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Sunday, May 02, 2004

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National - Elections 2004

Uttar Pradesh: beyond the arithmetic of caste

This election in the State is about political parties moving beyond their traditional caste-based blocs, says Yogendra Yadav.

Political stereotypes of Uttar Pradesh suggest that elections in this State are all about caste and nothing else. A close examination of the available evidence suggests that while there is an element of truth in this belief, this does not go very far in explaining the changing electoral outcomes. There is no short cut to a comprehensive understanding of all the factors that influence voting behaviour. Let us turn from a psephological analysis of the electoral battle in Uttar Pradesh presented in the first part of this essay to the more substantial questions of politics: who votes for whom? And why? This is particularly relevant in understanding this election when some of the established notions seem to be breaking down.

The idea that caste-based vote banks explain everything about elections raises two general questions that are relevant not just to Uttar Pradesh but to most parts of the country. First, how would caste-based voting explain the political choice of an overwhelming majority of voters who have either no choice or have too many choices? The stereotype is based on a rare coincidence of a voter who finds one and only one candidate of his caste and votes for him without having to bother to think about it. The trouble of course is that an overwhelming number of voters face a very different choice. If they belong to any of the numerically small communities, more often than not there is no candidate of their own community. If, on the other hand, they belong to one of the larger caste groups, they are likely to have more than one candidate of their own caste. The BSP, for instance, puts up an upper caste candidate in every constituency where they matter. Besides, it is not clear as to whose caste matters: that of the candidate or of the party? When Yadavs vote for the SP, irrespective of the caste of the candidate, this is clearly not a simple case of caste-based voting. If the definition of caste-based voting is to be extended to the candidate, or the party leader or the locally influential and so on, then it threatens to become a theory that can explain everything and therefore nothing.

The second general question that must be posed to the theories of caste-based voting is this: if everyone's voting was fixed by their caste, why do election outcomes change from one election to another? Uttar Pradesh has seen virtually all kinds of outcomes in the decade of 1990s. The BJP won a clear majority in the Vidhan Sabha and the Lok Sabha elections of 1991. The Samajwadi Party-BSP alliance won the 1993 Assembly elections. The BJP managed to hold on to a major share of the Lok Sabha constituencies in the general elections 1996, but failed to convert this into a victory in the Vidhan Sabha elections a few months later. It was the SP's turn to emerge as the largest single party in the Vidhan Sabha elections in 2002. What explains such a wide range of outcomes if the force that determined these was the same? Even when the same candidates contested two or more elections from the same constituency, why did the results differ? Even if this was a result of caste blocs switching their loyalty en masse, a proposition that is difficult to prove, why did they do so? Clearly, something other than caste was at work in UP of the 1990s. Or, at any rate, caste affiliations alone do not explain everything about this State.

A more plausible way of looking at this subject is that caste has played an important, even crucial role, in determining the initial levels of support of different sections of the citizens to different political parties. Once these social blocs came into existence, they tend to survive for several elections. The change from one election to another was not a result of any big change in these blocs; this change was caused by the routine factors of politics: issues, evaluation of the incumbent parties and representatives and other kinds of local and larger loyalties. Occasionally the basic blocs also change, but that too is a result of some of the larger factors mentioned above.

The basic social blocs of politics in today's Uttar Pradesh were created between 1989 and 1991. The grand rainbow social coalition of the Congress suddenly collapsed. The Congress used to get a more or less equal share of votes from all the castes and communities; a little more from the upper castes, Muslims and Dalits, but a little less from the peasant communities that had moved away from the Congress way back in the 1960s. Once the Congress declined, various parties ran away with different slices of this rainbow. The BJP took away the upper caste support, while the BSP targeted the Dalit voters and the SP focused on the Muslims along with Yadavs. Each of these blocs account for around one-fifth of U.P.'s population. The story of the first half of the 1990s is that of each party aggressively pursuing its own `vote bank' to the exclusion of the rest. The BJP's Hindutva had a slightly anti-social justice posture. Mulayam Singh Yadav was prepared to be called `Maulana Mulayam'. Kanshi Ram and Mayawati used aggressive anti-upper caste rhetoric in their public meetings.

By mid-1990s these blocs had crystallised and there is evidence to suggest that nearly three out of every four voters in each of the above mentioned caste-community voted for the party their caste was attached with, irrespective of the caste of the candidate. This incidentally was very different from the traditional caste politics, in which voters gave more importance to the caste of the candidates. Yet this gave politics the appearance of being frozen on caste lines. By the Lok Sabha and Vidhan Sabha elections held in 1996, the politics of caste polarisation had reached its peak. Its effects were visible in the Lok Sabha elections 1998 as well. Politics has moved on since then, but popular images have remained frozen at that moment of UP's politics.

The last few elections in UP have been characterised by a quest for moving beyond caste-based vote banks. All the major parties and political actors realise that they have reached a saturation point of support within the caste-community they courted assiduously. They also realise that they need to expand their support base if they wish to have any chance of getting a majority on their own. This has already produced a change in the rhetoric and strategy of all three major parties. The BJP has paid more and more attention to courting the OBCs other than Yadavs.

The BSP has focused on the lower OBCs and the Muslims and has changed its rhetoric from being the party of the `bahujan samaj' to that of the `sarvajan samaj'. The SP has gone for a broader strategy: it has targeted a cross-section of the voters, besides paying special attention to Rajputs. This quest also explains the search for new political alliances: the importance of Ajit Singh's Rashtriya Lok Dal with a strong base among the Jats of western Uttar Pradesh, the return of Kalyan Singh with his support among the Lodhs and the Apna Dal with support among the Kurmi-Koeris. Political parties are trying to expand their base beyond their known vote banks either by co-opting the leaders of other castes or by forming political coalitions. Voters too are trying to break free of their political bondage: Muslims have been searching for options as have many upper castes.

This Lok Sabha election in Uttar Pradesh is all about moving beyond caste-based political blocs.

The Samajwadi Party is hoping to retain its Yadav base and much of its Muslim voters as well, while courting a major section of the upper castes with the right mix of candidates. Its attempt to project for itself the image of a cross-sectional party that would turn Uttar Pradesh into `Uttam Pradesh' [the `best region'] is noteworthy as a move to go beyond caste polarisation. For Mulayam Singh Yadav, this is the first election he is contesting when in power. He has done well so far in the by-elections after coming to power and would hope to reap all the benefits of being in power, legitimate as well illegitimate. His main worry is the possibility of a serious erosion of Muslim votes. The Muslims have good reason to be concerned about the SP's alleged proximity to the BJP and many of them may well opt for BSP or Congress candidates wherever they offer serious opposition to the BJP.

The BSP has courted the Muslims very aggressively by giving the largest share of tickets to the Muslims and appealing to the lower caste Muslims in particular. The BSP also hopes to gain some support from the upper castes, at least more than the five per cent it used to get, by fielding the right candidates. Ms. Mayawati may have lost some of her appeal with the Taj corridor corruption charges hanging over her head. But it is doubtful if she would lose much of her Dalit vote that has stood solidly by her and has learnt not to trust the media. The BSP has a point to prove to its cadre, that its decision not to ally with the Congress was not a mistake. For that it would need to occupy the second slot, as it did in the Vidhan Sabha elections of 2002. At any rate it must improve upon its tally of 14 in the last Lok Sabha elections.

The BJP faces a tough situation that cannot be recovered with clever caste arithmetic. Less than two years ago, it was rejected comprehensively by the electorate largely because of the utter non-performance of its Government. Yet it shared power with the BSP and went down further in public esteem before the alliance broke down bringing further ridicule for the party. Its strategy in this election is to bring back Kalyan Singh and hope that he would bring with him the OBC support, at least the Lodhs, and impart greater coherence to the party. That has no doubt helped the party's sinking fortunes, but it is not clear how far can he help the BJP recover in such a short time. On the other hand anointing him as the party's head may have further alienated the Rajputs. The BJP strategists are really hoping that the non-BJP vote will be badly fragmented. That may well be the case. But BJP needs a handsome share of votes to be able to benefit from this fragmentation. It is not clear that the stability plank and Atal's popularity is enough to do the trick, especially in the wake of the saree distribution tragedy in Lucknow.

That leaves the Congress, the only party without a clear `vote bank' of its own. The party has no option except to go for a non-sectarian appeal to the voters. There is a secondary caste element to the Congress' strategy as well. While appealing to all the voters, it would hope to pick up a greater proportion of votes among the upper castes and the Muslims, the two sections that have already shown an inclination to vote for the party.

There are ground indications that the Congress has made successful inroads into these communities. The party was also hoping to gain at least a small chunk of Dalit votes, especially the non-Jatavs, but it is not clear if that is working out. The Congress lacks a State-level leader, but that may not be much of a liability in the Lok Sabha elections when the Gandhis are contesting from the State.

The first round of information and projections made by all the exit polls send conflicting signals about the ground situation in Uttar Pradesh and say very little about the changing caste equations in the State. But it may be safe to draw the following broad conclusions. One, we are looking at a serious multi-cornered contest. Very few constituencies will witness less than triangular contests; in many cases it could well be a four-cornered contest. Two, no party is in a clear lead across this maze of multi-polar contests. Therefore it is unlikely that any party would score an overwhelming victory and get something like 40 seats. Three, the BJP may or may not lose votes compared to the last elections, but it does not look like making any major gains. Therefore it is unlikely to cross its combined tally of 27 (including two seats won by its allies); it could fall below that. Four, while it is hazardous to predict the seats won by non-BJP parties in such a contest, it seems that the Samajwadi Party and the BSP may retain what they had last time; they could make some gains as well.

While the Congress is likely to make significant gains in its share of votes, it would be very difficult for the party to increase its tally substantially and come up to the same level as the BJP and the SP. Finally, this election may mark the beginning of the demobilisation of caste-based vote banks, especially among the upper castes and the Muslims, and pave the way for the routines of normal politics where caste is just one of the factors.

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