The Hindu : National / Elections 2004 : `Ticket splitting' is a serious possibility

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Monday, Apr 05, 2004

National

National - Elections 2004

`Ticket splitting' is a serious possibility

While the Lok Sabha elections may be reduced to a direct contest between the Congress and the BJP, the Assembly polls may turn out to be different, writes Yogendra Yadav

In Karnataka, the BJP has been knocking on the doors of power for well over a decade now. Karnataka was the first State in south India where the BJP achieved a breakthrough, way back in the 1991 Lok Sabha elections. Since then it has stagnated, if not retreated, much to the frustration of its national leadership. This time the party is not taking any chances and is making an all-out bid for power in the State Assembly elections; or at least for a clear dominance in the Lok Sabha contest in the State. If this final assault succeeds, it may lead to long-term changes in the State's politics, paving the way for a two-party system. If the assault does not succeed, it may be a serious setback to the BJP and can put the party behind by several years.

The Congress and the Janata Dal have successfully kept the BJP at bay during this period. Although the BJP won only 4 Lok Sabha seats in the 1991 election, it secured 29 per cent of the votes in the State, pushing the Janata Dal to third place. Then came the Assembly elections of 1994, when the Janata Dal came back to power and the BJP took the second place with 40 seats, pushing the Congress to third spot. The Lok Sabha elections in 1996 echoed the previous Assembly elections, as the JD took 16 seats and the BJP failed to push home its advantage. Realising that it was stagnating, the BJP allied with Ramakrishna Hegde's Lok Shakti in the 1998 Lok Sabha election and marginally improved its position. Yet the expanded alliance proved to be a liability in the Lok Sabha and Assembly elections of 1999 as the Congress captured power this time winning 18 seats in the Lok Sabha and 132 in the Assembly. The BJP and the JD (U) did pick the remaining 10 Lok Sabha seats and finished second in the Assembly, but they knew that they had messed up again.

An organisational failure, coupled with an inability to understand the social chemistry of the State, has prevented the BJP from building on its early success. Karnataka was one the last States to see the end of the one-party dominance of the Congress and one of the few States where the rainbow coalition woven by the Congress in the 1970s has not become politically irrelevant. Through the 1990s, the Congress has continued to be the overwhelming choice of the Dalits, Muslims and the OBCs, plus the poor, cutting across the caste divide. The solid support from these sections could be combined with support from one of the dominant peasant castes to manufacture a majority. The Janata Dal, on the other hand, drew upon a strong base among the dominant peasant castes and combined it with some support from the OBCs and the Dalits. The BJP made its entry by focussing on the upper castes and then the Lingayats.

The social map of voting behaviour was reflected in the geographical division of votes. The Congress has been quite evenly spread through the four political regions of the State. The Janata Dal always drew much of its success from the old Mysore region dominated by the Vokkaligas. The split in the Janata Dal has meant that the former Prime Minister, Deve Gowda's JD (S), does not get much support from north Karnataka. The BJP's stronghold has been coastal Karnataka, where the social equations are very different from the rest of Karnataka. It subsequently targeted the two regions of northern Karnataka, Hyderabad-Karnataka and Bombay Karnataka, where its votes have registered an increase since 1991. As yet it is not clear if the BJP has a strategy to win the Vokkaligas in the old Mysore region.

This time the BJP has come up with a strategy to address many of its known weaknesses. The leadership vacuum has been addressed by changing the State party president, shifting the former Union Minister Ananth Kumar to take over the State party and by inducing a series of defections. The entry of the former Chief Minister, S. Bangarappa, a prominent figure from the OBC community, into the BJP is bound to help it. Another prize catch for the BJP is the popular former Bangalore police chief, H. T. Sangliana, a Christian from the Northeast. The BJP is also trying hard to capture the Lingayat votes after the demise of Mr. Hegde, who though not a Lingayat, wielded considerable influence in the community. The State has witnessed a marked rise in communal temperature, with the Sangh Parivar actively stoking it. The BJP is likely to be the beneficiary of this rise in communal feeling. The evidence from recent surveys shows that the BJP can expect overwhelming support from the upper castes, as well as the Lingayats. Its vote share among the OBCs has also shown a clear upward trend and points to the success of the strategy of incorporating OBC leaders.

The Congress depends on largely on its Chief Minister to win this election for it. The Chief Minister, S. M. Krishna has managed to neutralise most of his rivals. The Congress suffers from a lesser degree of factionalism than the BJP, which till recently suffered defections and serious infighting, especially after the 1999 elections. The status of Bangalore as an IT city has helped boost Mr. Krishna's image as a dynamic and modern Chief Minister. Mr. Krishna has changed his Assembly constituency from his home turf, Maddur in Mandya district, to Chamarajpet in Bangalore city. But it is not clear how much this will help him outside the urban areas. The State Government's handling of the severe drought in most districts has left a lot to be desired and given the BJP an election plank. The Congress Government has not covered itself with glory in trying to capture the sandalwood smuggler Veerappan or in dealing effectively with the emerging naxalite problem in the forest areas of the State. Mr. Krishna may also face some serious questions on the handling of the Cauvery water dispute with Tamil Nadu. Survey evidence shows that while the Dalits and the Muslims continue to be with the Congress, it is not doing very well among the OBCs and the Vokkaligas.

The third player in the race is the JD (S) led by Mr. Gowda. A major player in Karnataka politics for nearly two decades, the party was nearly decimated in the 1999 elections, with Mr. Gowda himself being defeated in the Lok Sabha elections. Mr. Gowda did win a subsequent by-election from Kanakapura, but that was due to the helping hand extended by the JD (U). The JD has a reputation in Karnataka of rising from the ashes. But this time it is going to be more difficult than ever before. The Janata family stands fragmented and absorbed by the Congress and the BJP. With the death of Mr. Hegde and the former Chief Minister, J. H. Patel, the JD (U) found itself leaderless, but Mr. Gowda could not capitalise on this. Recently a bulk of the JD (U) MLAs crossed over to the Congress and the rump JD (U) has entered into a coalition with the BJP on less than respectable terms. The JD (S) is clearly unable to recreate the social coalition of the Janata Dal and remains Mr. Gowda's political faction with dwindling support among the Vokkaligas in old Mysore. In fact, the survey evidence points to a three-way split of the Vokkaliga vote, with Mr. Gowda getting only one-third of this traditional vote bank.

In the Lok Sabha elections, the contest may well be reduced to a direct contest between the Congress and the BJP. The contest at the Assembly level may turn out to be different. Karnataka has a history of `ticket splitting,' with voters changing their preferences from Lok Sabha to the Assembly elections. The famous instance of Mr. Hegde reversing a humiliating defeat in the 1984 Lok Sabha election by winning the mid-term Assembly poll within a few months is a political legend in Karnataka. In the last elections too, the Karnataka voters displayed divergent preferences in the Lok Sabha and the Assembly elections. The BJP and its allies did much worse in the Assembly elections. The CSDS survey showed then that the Congress could retain nearly 79 per cent of its Lok Sabha votes at the Assembly level. The retention rate of its main rival, the BJP- Janata Dal (United) alliance was much lower at 68 per cent. Ticket splitting is a serious possibility this time too. The polls forecast a better show for the BJP at the Lok Sabha level than at the Assembly level. Earlier the Congress used to benefit from ticket splitting at the national level, now its advantage lies at the State level.

The electoral equations also favour the Congress in the Assembly elections. If we start with the seat position in 1999, a modest swing of 2 per cent against the Congress will split the Lok Sabha seats from the State equally between itself and the NDA. At the Assembly level, however, a swing of 2 per cent against the Congress will leave it only 5 seats short of a majority with the BJP considerably behind. The BJP and its allies will need a swing of 8 per cent against the Congress to come close to forming the Government. The JD (S) may continue to be a player at the State level and benefit from the anti-Congress vote in the southern region. If it improves upon its tally of 10 in the last Assembly election, it may well be a critical bloc in the event of a hung Assembly.