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Wednesday, Apr 21, 2004

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Cyprus: can it put its past behind?

By R. Kannan

The U.N. plan to reunify Cyprus aims to offer closure to the painful past of both the Greek and Turkish Cypriots.

THESE ARE very emotional times for both Greek and Turkish Cypriots. On April 24, they will vote separately on a United Nations plan to reunify the island divided for 30 years. But unlike Lebanon or the subcontinent, Cyprus seems unable to put its painful past behind and move on.

The violence of 1963, only three years after Cyprus' independence, ended the cohabitation of Greek and Turkish Cypriots. Secessionist Turkish Cypriot leader, Rauf Denktash, insists that the two communities can live only as neighbours and not as compatriots any more with which most Greek and Turkish Cypriots disagree. The U.N. plan affords a great opportunity for both communities to start anew.

Greek Cypriot leader Archbishop Makarios preferred enosis or union with Greece over independence. In response, the 18 per cent Turkish Cypriots threatened taksim or partition and association with Turkey. In 1960, Makarios reluctantly accepted the independence idea and a constitutional power-sharing arrangement with the Turkish Cypriots. Three years later, complaining that the constitution was "unworkable," he attempted to amend it. This led to estrangement and violence between the two sides. Many died and others were unaccounted for. At Cyprus' request, the U.N. dispatched a peacekeeping force in 1964 to contribute to stability. The fewer Turkish Cypriots meanwhile began geographically aggregating even as they grew acutely conscious of their distinct identity. In 1974, Turkey took control of 37 per cent of the island in response to a coup by the junta in Greece. Following this, some 165,000 Greek and 45,000 Turkish Cypriots were displaced, rendering the demographics of the south and north almost purely Greek and Turkish Cypriot. An estimated 30,000 Turkish troops and tens of thousands of mainland Turks or "settlers" moved to the north. Contacts between Cypriots, tentative since 1963, froze after 1974. U.N. efforts to broker a solution proved impossible.

Cyprus' European Union accession course and prospects for Turkey's E.U. aspirations coupled with Greek-Turkish rapprochement led to intensified U.N. efforts from 1999. Last December, pro-solution forces gained the upper hand in the north. Turkish Premier Erdogan quickly clarified that Turkey would be a "step ahead" in the quest for peace. Earlier, Greek Cypriot leader and internationally recognised president of Cyprus, Tassos Papadopoulos, had written to the U.N. Secretary General, Kofi Annan, to resume negotiations stalled since spring 2003.

Mr. Annan desired a home-grown solution. Three days of talks amongst Cypriots, and Greek and Turkish Premiers in Switzerland, however, failed to narrow the gaps. Consequently, Mr. Annan tabled his "compromise" plan on March 31. He called his plan "fair" and pleaded with Cypriots not to throw away the unique opportunity for reconciliation.

In 1977, President Makarios and Mr. Denktash had agreed that a re-united Cyprus would have two zones and will be on a bi-communal federal basis. The U.N. plan, a Belgian-Swiss constitutional hybrid, thus provides for two largely autonomous Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot states joined by a federal government responsible for monetary, defence, foreign and E.U. policy. Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots would be of equal strength in the Senate; in the Lower House, Greek Cypriots would have three-fourth and Turkish Cypriots one-fourth representation. The executive six-member Presidential Council will be made up of four Greek and two Turkish Cypriots necessitating cooperation. Cyprus will be demilitarised. Mainland Greek and Turkish troops will be phased out over a period and remain in the hundreds as foreseen by the 1960 guarantor arrangements. A fourth of the north will revert to Greek Cypriot control in 42 months under U.N. supervision; some 86,000 of the 165,000 Greek Cypriots could return there. In order to preserve their identity, both states will have an assured two-thirds demographic majority under the plan.

In view of this and owing to the economic disparities (the Greek Cypriot side is four times more prosperous), while every property owner will be compensated (by a largely self-financing scheme), the plan contains certain limitations on return and a 15-year moratorium on purchase of property in the other state by Greek Cypriots. Some 60,000 to 70,000 "settlers" will gain Cypriot citizenship. Others are to go back to Turkey.

Greek Cypriots, however, regard the plan as favouring the Turkish Cypriot side. Consequently, emotions have stultified any debate. On April 7, in a tearful TV speech, Greek Cypriot leader Papadopoulos urged a "resounding no" to the plan. Mr. Papadopoulos said that the plan only "legalised and deepened" the de facto division, condoned the Turkish "invasion and occupation" and "mortgaged [Cyprus'] future to Turkey."

The Turkish Cypriot state is akin to any of the 28 Indian States drawn on a linguistic basis (although sans limitations on residence) and the moratorium on property purchase comparable to the ban on other Indians to hold property in Kashmir. Also in the plan's favour, Greek Cypriots will exercise shared de facto authority on the areas under "occupation" till now. Further on Turkey honouring the solution, Greece, Turkey and the U.K. would have to underwrite the plan to be closely supervised by the U.N. Mr. Papadopoulos also said the plan ended the Cyprus Republic, and if the new Cyprus collapsed, Turkish Cypriots would run away with their state, this time with "international recognition." The plan indeed forbids secession or partition. He equally argued that the `Taiwanisation' of the north in case of a "no," will not occur as the E.U. made up of "countries that matter", will not recognise the Turkish Cypriot statelet. He dismissed the claim that there was no alternative to the U.N. plan or that it signified the end of the 40-year long international search for peace. He said that after Cyprus joined the E.U., a better deal was possible. Mr. Papadopoulos added the plan would lead to an economic crisis and falling living standards amongst Greek Cypriots (the U.S. alone has pledged $400 million of the $2.5 billion settlement cost so far).

Mr. Papadopoulos' call resonated overwhelmingly with 80 per cent of the Greek Cypriots polled later, though his party has only 15 per cent support. AKEL, the island's biggest party and an ally, disagreed with Mr. Papadopoulos' negative assessment but fearing a rejection sought a postponement of the vote. The second largest party, DISY's octogenarian leader and a former President, Glafcos Clerides, said that a "no" clearly meant effective division and that he would "rather die than see this end." His sentimental plea seems to have touched many. However, the outcome of the vote remains uncertain. As U.N. mediator Alvaro de Soto explained, "change is always disquieting, particularly if the status quo is more or less comfortable."

Since 1963, when Turkish Cypriots withdrew from government, Greek Cypriots have exercised political authority and enjoyed international recognition exclusively. With hard work, frugality and international legitimacy, Greek Cypriots quickly rebuilt their lives from the 1974 upheaval. As Lebanon battled a civil war, Cyprus became an attractive offshore base. Tourism boomed adding wealth. Greek Cypriots nonetheless pined for the day when they could return to their homes in the north and be rid of Turkish troops and the "settlers" — in short, turn the clock back to pre-1974. The U.N. plan, a "compromise", does not do this.

Greek Cypriots are unable to understand that there could be limitations within a single country on property matters (polls show only a fourth say they would return to the Turkish Cypriot state). It is understandable. For 30 years, it was taboo to suggest that reunification entailed sacrifice. Consequently, not many Greek Cypriots seem ready or prepared for a solution.

The plan itself tries to divide both pain and gain equally. On the Turkish Cypriot side, more than 70,000 people would have to relocate. Turkish Cypriots would yield territory and their statelet "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus." The Turkish troop presence, a security requirement for Turkish Cypriots, would be thinned down to mere 650 over years. Most Turkish Cypriots are still unable to bring themselves to return to their homes in the south, and, unlike their counterparts, seem willing to forego ties and memories and move on.

Yet more than 60 per cent support the plan. Why? Notwithstanding their share of pain, for the 150,000 or so Turkish Cypriots, the U.N. plan means an end to their twilight existence. Only Turkey recognises their statelet. Spurned by the rest, Turkish Cypriots have to travel to Turkey to the outer world and on Turkish passports from there. International flights could land on their part of the island only if they touched Turkey. Thus, while the south receives three million tourists and the consequent wealth, the north sees a mere tenth of this number. Turkish Cypriot produce or goods cannot be exported directly. Worse still, as Mustafa Akinci, a Turkish Cypriot leader, pointed out once, the statelet's international address is a post box number in Mersin, Turkey. For three decades, Turkish Cypriots took all this in their stride. But with the opportunity for political equality and security under the U.N. plan, they appear ready to exchange their anomalous "sovereignty" for a normal and more prosperous future, which they consider their right. For Turkey itself, a Cyprus solution would enhance its E.U. prospects and international standing.

The U.N. plan aims to offer closure to the painful past of both communities. Equally, it could validate the decades-long Greek Cypriot desire for a solution. Till now, Greek Cypriots were upset that Turkey would not embrace peace. It would be a pity if the one complaining this time would be Turkey.

(R. Kannan heads civil affairs with the U.N. peacekeeping force in Cyprus. The views expressed are his own.)

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