The Hindu : Opinion / Leader Page Articles : How far can India travel with the U.S.?

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Thursday, Apr 28, 2005

Opinion

Opinion - Leader Page Articles

How far can India travel with the U.S.?

S. Nihal Singh

Non-alignment gave India room for manoeuvre at a time when the country was weak militarily and economically. India would lose its soul were it now to become a vassal of America.

THERE ARE defining moments in a country's foreign policy, and the George W. Bush presidency after 9/11 is undoubtedly one of them. The debate on the kind of world dominance the United States is seeking — whether it is in search of building a Second Roman Empire, as American academics would have it, or it is exercising power through sheriffs or both — is still raging. But one thing is clear: the U.S. establishment believes that it is in the unique position of reshaping the world.

What the American interests are have been amply spelled out, through Washington's strategic doctrine and otherwise. The U.S. wants to remain the supreme power and will repel any contestation by one or a combination of countries. It also reserves the right to invade a nation of its choice, unilaterally or with a `coalition of the willing.'

The Iraq invasion was carried out on the basis of strategic doctrine. The Bush administration is very much on the learning curve in promoting this policy. The difficulties of occupying Iraq have tempered its language. Washington is more civil to Europeans and it is not averse to asking for the help of the United Nations if it serves its interests. But the bedrock of American policy remains what the strategic doctrine states. To begin with, the watchword is the spread of democracy in West Asia.

Twin considerations

Post-9/11, American policy towards South Asia has been determined by two principles: the revival of close military ties with its Cold War ally, Pakistan, and an active exploration of upgrading relations with India as an emerging power, which presents the possibility of balancing China, if necessary. The Bush administration has seemingly not been intimidated by history and is confident of riding two horses.

The U.S. has convincingly demonstrated to Pakistan that there is a prize for doing its bidding. Islamabad has been designated as a "non-Nato ally" and a generous $3 billion military-cum-economic assistance package, extending over five years, has been topped with the grant of Pakistan's ultimate wish — the F-16, a deal that remained frozen for 15 years. Washington has also accepted the Pakistani nuclear scientist, A.Q. Khan's extraordinary activities as a provider of nuclear technology and material to countries with deep pockets as a solo operation.

The American logic is easy to understand. Afghanistan is likely to remain a problem state for many years to come. Given Pakistan's geographical location and the less-than-loyal-tribes who inhabit the porous Pakistan-Afghan border, the U.S. will continue to need Islamabad's active help. That General Pervez Musharraf has proved equal to the task endears him to the U.S. establishment, despite his cavalier attitude to the promises made. Relations between Washington and New Delhi present a more complex picture. There is the history of the Cold War. An originally promising relationship at the dawn of independence soured soon, with the U.S. seeking to enlist India in its crusade against Communism. On the other hand, New Delhi wished to retain as much autonomy in policy-making as it could.

The end of the Cold War offered an opportunity for a new beginning but Indian hopes remained unfulfilled, ultimately to be dashed by the Indian nuclear explosions of 1998. Towards the end of his second and final term, President Bill Clinton did inject a measure of bonhomie in the relationship and both sides talked of turning over a new leaf. But it was left to the Bush administration to declare the U.S.' interest in building a strong partnership with India.

After 9/11 and President Bush's "war on terror," New Delhi enthusiastically offered to join the battle with an eye on the insurgency in Kashmir. And even on the missile development plan unveiled by the Bush administration, India was effusive in its support.

A glance at the map would have revealed why Washington was less than enthusiastic about the Indian offer. Pakistan was the ideal base for fighting the war on terror in Afghanistan, and General Musharraf smartly turned 180 degrees from supporting the Taliban to becoming America's new ally against it in Afghanistan. Islamabad proved a good ally and provided America with military bases and intelligence, and even periodically handed over Al Qaeda operatives to calm American nerves.

The Bush administration has persistently maintained that its relations with Pakistan and India are not a zero sum game. Equally persistently, the hobgoblin of Pakistan keeps appearing in Indo-U.S. relations. New Delhi was, of course, deeply disappointed by the American embrace of Pakistan after 9/11, what seemed to it as a déjà vu scenario. Then followed the aid package to Pakistan, and most recently the F-16 decision.

As U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and President Bush himself have emphasised, Washington views India in the global context while Pakistan's importance has been relegated to a regional level, accompanied by whispers that Washington was saving it from becoming a failed state. There has been some movement with India in technology transfers and sale of some military equipment. Ms. Rice came to Delhi bearing gifts of F-16s or F-18s, if India wanted them, and cooperating in space and nuclear power generation. The rhetoric in Washington on India is upbeat, the climax being the suggestion that the U.S. would lead India to becoming a major power in the 21st century.

A range of opportunities

The American overtures have won over a section of Indian opinion-makers. Here was the only superpower offering India its dream, a major power status. Let us grab it, they said. The Government's approach is necessarily more cautious at a time of great challenges and opportunities in foreign policy. To emphasise the range of opportunities, Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao came calling, to be followed by Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi. Russia is beckoning and India's Look East policy has yielded some results with the ASEAN. There is also the growing presence of the European Union seeking to cut its apron strings to America.

Mr. Wen visit was successful because it spelt out the guiding principles to resolve the long-standing boundary dispute and set out a future charter for burgeoning trade and commerce. New Delhi and Beijing share a fondness for a multi-polar world, as opposed to America's unipolar concept. In view of their growing economies, there is much merit in collaborating, instead of competing, in such fields as energy and information technology. There is also the comforting philosophical concept of a Russia-China-India entente for navigation in an increasingly dangerous and predatory world.

There are no two views on the importance of the United States in today's scheme of things: the argument is over how far to align India with American policies, which have shown disturbing tendencies. The U.S. has appropriated for itself the role of an imperial centre the rest of the world must worship.It has given itself the right to be the world arbiter; it is above the law the others must follow. The rationale of international organisations has been reduced to their usefulness to U.S. interests and it will be for America to judge when and whether international organisations will come into play.

Europe re-divided

The world has changed since the Nehru era. Non-alignment has served its purpose and is now a curiosity. The Soviet Union has disappeared and President Bush's predecessors decided to re-divide the European continent by taking NATO to the very borders of the Soviet Union by going back on the American and West German promises. The present trend is to try and take as much of Europe as possible into NATO in order to isolate Russia, with consequences the world will pay for.

One thing, however, has not changed since the Nehru era. At a practical level, despite Jawaharlal Nehru's great failure in shaping the world with India and China in the lead, non-alignment gave India room for manoeuvre at a time when the country was weak militarily and economically. In other words, it was punching much above its weight, thanks also to Nehru's own eloquence and breadth of vision. India would lose its soul were it now to become a vassal of America. The crew in power in Washington has made it abundantly clear that all it can offer others seeking "partnership" is an unequal relationship. Europe is struggling against this very concept and has won some small victories, thanks to the costs of the Iraq war and occupation America is footing. In philosophical and ideological terms, India is where the dominant European continental powers are on the merits of a multi-polar world (a dirty word in the American lexicon) and the ideal of a welfare society.

Besides, New Delhi is in the rare position of standing on the cusp of opportunities: a more friendly China, a Japan seeking closer relations, a reliable Russia, a South-East Asia acknowledging the merit of friendship with India and a European Union that wants to come closer. India should maintain its balance and rightful place in a changing world.

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