The Hindu : National : NSA: lessons from America

Online edition of India's National Newspaper
Sunday, Jan 09, 2005

National

National

NSA: lessons from America

By Inder Malhotra

In the wake of the sudden death of J. N. ("Mani") Dixit, brisk media speculation over and unseemly lobbying for the selection of his successor as the National Security Adviser have been a depressing fact of life in the capital.

Of course, the post could not have been left vacant even for a short time, if only because the NSA is an important link in the nuclear command and control system.

Consequently, the Prime Minister immediately assigned the NSA's functions to M.K. Narayanan, in addition to the latter's existing duties as the Prime Minister's Special Adviser on internal security "until further orders."

The current arrangement is likely to last for quite a while so that the Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh, can have a close look at all aspects of national security management before deciding whether Mr. Narayanan — an outstanding former chief of the Intelligence Bureau who was also Secretary to the stillborn National Security Organisation during V. P. Singh's short tenure as Prime Minister — should continue to shoulder the responsibility or someone else should be the next NSA.

In this context, individuals do matter because of the sensitive nature of the job requiring deep knowledge and experience of the problems of national security in the widest sense of the term and of international power politics.

But institutions matter much more, and that is where the rub lies.

Defining the functions

For, the emphasis so far has been overwhelmingly on individuals, not on the institutional evolution of the NSA's office within the wider national security structure.

The powers that be further aggravated the flawed situation by failing to define precisely the functions of the NSA or, for that matter, of the National Security Council (NSC), the source of his or her authority.

For instance, the Task Force, headed by the then Deputy Chairman of the Planning Commission, K.C. Pant, had recommended that the NSC be responsible for long-term planning of national security and coordination among various ministries and agencies of the Government that should otherwise be left alone to discharge their responsibilities in their spheres.

The task force had, therefore, suggested that under the NSA there should be three Deputy NSAs responsible for three major areas of the NSC's task: overall assessment of national security requirements and long-term plans to meet them; to make a thorough assessment and analysis of the intelligence collected by various Intelligence agencies, civilian and military; and monitoring and coordination of crisis management.

By August 1998 the Government had announced its decision to set up the NSC as well as a National Security Advisory Board (NSAB). But it was only on April 16, 1999 that the Government issued its resolution on the subject. In it, the Cabinet set out the council's functions in broad and sometimes vague terms, giving the Task Force's specific suggestions a wide berth. As if this was not enough, Mr. Atal Bihari Vajpayee and his colleagues took the extraordinary step of appointing the Prime Minister's Principal Secretary, Brajesh Mishra, National Security Adviser, too.

Second line advisors

Understandably, the Kargil Committee headed by K. Subrahmanyam, who was then convener of the NSAB also, criticised this arrangement and recommended that apart from a whole-time NSA, the "second line" of personnel should be inducted and "groomed" for higher responsibilities.

The post of NSA was being introduced in the country for the first time. Mr. Mishra's dual position and formidable clout made its smooth evolution virtually impossible.

For example, the kind of problems that had lately come to surface between the External Affairs Minister, Natwar Singh, and Dixit were not unknown during the previous regime.

But no aggrieved Minister then was in a position to complain. In the changed circumstances of today such problems have got to be sorted out.

There is good reason to believe that this is precisely what the Prime Minister is engaged in doing in the midst of his other pressing preoccupations. Since what prevailed during Mr. Mishra's time would not be feasible the best course of action to follow now would be to bring back to life the dormant NSC that has hardly met during the nearly six years of its existence.

The one decision it took when, in the midst of the Kargil War it did meet, has never been implemented. Why? Because of the usual turf war among the Ministries and agencies concerned!

It would also be useful to draw some lessons from the American experience even though the Presidential system in the U.S. is different from this country's parliamentary pattern. Henry Kissinger was clearly the most assertive, indeed domineering NSA there. Zbigniew Brzezinski, then a professor, criticised him as the "Lone Warrior."

But on becoming President Carter's NSA, he flattered Dr. Kissinger by imitation. Most others in that job at the White House have largely remained in the background.

Even the high-profile Condoleezza Rice, soon to be Secretary of State, has played, in her present position, an essentially coordinating role, constantly conferring with the "principals' committee" on national security.

A worthy example to follow.

Printer friendly page
Send this article to Friends by E-Mail

National