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Monday, Jun 28, 2004

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Opinion - Leader Page Articles

Karuna plays a hand

By V.S. Sambandan

Whichever way `Col.' Karuna's rebellion unfolds, the situation in eastern Sri Lanka and consequently the conflict resolution process will have undergone a radical change.

AFTER LEADING the crack fighting units of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam for 17 years, V. Muralitharan — whose battlefield successes under the nom de guerre `Col.' Karuna had made him an icon within the group — is now both hunter and hunted. Since the March 3 rebellion, those who had dreaded `Col.' Karuna cherish him and those who had adored him revile him. However, the impact of his revolt on the LTTE, which he joined as a schoolboy and left as the longest-serving regional commander, is perceptible with each passing day.

Three months after `Col.' Karuna broke ranks and lived to tell his tale, Sri Lanka's East, and along with it the national politics of peace making, has changed completely. The impact of `Col.' Karuna's rebellion cuts across political, social and military spheres.

The success of the LTTE as a challenger to the Sri Lankan state was a result of its out-manoeuvring its rivals, primarily through the bullet, pushing the Sri Lankan armed forces into a corner, and ensuring control over civilians in the North and the East. The LTTE has always wanted to be the `sole representative' of the Tamils in the island. The political reasoning was that otherwise Colombo would play one Tamil group against another. Consequently, the rise of militant politics also saw the gradual demise of multi-party representation of the Tamils.

`Col.' Karuna's revolt and the reasons he chose to expound for breaking away questioned the fundamentals of Sri Lankan Tamil nationalism, which pre-date militancy. By asserting the `regional aspirations' of the East, `Col.' Karuna has challenged a key concept of the island's Tamil ethno-politics — traditional homelands. The LTTE faces the most serious challenge to its decades-long existence at the ideological level.

Politically, the timing of the `Col.' Karuna's move dented the LTTE's claim to the status of `sole representatives' of the Tamils at the negotiations with the Government. Indications that the rebel commander is keen on starting a new political party add another dimension to the emerging scenario. This is particularly so as the new Sri Lankan Government is keen on inclusiveness in negotiations within a two-tier system framework.

While Colombo has made it clear that the LTTE will be the principal negotiator at the main talks, it has also conceived of a second tier to include all interested groups and parties. As the Government views `Col.' Karuna as a breakaway group of the LTTE, the question is whether he and his supporters will be involved separately.

Immediately after he broke away from the LTTE, `Col.' Karuna declared: "I want to do my duty by the people of southern Tamil Eelam. It is my final goal that I should fight for these people and die at their feet. I do not want anyone to interfere in this."

With eastern assertion becoming an issue, the question is whether regionalism could emerge within Sri Lankan Tamil nationalism.

As he is more than anything else a product of the LTTE, `Col.' Karuna's tactics are likely to be broadly politico-military in approach. Formation of a political party depends on several imponderables, primarily his ability to continue to hold out against a powerful antagonist. His effectiveness will also be dependent on his ability to strike an independent line, with or without new allies, and on the eagerness with which the Sri Lankan polity involves him in national affairs.

That `Col.' Karuna had not just subscribed to the LTTE's views, but was at the helm of its fighting forces makes him different from other Tamil militants who aspired to make a break with their past. Bringing `Col.' Karuna into the mainstream will, therefore, be a challenge for the Sri Lankan polity.

His bid to join the political mainstream is likely to see him shift his approach from that of an eastern leader to one espousing the case of pan-Sri Lankan Tamil nationalism. To that extent, recalibrating his earlier bitterness over "discrimination against the eastern Tamils by the Vanni leadership," could mark the starting point. `Col.' Karuna's plans are officially to float a political party to take the battle to the LTTE camp. This raises the possibility of a revival of internecine clashes the island witnessed during the early days of Tamil militancy.

While the formalisation of a political party will add to his legitimacy as a political player, the military element is bound to continue in the form of guerrilla attacks on the LTTE.

As in the case of the LTTE, `Col.' Karuna's party in formation will aspire to be a politico-military organisation. While a political party will make him a legal entity, the armed dimension of `Col.' Karuna's resistance is bound to continue. With his knowledge of the eastern terrain and his direct involvement with the people of Batticaloa-Amparai, `Col.' Karuna can add a new dimension to the conflict resolution process.

The core of his new support comprises two broad groupings, the common strand being an endorsement of his publicly stated opposition to the LTTE. Sections of Sinhalese who had once termed him the `Butcher of Batticaloa' now back him, seeing in him a way to get over issues crucial to the conflict resolution process — the de-merger of the north-east, for instance. For his small core of Tamil supporters, `Col.' Karuna remains on a pedestal as one who can stand up for the discriminated within the LTTE monolith.

To a significant extent `Col.' Karuna's joining the mainstream will depend on the acumen displayed by him during this difficult as well as tricky stage of transition. The change from being the undisputed LTTE leader of Batticaloa-Amparai to a rebel on the run and challenging the LTTE has made him more vulnerable than ever.

Recent allegations that sections of the Sri Lankan military sheltered `Col.' Karuna from the LTTE are bound to create further discord between the Sri Lankan polity and the Tigers. Even more disturbing is the continuing bitterness between the two main parties — the ruling United People's Freedom Alliance (UPFA) and the United National Party — who continue to trade charges, oblivious to the need to think along national rather than party lines.

After `Col.' Karuna's rebellion, fear has gripped Batticaloa. The change is so complete that the eastern town, once the stronghold of the LTTE, can never be the same again. Decades of militarisation had made even commoners identify and rapidly shift public allegiances between the Government forces and the LTTE — depending on which side had more strike capability. However, now with the LTTE and `Col.' Karuna's fighters making clear their intention to sort matters out with the bullet the civilian is wary.

Trust, a rare commodity in any conflict-torn region, has plummeted to an extent that prompted a Sri Lankan political commentator to observe: "Even family members are now split. Friends don't trust friends. Political and personal links are suspect. No one knows from where the next firing will come, for what reason and when." Whichever way `Col.' Karuna's rebellion unfolds, the situation in eastern Sri Lanka and consequently the conflict resolution process will have undergone a radical change.

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