commitment to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction.

While the U.S. seems eager to forgive Pakistan's transgressions on the non-proliferation front and bestow it with favours, it finds many excuses in not moving forward on the promise of liberalising the transfer of advanced technologies to India. Concerns about regional stability and the alleged implications for Indo-Pakistan military balance are being used in Washington to slow down bilateral cooperation in missile defence that had been agreed in the past. Demonstrating quick and tangible progress on the bilateral agenda has now become more urgent than ever for the U.S. to retain some political credibility in New Delhi.

Despite its preoccupation with the elections, the Government must find ways to push this three-point agenda in the coming weeks with Washington. Given the uncomfortable timing of the U.S. decision to formally revive the alliance with Pakistan, the Government will be tempted to posture for domestic consumption. That will not help manage the potentially significant consequences of the American move. New Delhi needs to clearly signal its concerns to the Bush administration and develop a credible strategy to influence the American domestic debate on the implications of designating Pakistan a major non-NATO ally.

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