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Tuesday, Apr 06, 2004

Opinion

Opinion - Leader Page Articles

Old habits die hard?

By Amit Baruah

Pakistani and Indian leaders would be best advised to refrain from making public comments on bilateral issues as India heads for elections.

IS THE Pakistan President, Pervez Musharraf, back to his old ways on Kashmir? What does one make of the General's recent statement that he would not be a party to the peace process if there was no progress on Kashmir when Foreign Secretariesand Foreign Ministers of the two countries are scheduled to meet in July-August? No deadline may have been set for the process, but the change in the General's tone and tenor is evident.

Rhetoric and point-scoring were missing from the India-Pakistan agenda after the January 6 joint press statement issued by the two countries following the Islamabad meeting between Gen. Musharraf and the Prime Minister, Atal Bihari Vajpayee. The situation seems to have changed since January. Senior Indian officials said that there had been no effort on the part of New Delhi at the time to suggest that the joint press statement was a success for India. They referred to a key paragraph in the statement that speaks of a composite dialogue leading to the peaceful settlement of "all bilateral issues," including Jammu and Kashmir, to the satisfaction of both sides. The Pakistani concession that Kashmir was one of the bilateral issues was seen as significant by New Delhi.

Restraint on rhetoric seems to have been abandoned with Gen. Musharraf returning to his `Kashmir-first' stance that had upset India in the past. While many believe that he is "under pressure" at home, it would appear that the Pakistani position is related to the recent positive trend in its relations with the United States.

Pakistan, which is possibly aware that it cannot back terrorism in Kashmir while fighting the Al-Qaeda at home, seemed to have made a break from the past when it came to defining its relationship with India.

The success of the India-Pakistan "back channel," which is manned by senior, trusted officials on both sides, suggested a new beginning by both sides and was mirrored in the ease with which the joint declaration was issued by SAARC leaders in Islamabad. The U.S. decision to give Pakistan the status of a major non-NATO ally, and its recent remark that Islamabad was the most trusted ally in the war against terrorism, have certainly come as a boost to Gen. Musharraf and Islamabad.

As for the "why" behind Gen. Musharraf's soft approach towards India in January, it was because Pakistan, under pressure from the U.S. on the Abdul Qadeer Khan affair (clandestine sale of nuclear weapons' components), felt that a softer approach would be in its tactical interest. Now that the U.S. has come to accept the Khan pardon and the overall Pakistani position in public, Gen. Musharraf feels comfortable reverting to his old, known position on Kashmir.

Such a hypothesis suggests that Pakistan's control over its nuclear assets was, in the short term, far more important than singing the old raga of Kashmir. The General, of course, was aware that improvisation did not prevent him from returning to the basic composition on Kashmir.

In an interview to Ahmed Rashid of the Far Eastern Economic Review, the U.S. Deputy Defence Secretary, Paul Wolfowitz, said about the Khan pardon: "We feel it gives us more leverage ... the international community is prepared to accept his [Gen. Musharraf's] pardon of A.Q. Khan for all [that] he has done, but it's clearly an IOU that, in return for that, there has to be a full accounting of what has happened."

Mr. Wolfowitz said that the Pakistan military was cooperating in getting at the Al-Qaeda, but not in hunting down the Taliban. The "leverage" that Mr. Wolfowitz referred to is not necessarily restricted to Mr. Khan's accountability, but to greater Pakistani cooperation in tackling the Taliban in the border areas of Pakistan and Afghanistan.

So, the U.S. wants "more" from Gen. Musharraf. In return, Gen. Powell said last month that no decision had been taken on military sales to Pakistan, including F-16 aircraft. Pakistan is certainly out of the September 11, 2001, doghouse and is winning brownie points from the U.S.

Washington's "strategic partnership" with India notwithstanding, Pakistan now feels that the U.S. will give a fair hearing to Islamabad's position on Kashmir and other issues relating to India. This can only strengthen the Pakistani leader's position when it comes to dealing with India.

When India begins dealing with Pakistan after the elections, it may find Islamabad exerting pressure on New Delhi once again to "give something" on Kashmir. While both Gen. Musharraf and Mr. Vajpayee were very upbeat in January, the nitty-gritty of negotiations will be far from easy.

Such an approach is fraught with danger. India and Pakistan can quickly revert to their known positions and India's sharp response to Gen. Musharraf's comments made during an address by satellite last month indicated that during election time, the Pakistani leader would not be left to score points without adequate repartee.

Pakistani and Indian leaders would be best advised to refrain from making public comments on bilateral issues as India heads for elections. All India-Pakistan processes are fragile; the current process appears secure from rupture at the moment, but straining it seems pointless.

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