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Saturday, Dec 25, 2004

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Opinion - Leader Page Articles

Tackling the Maoists

By K. Srinivas Reddy

The success of any counter-revolutionary strategy depends on the right mix of policies aimed at reducing the relevance of revolutionary politics to even a small segment of society.

WHEN THE Andhra Pradesh Government decided to engage the Communist Party of India (Maoists) in peace talks, many other States facing the naxal problem began to watch the emerging scenario with keen interest. It was a radical decision to address a deep-rooted problem. The proposed talks attracted more attention as a similar exercise ended abruptly two years ago when the Telugu Desam Party was in power.

Despite the charge that the effort was the result of political expediency, a section of intellectuals was visibly relieved at the Government's decision. It spared no effort in bringing the Maoists and the Government to the negotiating table. The most relieved lot were the people living in the violence-affected areas. The `ceasefire agreement' (though not official) between the police and the naxalites meant no more killings.

But it took just seven months for the initial euphoria to give way to mutual recrimination. Both sides now accuse each other of violating the ceasefire norms and trying to take advantage of the truce period. The attitude of give-and-take, exhibited in abundance when the peace process began, has been replaced with varying degrees of belligerence.

If the Maoist leadership asked its cadres to resort to counter-offensive acts in self-defence, the Government ordered the arrest of those naxalites found indulging in extortion or carrying weapons while moving about in the villages. Once again, the law-will-take-its-own-course idea began doing the rounds.

The seeds of distrust, in fact, were sown even before the talks began. Both sides entered the negotiations with their own agenda. For the Congress Government of Rajasekhara Reddy, holding talks with naxalites was a pre-poll promise. After being swept to power, the Congress could neither ignore its promise nor afford to take a confrontationist stand.

The Maoists too needed some breathing time. Severe repression during the Chandrababu Naidu regime had decimated the party's grassroots network, especially in the Telangana districts, which it had always showcased as a beacon for revolutionaries. Efforts were also under way for the unification of revolutionary forces in the country. (The CPI-ML People's War merged with the MCCI to form CPI-Maoist)

Apart from the losses the State inflicted on the naxalites by decimating squad after squad, recruitment into the party fold, mainly from among workers and students, was reduced to a great extent though there was some response from the peasantry. It was an incongruous situation because while the revolutionary movement was getting international attention (the United States included People's War in the list of organisations to be kept under watch), the people were distancing themselves from the movement at the field level.

There were other compulsions that forced the Congress Government and the Maoists to enter into a dialogue. People were becoming increasingly weary of the strategy of using assassination as a tool in revolutionary and counter-revolutionary warfare. Though intellectuals and civil liberties activists were raising a hue and cry, the common man seemed to have become immune to the violence.

Against this backdrop, the peace process initiated by the Committee of Concerned Citizens (CCC) came like a breath of fresh air. Despite compulsions on both sides, the people by and large welcomed the process for the simple reason that the killings would halt. But now the peace process is in jeopardy with criticism mounting against the Government for its conciliatory approach towards Left-wing extremists.

During the ceasefire period, the Maoists grew in strength. They are reported to have collected huge amounts of funds and explosives. Armed cadres moved about openly holding meetings, creating unease in society. The Government too tried to take advantage of the situation. Since attempts to tackle the problem on a military plane in the last three decades had not yielded much, it had to employ a different strategy. It decided to let the Maoists at least voice their opinions on any subject.

The seemingly unruffled attitude of the Government strategists towards the Maoists reconsolidating their position could be understood. After all, the Government has the ultimate weapon of using force to contain extremism. But that would only be a last resort. It is now clear that before it takes recourse to this option, the Government would like to address the issues that have always provided space and relevance for revolutionary politics.

To address these problems, be it the distribution of land, tackling unemployment or providing succour to the poor, the Government has decided to galvanise the civil administration, which had by and large remained aloof with regard to the naxalite issue. The plan of distributing one lakh acres of land during the coming Republic Day celebrations is in that direction.

Development of rural infrastructure, improving rural employment, and distribution of land are the three core non-military components of the Government's counter-revolutionary strategy.

But can the Chief Minister, Y.S. Rajasekhara Reddy, pull it off? As part of the strategy, official teams were ordered to visit interior areas to identify problems that could be solved. Teams are moving though tangible results are yet to come.

However, it can be argued that the counter-revolutionary strategy planned is not without its flaws. The Government should have made a careful estimate of the situation and evolved a realistic long-term plan with time-bound goals to wrest the initiative from the naxalites.

So far, the Government has only responded to the issues raised by the Maoists. The administration is too slow to be pro-active and situations borne out of this scenario do provide a fillip to revolutionary politics. While the Maoists follow a brilliant mix of psycho-military-politico strategies as laid down by Mao Zedong, Governments lag behind.

And underground outfits enjoy the advantage of using terror effectively; in whatever way they term it. Where propaganda fails, intimidation works. There is a danger in not realising that the Maoists do take full advantage of ceasefire periods to recruit, train, expand activity, consolidate by merging organisations and seek international support. Nepal is an example where the Maoists used this strategy effectively and the result is there for all to see.

Is the Andhra Pradesh Government adopting an effective counter-revolutionary strategy? Or is it merely nursing the hope of solving the problem through reforms? Is it merely indulging in the process of talks with the belief that it can win in any situation keeping the factor of the use of force as a last resort? There are several questions without answers.

Is there a way out? The success of any counter-revolutionary strategy depends heavily on the right mix of military and political strategies aimed at reducing the relevance of revolutionary politics even to a small segment of society. The administration must become accountable and pro-active; the public's needs should be assessed regularly and attended to immediately. Perhaps, the time has come to introduce suitable changes in the current administrative set-up.

For example, the institution of Collectorates has almost become dysfunctional because of the increasing number of responsibilities thrust on the District Collectors. Merely appointing Special Collectors in addition to the District Collector in some districts, as done in Andhra Pradesh, may not serve the purpose. Instead, each district could be divided into two or three small units and funds released directly. Smaller areas to administer means more effective functioning. Most importantly, the Government must discard the strategy of using assassination as a tool in fighting the Maoists. Such tactics have proved to be counter-productive in the past. A welcome development in Andhra Pradesh is that Dr. Reddy has issued clear instructions in this regard. Now, there are instances of police arresting armed naxalite cadres, a rare happening earlier.

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