The Hindu : Opinion / News Analysis : India's options in Nepal

Online edition of India's National Newspaper
Wednesday, Apr 14, 2004

Opinion

Opinion - News Analysis

India's options in Nepal

By C. Raja Mohan

NEW DELHI, APRIL 13. As the crisis in Nepal deepens amidst a growing confrontation between the monarchy and the political parties, the rising influence of the Maoists, and brazen attacks on Indian targets, the Government will soon have to rethink its policy towards its special neighbour to the north.

Until now India has urged King Gyanendra to work out a compromise with the political parties and put in place a credible government that could address the Maoist threat. Second, it has provided military assistance to the Royal Nepal Army in its war against terrorism. Both these lines have come under stress as King Gyanendra refuses to work with the political parties and the RNA has been unable to make headway against the Maoists.

When King Gyanendra ousted the elected government of Nepal in October 2002, there were suspicions in the country that he wanted to rule by himself. He has done nothing to allay these apprehensions.

Instead of uniting the country against the Maoist threat, he has deepened the rift within the traditional political establishment of Nepal. An alliance of five major political parties in Nepal has stepped up the agitation against the King demanding a full restoration of democracy.

King Gyanendra seems to have, mistakenly, believed that he could cut a separate deal with the Maoists. But these negotiations failed quickly and the ceasefire between the two sides collapsed. Since then the Maoists have returned to the countryside and steadily expanded their territorial control.

King Gyanendra's apparently self-defeating policy that threatens the future of both the monarchy and the state itself can only be explained in terms of his likely motivations.

He might have made the political assumption that when the final confrontation between himself and the Maoists arrives, India and the international community would have no choice but to back him unconditionally.

Despite the advice from the South Block to move towards political accommodation, King Gyanendra might have come to believe that the links he has assiduously cultivated with the Hindutva parivar provide him an unassailable insurance against any real pressure from New Delhi.

The political parties, struggling to restore democracy at the national level and fighting for survival against the Maoists in the countryside are disenchanted with the apparent paralysis in Indian policy towards Nepal.

While New Delhi rightly emphasises the importance of both constitutional monarchy and multiparty democracy, the chattering classes in Kathmandu see India acquiescing in what they see as an attempt by King Gyanendra to move towards an executive monarchy by transgressing the limits of the 1990 Constitution.

Meanwhile the Maoists seem to believe they have gone beyond the phase of a "strategic stalemate" with the Nepalese state. Despite military assistance from India and the United States, the Royal Nepal Army has not been able to tame the Maoists. Meanwhile, there have been growing complaints that the RNA has been indiscriminate in the use of force and has been alienating the people rather than winning them over to its side.

It is a matter of time, the Maoists sense, when they would be in a position to launch the decisive strategic offensive against Kathmandu. They clearly want to neutralise India in what they see as the approaching final confrontation in Nepal. The recent attacks against Indian businessmen and properties appear designed with this goal in mind.

Sensing the strong reaction from India to these attacks, the Maoists have tried to play down their significance. They have said the attacks were unplanned ground level reactions to the recent Indian arrest in Siliguri of Mohan Vaidya who is a leading ideologue of the Maoists.

The seeming attempt to mollify India may in fact be an unambiguous Maoist signal to New Delhi — just stay out of this war or your interests in Nepal will suffer. It comes amidst continuous signals from the Maoists that India has no reason to worry about their potential capture of power in Kathmandu.

The credibility of the Indian policy has begun to erode with all the three elements of the current power struggle in Nepal — the monarchy, political parties and the Maoists. New Delhi can no longer afford to remain a bystander in Nepal, where the crisis is maturing into a bloody confrontation.

India is indeed busy with the general elections. But the crisis in Nepal need not necessarily accommodate the Indian political calendar. The time has come for New Delhi to think of specific actions before the situation in Nepal gets out of hand. Acting in time might prevent more difficult and desperate remedies in the future.

New Delhi must dispel the impression in the Nepali court that it can take Indian support for granted. It must convey in clear terms to King Gyanendra that if he does not come quickly to reasonable terms with the political parties, India will have to think of other alternatives. Of special importance will be assurances of support to the political parties and pressure on them to get their own act together.

There are voices in New Delhi arguing that the war against the Maoists cannot be won through military means and their genuine political grievances must be addressed. Dealing with the Maoists now could only tend to undermine India's credibility. Any future Indian talks with the Maoists must be linked to an end to their violence and a return to negotiations. Meanwhile New Delhi needs to crack down hard on the sources of their support within India

Indian actions must be designed to ensure that there is a productive dialogue between the King and the political parties and an early ceasefire between the Royal Nepal Army and the Maoists. Only then will there be some space for politics to avoid a calamity in Nepal.

Printer friendly page
Send this article to Friends by E-Mail

Opinion

News Update

Stories in this Section

WHERE INDIA DOES NOT SHINE

A MASS UPRISING

Vajpayee's chance

Rwanda: the victim's licence

India's options in Nepal