The Hindu : A year under the yoke

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Sunday, Mar 28, 2004

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A year under the yoke

The Iraqis remain deeply suspicious of the occupiers and their motives, says Atul Aneja.

A YEAR after the occupation of Iraq, Shias and Sunnis are agreed on one thing: the Americans must leave. Faced with a determined Iraqi resistance, the United States is planning to hand over internal security duties to a handpicked regime and a hastily-raised local police force, while holding on to power. But the American efforts are unlikely to pay off. Violence and instability look set to continue in Iraq.

Vast sections of Iraqis believe the U.S. invaded their country to control their oil but that this was not the only reason. Many in the Iraqi intelligentsia believe the U.S. is in Iraq to carve out and control a new strategic corridor in the heart of West Asia. With neighbouring Jordan already a faithful ally, they believe the American occupiers plan to dominate a vital stretch of territory that begins from Israel and ends at Iraq's borders with Iran, Syria, Saudi Arabia and Turkey along a geographically contiguous zone. If America consolidates power, they fear, it would be well positioned to influence events in the neighbouring countries as a possible stage two of redefining the political order in the region.

The Iraqis, who value their independence, find these imperial aspirations unacceptable. This goes for both the Shia community and the minority Sunnis. Despite being in a majority — about 62 per cent — the Shias have been denied the opportunity to rule Baghdad for 400 years. For many of them, Saddam Hussein was an impediment to the fulfilment of their aspirations. Though some Shias held high positions in the Saddam regime, the Sunnis (who constitute 30 per cent of the population) dominated, especially tribes such as Tikritis and Shamars. With the exit of Saddam Hussein, a key hurdle to Shia political dominance disappeared. But it brought in another obstacle — the U.S., which has been seeking to entrench itself in the country.

The Shias have adopted a three-pronged approach to achieve their goals over the year. Hoping to see the back of the Americans through peaceful means, they have participated in the attempt to resurrect a Washington-friendly political dispensation. Not surprisingly, the Shias are prominently represented on the U.S.-appointed Governing Council and are partners in negotiations on Iraq's post-war future. While engaging the Americans, they have nevertheless kept their firepower intact. The Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), a key Shia organisation, has the Badr Corps a well-armed militia that keeps a low profile. Besides, Muqtada Sadr, a firebrand Shia cleric, has a militia of his own.

The Shias also wish to ward off a civil war, where the well-armed Sunnis would be their adversaries. Consequently, they have been networking with Sunni leaders such as Ahmad Al Qubasy, a former professor of Islamic Studies at Baghdad University.

Shias look to the Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani, the reclusive cleric who resides in the holy city of Najaf, for guidance. He is hence considered one of the most powerful men in Iraq. Ayatollah Sistani has so far played his cards skilfully. Keen on an American exit, he has been advocating that the United Nations, and not the Americans, play a central role in ushering in Iraq's transition to self-rule. He has also voiced his opposition to a clause in the Iraqi interim constitution, which seeks to impose limitations on the Shias' powers. Disregarding the majority Shia opinion, the clause, when taken to its logical conclusion, will allow the Kurds or Sunnis to veto a permanent constitution.

The Sunnis are also deeply resentful of the American presence. One of the biggest blunders committed by the American occupiers was the ill-conceived purge of suspected Baa'thists from Iraqi institutions. The army was disbanded, thousands of trained fighters lost their jobs and became potential recruits for the Iraqi resistance. Many more, such as employees and technocrats of the Iraqi oil industry, were sacked overnight, swelling the ranks of a growing army of the unemployed and the dispossessed. Many of these oil workers subsequently became advisers to the Iraqi guerrillas who were undertaking missions to damage oil pipelines. Despite feverish efforts by the Americans, the Iraqi oil industry is yet to revive to its pre-war level.

While the Iraqi resistance has been most intense in places such as Baghdad, Fallujah, Baquba and Tikrit, it has spread beyond what is called the Sunni triangle of Central Iraq. Mosul in the north has become a major flashpoint of guerrilla warfare and the oil city of Kirkuk has also seen frequent attacks on American forces. The capture of Saddam Hussein in December, despite all its propaganda mileage, has done little to stem the unabated Iraqi resistance, which has so far claimed nearly 600 American lives. And it has become a major player in influencing the course of the presidential elections in the U.S.

The Iraqi resistance has so far thwarted American attempts to build institutions that would allow them to transfer power to a pro-American transitional government. The resistance has been especially severe on Iraqi policemen recruited by the Americans as they are seen as collaborators. So far 350 policemen have been killed.

Besides the Iraqis, there are powerful external forces that want the Americans out of Iraq. Iran for example. With U.S. forces already present in Afghanistan to its east and in most countries of the Persian Gulf, Iran was dismayed to see American troops pouring into Iraq, along its western borders. Consequently, it has emerged as a prominent player in Iraq's domestic scene and has operated mainly through the Shia community. Iran's links with the SCIRI and the Badr Corps are well known. The SCIRI leader, Mohammad Baqr Al Hakim, was in exile in Iran for nearly 21 years, before returning to Najaf. Kazim al-Husseini al-Hairi, the cleric who is known to have considerable influence over Muqtada Sadr, resides in Qom, the centre of Shia learning in Iran.

Even Ayatollah Sistani is of Iranian descent, though few believe that the Iranians exercise any tangible influence over him. In Sadr, a Shia suburb in the Baghdad, there are posters that support the Hizbollah — the powerful Lebanese Shia militia that is supported by Iran and Syria. But there is no confirmation of the Hizbollah having made inroads into Iraq. A year of U.S. occupation has seen the Al-Qaeda network acquire prominence in Iraq. There was a double suicide bombing in Kurdish city of Irbil on February 1, in which 109 people were killed. An estimated 181 people died when a series of bombs exploded nearly simultaneously during a procession marking the Shia religious ceremony of Ashura in Karbala and outside a mosque packed with worshippers in Baghdad earlier this month. The Americans have attributed these bombings to Abu Musab al Zarqawi, an Al-Qaeda operative of Jordanian origin. Some Iraqis do believe that the Karbala bombings were the handiwork of the "Wahabbis," a highly conservative militant Sunni sect that is well represented in Al-Qaeda. But most Iraqis hold the Americans responsible for the latest series of attacks.

In the Baghdad street, the dominant view is that the Americans and the Israelis have a hidden agenda of fomenting a civil war among the Sunnis, the Shias and the Kurds which will result in the trifurcation of Iraq into a oil rich north and south, with the Sunnis bottled in a separate, resourceless enclave of central Iraq.

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