The Hindu : Opinion / Leader Page Articles : Fuel for TAPS

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Saturday, Dec 18, 2004

Opinion

Opinion - Leader Page Articles

Fuel for TAPS

By R. Ramachandran

Looking for alternative sources of low-enriched uranium or switching to a first-ever fully mixed oxide loaded reactor are options to keep the Tarapur Atomic Power Station running.

FROM THE perspective of an otherwise generally satisfactory outcome of the Russian President, Vladimir Putin's recent visit, it is unfortunate that Russia cannot supply low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuel for the Tarapur Atomic Power Station (TAPS) and build additional power reactors similar to those being built at Koodankulam ( The Hindu , December 6).

According to Alexander Yuryevich Rumyantsev, director of the Russian Federal Atomic Energy Agency, the guidelines of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) were the stumbling block. Adopted in April 1992, these guidelines allow an NSG member to transfer nuclear equipment, materials or technologies to a non-nuclear weapon state (NNWS), only if the receiving state places all its nuclear activities under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards — termed `full-scope safeguards' (FSS).

Among the Indian nuclear facilities, the twin Boiling Water Reactors (BWRs) of TAPS (2 x 160 MWe) and the 2 x 220 MWe Pressurised Heavy Water Reactors (PHWRs) of the Rajasthan Atomic Power Station (RAPS) are the only ones under IAEA safeguards.

While the NSG itself does not define a nuclear weapon state (NWS), the definition adopted by the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) — as one that has exploded a nuclear device before January 1, 1967 — is assumed to apply. Even though India has conducted nuclear explosions, it is not an NWS in the above sense. So, FSS would apply for any nuclear transfer from NSG members to India, which is not acceptable to India. Russia is a founding member of the NSG, a multilateral arrangement founded in 1975 following India's Pokhran-I explosion in 1974, which now has 44 members. China was admitted into the Group in May this year.

Both the Indo-Russian Koodankulam project to build two 1000 MWe light water reactors, which was finalised in June 1998, and the Russian supply of LEU in 2001 had become controversial and had drawn very adverse reactions from the other NSG members. Reiterating its commitment to the guidelines, Russia had then argued as follows: as the reactor sale had been "grand-fathered" by an inter-governmental agreement of 1988, which predated April 3, 1992, when the new guidelines became effective, FSS would not apply. As regards fuel supply for TAPS, Russia had invoked the safety caveat in the guidelines and had assured the NSG that it was a "one-time supply" for an "exceptional safety-related situation."

The controversy surrounding TAPS, India's first nuclear power plant, is well known. Built by General Electric of the United States under a 30-year bilateral agreement of August 1963, TAPS became operational in 1969. Unlike the PHWRs, which are fuelled by natural uranium (containing only 0.7 per cent fissile U-235) and moderated by heavy water, TAPS reactors are fuelled by LEU (containing 2-3 per cent U-235) and moderated by ordinary (light) water. TAPS fuel was provided by the U.S. under a 1966 fuel supply contract until it pulled out of the agreement in the wake of Pokhran-1.

In 1981 France stepped in. The tripartite safeguards agreement of 1971 among India, the U.S., and the IAEA was merely transferred in favour of France. The terms and conditions of the French supply were just a carry-over of the original 1963 agreement. That is, the supplier would first have the right to take back the spent fuel. Failing this, any reprocessing in India could be done only after a joint determination by India and the U.S. The safeguards agreement was coterminous with the initial agreement, which expired in October 1993. The French supply lasted till 1995 but France, as a member of the NSG, could no longer supply because of the 1992 guidelines.

Neither the U.S. nor France has, however, taken back the spent fuel, and its reprocessing remains an unresolved and contentious issue. India has maintained that, with the expiry of the agreement, it has the unilateral right to reprocess it whenever it desires. But it has not reprocessed the TAPS spent fuel so far.

However, faced with the non-availability of LEU, India informed the IAEA in 1993 of its plan to reprocess TAPS fuel for extracting plutonium-239 and using it in the mixed oxide (MOX) fuel for TAPS. In the mixed plutonium (natural) uranium oxide of MOX, the Pu-239 essentially compensates for the required U-235 enrichment. India also unilaterally brought TAPS under safeguards in 1994 through a bilateral agreement with the IAEA. The new agreement brought all the nuclear material covered by the earlier tripartite agreement as well as any new fuel from any other supplier if required by the supplier state (and subsequent generations of fissile material therefrom). Any MOX fabricated from TAPS spent fuel will thus automatically be under safeguards.

During 1992-94, the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) had demonstrated the technical feasibility of using MOX by introducing bundles of it up to about 10 per cent of the reactor core. The plutonium for this came from reprocessing the safeguarded RAPS spent fuel. It must, however, be pointed out that this is quite far from loading the entire core with MOX. The maximum loading that has been studied anywhere in the world so far is 25-30 per cent.

Recourse to the MOX route did not become necessary because in 1995 China agreed to supply LEU. This supply lasted till 2000 when Russia offered to supply and India preferred the Russian fuel to the Chinese fuel. This "one-time supply" of 58 tonnes of LEU came in 2001. However, it is curious why India dumped China considering that it was not a member of the NSG then and could have supplied fuel till this year instead of the complications involved in Russia getting around the FSS guideline.

So what options does the DAE now have to keep TAPS running? Look for alternative sources of LEU, including domestic, or switch to a first-ever fully MOX loaded reactor? But whatever the strategy, international ramifications are inevitable.

According to S.K. Jain, Chairman of the Nuclear Power Corporation (NPC), plans have been drawn up for TAPS modernisation and preliminary assessment indicates that it can be safely operated for another 10-15 years. In response to this proposal, the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB) has directed the NPC to shut down TAPS before June 30, 2005, and examine all its systems and subsystems. The AERB will give the go-ahead after analysing the data. The shutdown would last for 6-8 months, according to S. P. Sukhatme, the AERB Chairman. That gives sufficient time to evolve an appropriate strategy for the future of TAPS. However, the proposal assumes that LEU would continue to be the fuel. If a decision to switch to MOX is made, NPC would have to make a fresh proposal as there would be changes in reactor controls and fuel geometry because of different neutron kinetics, Mr. Sukhatme pointed out.

Since experience with MOX is limited only to loading of the core up to 10 per cent, with the rest being LEU, alternative scenarios based on physics have to be worked out given the non-availability of LEU.

According to A.S. Anand, a former BARC scientist who designed the earlier MOX experiments, full MOX loading of the reactor is eminently feasible. He pointed out that elsewhere MOX loading beyond 30 per cent has not been attempted because, with plenty of LEU available in these countries, there has been no compulsion. "But here the situation forces us to load it fully. It will not be straightforward, but it can be done," he said. According to Mr. Jain, as the MOX content is slowly increased, even depleted uranium from PHWRs can compensate for the lack of LEU in the rest of the core.

India had considered reprocessing of TAPS fuel in 1980 itself, which was reiterated in its communication to the IAEA in 1993. It could, therefore, exercise its unilateral right to reprocess TAPS fuel now. However, given U.S. objections, the more prudent option would be to produce MOX by reprocessing the safeguarded RAPS spent fuel, as was done during the experimental MOX runs. TAPS would again continue to be under safeguards and, by not reprocessing TAPS spent fuel, a possible legal confrontation with the U.S. would also be avoided. If the DAE is confident of operating a MOX-loaded reactor, this would be the best solution from all considerations.

If, however, the DAE wishes to avoid the uncertainties of MOX, the possible sources for LEU are non-NSG members, such as Pakistan and Israel, and domestic production in its centrifuge facility at the Special Materials Plant (SMP) near Mysore. About 50 tonnes would be required to keep TAPS operational till about 2010. The capacity and performance of SMP, it is learnt, have greatly improved in recent years. In fact, very recently the compact reactor for the nuclear submarine, which uses 25 per cent enriched uranium, went critical at Kalpakkam. The SMP can thus be a source of LEU for TAPS. As it would be unwise to bring unsafeguarded enriched uranium under safeguards, India can then formally terminate the safeguards arrangement with the IAEA.

Alternatively, India can turn to Pakistan or Israel, which are also not members of NPT or NSG like India. Pakistan as a source might seem far-fetched. But, given the current efforts at confidence building measures, nothing can be better than civilian nuclear cooperation. However, if Pakistan refuses, India could approach Israel.

Recently, Mohamed ElBaradei, the IAEA chief, offered to arrange LEU supply to Iran. In fact, by arranging fuel for TAPS, Mr. ElBaradei could establish IAEA's credibility in promoting civilian applications of nuclear technology.

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