The Hindu : Opinion / Leader Page Articles : The `best hope' in South Asia

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Friday, Aug 13, 2004

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Opinion - Leader Page Articles

The `best hope' in South Asia

By Sumit Ganguly

Despite a profoundly questionable American effort to prop up an unpopular and disingenuous regime in Pakistan, India should doggedly focus on the pursuit of its own interests.

IT WAS at an elegant dinner in Austin, Texas that a then colleague of mine at the University of Texas at Austin turned to a visiting Indian dignitary and said that Pervez Musharraf's Government represented "the best hope" for a negotiated peace between India and Pakistan. The seasoned Indian diplomat smiled and said, "Sir, I fear that none of your best hopes has offered us much comfort in India." The conversation then veered to a long discussion of particular historical junctures and possible missed opportunities for achieving a just and lasting peace in the region.

The conversation came to mind as I perused through the 9/11 Commission's Report. Despite the commission's thorough appraisal of the Pakistani state's deep involvement with the Taliban and some connections with the Al-Qaeda, the commission again turned to General Musharraf as "the best hope" for the United States. The fact that there is ample evidence that his regime has run with the hare while running with the hound seemed to have again escaped the attention of this group of analysts.

Tragically, this failure is hardly new. The diplomatic history of American involvement in South Asia since the emergence of India and Pakistan is littered with the failed quest for these "best hopes." Will the American foreign policy establishment ever learn that the search for this "best hope" does not lie with Pakistani military regimes? Will it ever see the need to invest in Pakistan's fledgling democratic institutions and make them more viable and robust? That the bromide of expanding "military to military" cooperation has not contributed to the inculcation of a democratic ethos in the Pakistani Army? It is tempting to answer all these questions in the negative. The historical record fails to offer solace.

Since the U.S.-Pakistan defence agreement of 1954, a range of regimes, both Democratic and Republican, have suggested that a number of military regimes offered the "best hope" for pursuing the resolution of regional as well as global problems. During a significant part of the Cold War, a number of American Presidents embraced the self-styled Field Marshal Ayub Khan's regime as a bastion against Communist expansion. Worse still, a generation of American political scientists and economists contended that his authoritarian regime represented a model that was worthy of emulation by others in the developing world. After all, it was stable, it was generating economic growth and it was pro-Western. Only a handful of thoughtful American observers contended otherwise. They argued that India's messy, chaotic democracy still represented a far, far better choice for its population and for the world. Even India's non-alignment policies and occasional anti-Americanism was preferable, they argued, to Pakistan's professed pro-Western leanings and its despotic regime.

These voices, however, were mostly drowned out. The fondness for stability and orderliness of the regime, for the bonhomie of the bluff Pakistani Generals with their impeccably starched uniforms and contrived British accents and for their putatively anti-Communist credentials swayed the Washington establishment. Of course, in all fairness, India's anti-American outbursts helped little especially as India remained acutely dependent on American economic assistance.

Between Pakistani duplicity and Indian hostility American policy towards the region was often quite skewed in favour of Pakistan. The Cold War's end, did for a while, devalue Pakistan in the calculus of American foreign policy interests. That, however, came to an end with the tragedy of September 11, 2001. Even in an age of intercontinental bombers, missiles and precision-guided munitions, geography still matters. Accordingly, Pakistan's physical proximity to Afghanistan (not to mention its close links with the Taliban and looser ties to the Al-Qaeda) once again contributed to its revaluation. India's ardent efforts to court the U.S. yielded little. General Musharraf's dodgy regime, almost on the verge of economic collapse, was rapidly rescued through a deferral of a range of multilateral loans and infusions of new capital.

Since that time, the Musharraf regime has managed to not only avoid censure on a plethora of issues but has also succeeded in obtaining the coveted status of a "major, non-NATO ally." Its complicity in supporting the Taliban even after September 11, 2001 largely overlooked, its continuing involvement in Kashmir drawing only mild disapprobation, and its deep involvement in proliferating nuclear weapons technology mostly forgiven. Its strategic location, its possession of nuclear weapons, and its feeble and fitful cooperation in American attempts to eviscerate the remnants of the Al-Qaeda and the Taliban are the principal reasons for its ability to remain in Washington's good books.

Of course, one other factor cannot be overlooked. Over several decades significant numbers of Islamabad's power brokers, both civilian and military, had carefully cultivated a series of close friendships and social ties with Washington's powerful and mighty. These bonds were carefully maintained and tended to even during the lean years after the Cold War when Pakistan's strategic significance to the U.S. had plummeted. Today apologists for Pakistan abound in Washington's corridors. Indian diplomacy, on the other hand, with its seemingly high-minded principles and tired shibboleths can boast of few such bonds of friendship. Worse still, India's policy of keeping its military shielded from developing any meaningful links with the Pentagon, prevented the growth of similar informal networks which could then enable India to make its case and critical influence decisions pertaining to South Asia in Washington's key executive offices.

The best Indian diplomacy could accomplish was the creation of India Caucuses in the House and the Senate. The effectiveness of these loosely-structured entities in shaping American foreign and security policies towards South Asia is at best, limited, and at worst, non-existent. Powerful Presidents from both parties when making fundamental foreign and security policy choices towards South Asia have routinely paid only token deference to these caucuses, if at all.

The 9/11 Commission's flawed recommendations should sound a tocsin in New Delhi. Indian foreign policy decision-makers can hardly afford to be complacent especially because the independent commission has not simply endorsed but provided an intellectual rationale and a further policy justification for the Bush administration's existing policies towards Pakistan. Even if a Kerry administration emerges in November three factors may still see a continuation of current policies. First, the Kerry administration will be loath to ignore the strong recommendations of the 9/11 Commission. Secondly, it will be extremely difficult for the new administration to abruptly reverse course in Pakistan and end American military involvement before seriously denting the Al-Qaeda. Finally, Pakistan, quite expectedly, will step up its diplomatic efforts through its extensive array of well-tended contacts in Washington.

In the last several years, despite important and continuing disagreements, Indo-U.S. relations have been rescued in substantial measure from their familiar ruts. Accordingly, decision-makers in South Block would be wise to adopt a longer-term view and avoid the temptation to wallow in self-pity and engage in recrimination. Adopting such a stance will ill-serve India's interests. Regardless of which regime assumes power in Washington this November, South Asia will remain a region of concern for American foreign and security policy makers. More to the point, India can ill-afford to turn its back on the U.S. in a moment of pique over U.S.-Pakistan relations. Far too much is at stake. Significant economic ties have been forged and are expanding, military-to-military cooperation is expanding and overall diplomatic relations markedly improved. Despite a profoundly questionable American effort to prop up an unpopular and disingenuous regime in Pakistan, India should doggedly focus on the pursuit of its own interests. Regardless of which party is victorious in Washington, Indian diplomacy has much to accomplish.

(Sumit Ganguly holds the Rabindranath Tagore Chair in Indian Cultures and Civilization at Indiana University in Bloomington.)

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