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Tuesday, Mar 29, 2005

Opinion

Opinion - Leader Page Articles

Anatomy of a revolution

By M.K. Bhadrakumar

In Kyrgyzstan, there have been deviations from the revolutionary script choreographed in Washington and finessed in Georgia and Ukraine.

THE MYSTIQUE of all revolutions is that they acquire a dynamics of their own and result in unforeseen culminations. Two classic examples of the 20th century were the Russian Revolution in 1917 and the Iranian Revolution in 1979. The Mensheviks replaced the Czarist regime in Russia while the revolution was gathering steam and within months, power passed into the hands of the Bolsheviks. The `fedayeen' of the cadre-based Tudeh Party (communists) lent the foot soldiers for the overthrow of the Shah's rule in Iran and themselves became the victims of the Islamic takeover of the successor regime.

The "revolution" in the Central Asian state of Kyrgyzstan has already thrown up surprises. A comparison with the two earlier "colour" revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine will be a good starting point. First, the striking similarities between the three "revolutions" must be duly noted. All three are meant to signify the unstoppable spread of the fire of liberty lit by the United States in Afghanistan and Iraq in the aftermath of 9/11.

But behind the rhetoric, the truth is that the U.S. wanted regime change in Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan because of difficulties with the incumbent leadership. The leaders of all the three countries — Eduard Shevardnadze in Georgia, Leonid Kuchma in Ukraine, and Askar Akayev in Kyrgyzstan — had enjoyed the support of the U.S. during most of their rule. Washington had cited them repeatedly as the beacons of hope for democracy and globalisation in the territories of the former Soviet Union.

Their trouble began when they incrementally began to edge towards a resurgent Russia under Vladimir Putin. They had reasons for doing so. Russia could offer them tangible cooperation in the vital economic sphere that was not forthcoming from the West — subsidised energy supplies, investment and trade. And all the three countries are strategically placed in the post-Soviet space. They comprise Russia's "near abroad." Washington has been expanding its influence in the arc of former Soviet republics — in the Baltics, the Balkans, the Caucasus, and Central Asia — in the recent years with a tenacity that worries Moscow.

Kyrgyzstan's strategic importance in this sense cannot but be stressed. Moreover, it borders China's Xinjiang; a sizeable population belonging to the Uighur community lives there with a track record of militancy. Though singularly lacking in natural resources — with the exception of water and breath-taking Alpine scenery — geographically it is a hub of Central Asia, sharing borders with Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan.

But Kyrgyzstan's similarity with Georgia and Ukraine ends here. Of all dissimilarities, the most conspicuous one was that the two main protagonists — the leaderships in Bishkek and Moscow — prepared themselves for the revolution. Ever since 2003 when Mr. Akayev decided on allowing Russia to establish a full-fledged military base in Kant he knew he was on the American "watch list." The political temperature within Kyrgyzstan began to rise. The Americans made it clear in many ways that they desired a regime change in Bishkek. The U.S. began supporting all conceivable elements arrayed against Mr. Akayev.

Thus in a way it became a slow motion revolution. One main element was missing — surprise. The revolutionary script choreographed in Washington and finessed in Georgia and Ukraine became redundant in Kyrgyzstan — swiftly usurp power, and legitimise it with lightning speed, with all this unfolding in a blaze of revolutionary idiom, packaged and presented with incredible real time media coverage.

A crucial factor has been Moscow's approach to the impending revolution. It was faultless. Moscow had evidently drawn its conclusions about what happened in Ukraine. It had no problems with Mr. Akayev remaining in power but never displayed its options. It took care not to be vilified as being against democracy and liberty in Kyrgyzstan. In fact, Moscow even hosted visits by the Kyrgyz Opposition.

This inability to monopolise the Opposition deprived the U.S. of a crucial pre-requisite of the "colour" revolution — a unified opposition as in Georgia or Ukraine under a single leader. From this point onward, several factors inevitably came into play: the clan structure of Kyrgyz society; issues of regional imbalance; the explosive nationality question (Kyrgyz versus Uzbek); and incipient tendencies of political Islam in the provinces bordering the Fergana Valley.

Mr. Akayev, on his part, would also seem to have done his homework. His clan base lay in the north and he refused to negotiate with the Opposition in the southern Osh-Jalalabad region where the "revolution" erupted. When the "revolution" refused to spread to the north, the Opposition brought into Bishkek (in the north) its militant supporters from Jalalabad, who finally staged the "revolution" in the dormant capital on March 23. (This also partly explains the violent scenes that ensued.)

Thus, in plain terms, we have a curious scenario where the locus of power in the country has overnight shifted into the hands of the southerners for the first time in history. Mr. Akayev simply withdrew with an abruptness that none expected. But no sooner was it announced that Kurmanbek Bakiyev, Opposition leader from the south, would be the acting President and Prime Minister that Mr. Akayev spoke up, objecting to the legitimacy of power transfer in Bishkek.

Russia swiftly endorsed Mr. Bakiyev's leadership. Referring to the new leadership, Mr. Putin said: "We know these people pretty well and they have done quite a lot to establish good relations between Russia and Kyrgyzstan."

On the other hand, from the unenthusiastic tone of the formally worded response from Washington it is clear that the revolutionary script has got lost in the Central Asian steppes. Indeed, Central Asia is a difficult region with inscrutable ways rooted in centuries of history and tradition.

Influential sections of American opinion have begun to question the "legitimacy" of the transfer of power in the Kyrgyz "revolution." The pro-American elements in the fragmented Opposition (from the northern clans) have even suggested that Mr. Akayev be allowed to return, reassume office and a "legitimate" transfer of power be effected in Bishkek!

Kyrgyzstan, after Lebanon, is the second Muslim country where an attempt at guided "revolution" has taken maverick turns. This brings into scrutiny the efficacy of manipulating "people's power" in alien cultures.

Kyrgyzstan's problems are of poverty. Average daily income for a Kyrgyz is less than a dollar a day. A university professor earns something like Rs.3000 a month. The economy is just about recovering from the trauma of the Soviet Union's disintegration. Nothing brings this out more poignantly than the fact that a significant source of the country's income today is generated out of renting military bases to the U.S. and Russia for the "war on terror." What the country needs is economic assistance in making a successful transition. If a single day's outflow of what the U.S. is spending on its military occupation of Afghanistan and Iraq could be earmarked for Kyrgyzstan, it could make all the difference.

Of all the major players on the Kyrgyz scene — the U.S., Russia, China, and the European Union — it is only the U.S. that has rooted for a "revolution" in Kyrgyzstan as the panacea for the country's problems.

(The writer is a former Indian Foreign Service Officer with wide experience in the Central Asian regions.)

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