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Monday, Jun 28, 2004

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India's Afghan policy

By M.K. Bhadrakumar

India has begun to edge away from its all-embracing diplomatic cooperation with the United States on Afghanistan.

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS Minister Natwar Singh picked out Afghanistan for one of his first detailed briefings by officials after assuming office. Indian policy towards Afghanistan, pursued by successive Congress governments till 1995, had placed emphasis on the historical and cultural ties with the two peoples. The primacy for people-to-people relations stemmed from close fraternal feelings towards Pashtuns who were participants in India's freedom struggle.

Secondly, India stuck to a line of non-interference in Afghanistan's internal affairs. Thus, following Mujahideen takeover in Kabul in 1991, when individual groups gearing up for the looming intra-Afghan strife began to seek Indian patronage, New Delhi firmly discouraged such "feelers". India would not be party to an intra-Afghan strife. Thirdly, India consistently regarded that Afghan people should decide on their form of government by themselves through sustained intra-Afghan dialogue. India held to this line even when Peshawar-based Mujahideen groups, rooted in the culture of jihad, grabbed power.

Finally, Indian policy called for an independent, non-aligned and strong Afghanistan that would be free from outside interference.

Since 1995, however, there have been departures in policy. These were initially digressions or marginal deviations. In September 1999, however, the then External Affairs Minister, Jaswant Singh, openly called for a "pro-active" policy towards Afghanistan and underlined that India had vital interests in Afghanistan. When he said the days of India's "supine acceptance" of developments in Afghanistan were over, Mr. Singh was articulating an altogether new template of policy. Justifying the shift, he had said that India had evidence that Osama bin Laden was involved in the Kargil incursion — evidence "we will reveal at an appropriate time." Admittedly, there has been some degree of course correction in the period since June 2002 when Jaswant Singh left office as External Affairs Minister.

Thus, India has picked up its moribund links with the majority Pashtun community. India's exclusive alliances with hand-picked non-Pashtun groups are giving way to even-handed dealings with all Afghan groups cutting across ethnic, religious, regional divides. Civilian, humanitarian, people-to-people contact has been gaining ascendancy in India's diplomacy. Without doubt, India has begun to edge away from its all-embracing diplomatic cooperation with the United States on Afghanistan that was fostered under Jaswant Singh's watchful eye.

This course correction is being undertaken quietly, but Afghan people seem to take note of it nonetheless. The rhetorical flourishes of current Taliban literature do not any longer contain anti-India tirades. The unconditional release of Indian workers is another example.

What stocktaking can the United Progressive Alliance Government do regarding the Afghan situation? The Afghans are increasingly saying that American forces occupying their country have the watches but the Taliban have the time. This just about sums up the Afghan stalemate. The stalemate has several dimensions. First and foremost, the Afghan war has turned out to be a classic Clausewitzean war — politics by other means. Clearly, much prior to September 11, the U.S. had planned to intervene in Afghanistan. The BJP-led Government was supportive of such U.S. intervention as far back as 1999-2000 even though India shared little common ground with American regional objectives in Afghanistan. The BJP-led Government overlooked that the Americans had only a limited quarrel with the Taliban — that it should severe links with Osama bin Laden — whereas, India had far more fundamental concerns. The BJP-led Government sidestepped the manifest reality that its offer of support to American intervention notwithstanding, the U.S. had all along preferred Pakistan as its chosen ally in Afghanistan.

State Department cables that have been de-classified recently testify that Washington had the utmost confidence all along that Pervez Musharraf would cooperate with a U.S. intervention in Afghanistan and, most crucially, he would override Islamist domestic opposition.

If September 11 provided the excuse for the U.S. occupation of Afghanistan, war provided the context for establishing American military presence in Central Asia, thereby fulfilling a long-term strategic objective. In the event, "war against terrorism" became an exclusive American show in pursuit of U.S. interests. Thus, as Sergei Ivanov, Russia's Defence Minister underlined at the International Security Conference in Munich in February this year, if peace still remains elusive, "it results from the absence of a truly international approach towards the stabilisation of Afghanistan".

The Afghans are a deeply disappointed people after three years of "liberation". Little has changed outside of the cities. The popular perception is that the tenuous stability will collapse once international forces leave.

Jean Arnault, U.N. special envoy to Afghanistan, warned recently, "The security situation has clearly deteriorated in the south, where there is an intensification of Taliban's military campaign". To counter the Taliban challenge, American forces are resorting to search-and-destroy missions and revenge killings that only alienate innocent civilians. Human Rights Watch documented in a 59-page report in March that the American war crimes in Afghanistan are no less inhuman than in Iraq.

There is continuing speculation, meanwhile, that the Americans might at some point cut their losses and seek an "exit strategy". Conceivably, the Taliban cannot be faulted in estimating that time favours it. India has much to ponder over.

(The writer is a former Indian Foreign Service officer with wide experience in Afghanistan and Central Asia.)

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