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Wednesday, Jul 28, 2004

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Opinion - Leader Page Articles

Sea Tigers — threat to Indian security

By V. Suryanarayan

India should work with the objective of neutralising the Sea Tigers at the earliest.

TWO SIGNIFICANT statements on the ongoing military preparations of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) have not received much attention from the Sri Lanka-watchers in India. The first pronouncement was made by the former civil servant, Bradman Weerakoon, in his recent Dudley Senanayake Memorial Lecture. Based on information provided by "high authority," Mr. Weerakoon underlined the fact that the Tigers had acquired 11 shiploads of arms during the "current peace process." `Colonel' Karuna, the leader of the breakaway faction of the LTTE, made the second statement. In a recent revelation to the media, he revealed he had personally handed over an arms procurement list to Kumaran Padmanabhan (`KP'), the well-known arms procurer of the Tigers, when he went to Bangkok as a member of the LTTE negotiating team.

The emergence of the `Sea Tigers' as a credible fighting force in India's maritime neighbourhood has to be analysed in the context of the changing strategic environment, the objectives of the Sea Tigers, and the likely dangers posed by maritime terrorism. Sri Lankan and foreign intelligence agencies estimate the strength of the Sea Tigers at 2,000 to 3,000 cadres. They have acquired the latest equipment from several countries in Asia and Europe to enhance their fighting capabilities. According to an LTTE publication, the cadres include specialists from disciplines ranging from marine engineering to naval architecture. The Sea Tigers deploy squadrons of heavily armed gunboats and speedboats. Jane's International Defence Review, in a report on Sri Lanka, published a few years ago, pointed out that the Sea Tigers "have taken on the Sri Lankan navy with unprecedented success." A recent publication of the Woodrow Wilson School of Politics and International Affairs for the Centre for Strategic and International Studies reckons that they have destroyed 30 to 50 per cent of Sri Lanka's navy coastal craft.

The origin and growth of the naval wing of the LTTE not only makes fascinating reading; it is also a tribute to the ingenuity and ruthless efficiency of Velupillai Prabakaran. During the formative years, Tamil Nadu was the sanctuary and backyard of the Eelam struggle. There was a close nexus among fishermen, smugglers and Tamil militants. Prabakaran, Kuttimani, Kittu, and Baby Subramaniam hailed from Valvettiturai, which was a smuggler's paradise. After attacking their targets in the island, the Tamil militants escaped to Tamil Nadu and took sanctuary in safe places. After the communal holocaust in July 1983, the Tiger strength expanded in a big way. A number of fibreglass boats manoeuvred their way through the Palk Strait, escaping the attention of the Sri Lankan Navy. They transported not merely guerrillas but also weapons, ammunition and other vital supplies.

From the very beginning, Mr. Prabakaran realised the necessity of dominating the seas. He identified this as an absolute pre-requisite for winning Tamil Eelam. To quote Prabakaran: "Geographically the security of Tamil Eelam is interlinked with that of its seas. It is only when we are strong on the seas and break the dominance the enemy now has that we will be able to retain the land areas we liberated and drive our enemies from our homeland."

From 1983, Mr. Prabakaran knew that New Delhi did not subscribe to the goal of an independent state of Tamil Eelam. The LTTE therefore planned its activities in such a manner that it got whatever it could possibly get from India while steadfastly pursuing its goal — independent of India's policy and thinking. There were two consequences: first, the Tigers started their own training camps in Tamil Nadu, and, secondly, they began to build up their international network.

With Tamil Nadu and India turning hostile to the LTTE in the wake of Rajiv Gandhi's assassination, Mr. Prabakaran began assiduously to build international linkages. Given the geographical configuration of Sri Lanka, he naturally laid special emphasis on building his organisation's naval strength. A major step was the decision to appoint his trusted colleague, Soosai, as the Special Commander of the Sea Tigers. Later Gangai Amaran was appointed Deputy Commander; a few years later, he died in combat with the Sri Lankan armed forces.

The Black Sea Tigers, the suicide squad of the naval wing comprising highly motivated young men and women, was formed in 1990. Mr. Prabakaran wanted to challenge the supremacy of the Sri Lankan Navy and for this effectively used the dedication of the Sea Tigers. The Black Sea Tigers made use of small boats, packed with large quantities of explosives, and generally under cover of darkness hit their target, triggering off explosions. In the process, they naturally sacrificed their lives. In the first Black Sea Tiger attack off Valvettiturai on July 10, 1990, the guerrillas badly damaged the Sri Lankan naval ship Edithara. On May 4, 1991, they sank the Sri Lankan command ship Abitha.

The LTTE has claimed that its ocean-going vessels have inflicted untold damage on the Sri Lankan Navy. One of the daring accomplishments of the Sea Tigers was the recapture of Mullaitivu in 1996. They ferried hundreds of troops to attack army positions. Simultaneously they thwarted the Army's attempts to recapture the territory. Mullaitivu is the headquarters of the Sea Tigers; from there they are able to dominate the eastern coast extending from Jaffna to Trincomalee. On October 23, 2000, the Sea Tigers penetrated Sri Lanka's largest naval complex in Trincomalee, sinking a naval boat and damaging a few others. The fighting raged for three hours in the high security zones, before the guerrillas withdrew their forces.

During the battle for Elephant Pass in 2000, the Sea Tigers conducted a massive amphibious operation, landing 1,500 guerrillas undetected in the Jaffna coast with their weapons. This was a turning point in the chain of events that led to the withdrawal of the Sri Lankan armed forces and the subsequent surrender of the Elephant Pass complex.

Although the ceasefire had been in existence for two years, the situation in the seas surrounding the north and the east continues to be volatile. Even as the Norway-facilitated talks continued (until the LTTE unilaterally withdrew, accusing Colombo of perfidy), the two sides built up their strength. The matter came to a crisis when the Sri Lankan Navy sank a Tiger ship, allegedly carrying arms, on March 10, 2003. Predictably, conflicting statements followed. The Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission failed to clarify the situation as it should have. The Norwegian monitors played it safe and did not issue a conclusive statement of facts.

In the days following the events in March 2003, the Tigers began to articulate their `rights' in the seas. Mr. Prabakaran has asked for a de facto naval status to the Sea Tigers. What is more, in its proposals for interim self-government, the LTTE has demanded control over marine resources and the right of access and exploitation over them. In case Colombo accepts these proposals, two thirds of Sri Lanka's coastline will come under Tiger control. As far as the Palk Bay is concerned, the Sea Tigers dominate the entire coastline excepting the outer islands in the Jaffna peninsula and the Mannar island, which continue to be under the control of Sri Lankan Navy.

There had been a number of incidents in recent months when LTTE-backed Sri Lankan fishermen have attacked fishermen from Tamil Nadu, who regularly poach into Sri Lankan waters. Of equal relevance is the International Ship and Security Code (ISPS) that came into force in July 2004. India and Sri Lanka are among the signatories to the Code, which makes it mandatory for member-states to keep their ports and ships at a high level of readiness to tackle incidents of maritime terrorism. As early as September 1997, the Maritime Intelligence and Counter Piracy Operations Centre issued a warning that the Sri Lankan waters had become "extremely dangerous areas for maritime traffic." If effective steps are not taken, the LTTE will expand its geographic space as well as range of operations, posing a threat to South Asian security.

A country of India's size and resources should not merely assess the dangers emanating from a changing strategic environment. It should also zealously safeguard its autonomy in decision-making. New Delhi should develop the political will to pursue courses of action that promote India's national interest. India should work with the objective of neutralising the Sea Tigers at the earliest opportunity. What Sardar K. M. Panikkar wrote in 1944 on the strategic significance of Burma applies very much to India-Sri Lanka security linkages today: "The defence of Burma is in fact the defence of India and it is India's primary concern, no less than Burma's, to see that its frontiers remain inviolate. In fact, no responsibility should be considered too heavy for India when it comes to the question of defending Burma."

(Dr. V. Suryanarayan is a former Director of the Centre for South and Southeast Asian Studies, University of Madras, Chennai.)

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