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Tuesday, May 03, 2005

Opinion

Opinion - Leader Page Articles

Presidents face hard work in Moscow

Alexander Konovalov

Presidents Vladimir Putin and George Bush have a range of sticky issues to sort out at their upcoming summit.

THE MAIN purpose of American President George W. Bush's visit to Moscow from May 23 is to attend the celebrations of the 60th Anniversary of VE Day. Normally, such visits do not include a busy work programme because there is simply no time. However, judging by the serious preparatory work conducted by U.S. State Secretary Condoleezza Rice during her recent visit to Moscow, the schedule of President Bush's visit to the Russian capital will be as busy as it is festive.

The number of topics for the two Presidents to discuss is increasing, which would have certainly been a positive sign, had they not been overshadowed by growing tension, reciprocal distrust, and a lack of understanding in relations between Russia and the U.S. Presidents Bush and Vladimir Putin will undoubtedly address the most urgent problems during their meetings in Moscow.

First, the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and fissionable materials. This problem is not new, but the U.S. is currently concerned about two practical aspects: the Iranian nuclear programme, and security at Russian nuclear facilities. Both Moscow and Washington are categorically opposed to Iran becoming a nuclear power by acquiring nuclear weapons. In this sense their interests coincide. The disagreement comes with the choice of the best way to achieve the desired result.

The U.S. has stated on numerous occasions that it is ready to use force to halt the Iranian military nuclear program. Russia pursues the opposite strategy. The day before Ms. Rice arrived in Moscow, the deputy secretary of the Iranian Supreme National Security Council, Hussein Musavian, visited the Russian capital. The Kremlin wanted to receive assurances from the Iranian leadership that it would uphold its moratorium on uranium enrichment and that an agreement would be signed on the return to Russia of spent nuclear fuel from the Bushehr nuclear power plant. Spent fuel can be used to make weapon-grade plutonium.

However, given that few people in America believe a political solution could be found to the problem of Iran's nuclear programme, for the first time in the last 25 years, the U.S. Congress announced a plan to spend $3 million on supporting democracy in Iran. At the same time, Washington is still considering using force. Several weeks ago, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld spent two days visiting Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Kyrgyzstan and Azerbaijan, literally circling Iran in an attempt to find the best bridgehead for a possible military operation against that country.

The security of Russian nuclear facilities is another "old subject" of Russian-U.S. talks. During the summit in Bratislava, the sides signed a joint statement on cooperation in the sphere of nuclear security. The statement focusses on stricter control over weapons-grade fissionable materials and components of nuclear weapons. During the Soviet era, Russia traditionally addressed this problem by imposing strict criteria on personnel working with nuclear weapons and their components, rather than through the use of sophisticated technology.

In the new economic situation and with the emergence of transnational terrorist networks that want to acquire nuclear weapons, the need for advanced equipment to protect and maintain control over nuclear weapons in Russia has greatly increased. The U.S. is interested in providing this equipment and helping Russia to prevent nuclear weapons from falling into the hands of terrorists.

Access to Americans

However, the Bratislava statement became something of a detective story. The Russian version of the text, posted on the Kremlin web site, contained a paragraph suggesting that the American inspectors would gain access to Russia's nuclear facilities as early as this year. The next day, this paragraph was removed, and the authorities told the press that a copy of an interim and uncoordinated document had been made public due to a "computer glitch"; the Russian Government did not intend to allow American inspectors to visit the country's nuclear facilities.

However, during her visit to Moscow, Ms. Rice announced after a dinner with Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov, that she had secured better access for American experts to these facilities, but there was still some work to be done. This work has apparently been left for the Presidents. All this suggests that the problem of U.S. inspections of Russian nuclear facilities has been discussed and will remain on the agenda in the future.

President Putin's administration simply does not want to attract too much attention to the subject from Russia's radical political groups. After all, these groups have already accused the President of betraying national interests, jeopardising Russia's sovereignty and transferring control over Russia's nuclear facilities to the Americans.

These accusations are certainly groundless and amateurish. No one is inviting the Americans to visit the Command Centre of the Strategic Missile Forces or allowing them access to nuclear missile control systems. The inspections might also be organised so they do not include the most sensitive nuclear weapons manufacturing facilities. The U.S. does not need these nuclear secrets, though. The Americans know how to make nuclear weapons as well as the Russians do. But when it comes to the security of nuclear facilities, the U.S. could provide a great deal of necessary assistance.

Secondly, post-Soviet territory: increased authoritarian tendencies in Russia, the "colour" revolutions and their results.

The Presidents will have to work out a "code of conduct" on the post-Soviet territory. The Kremlin is very sensitive about U.S. actions that lead to a decline in Russia's influence in traditional zones. During her recent visit to Moscow, Ms. Rice did everything to reassure the Russian leadership that U.S. policy in the former Soviet Union was not focussed on damaging Russia's interests. "...we see this as not a zero-sum game, but one in which everybody has much to gain, when there are prosperous, democratic countries in the area of the neighbouring states around Russia," she stated.

Unfortunately, Georgia, Ukraine and particularly Kyrgyzstan cannot be considered either prosperous or even economically developed countries, and the former two have already developed a number of problems in relations with Russia. In general, persistent attempts to spread the U.S. model of democracy often work against the United States itself.

It would be inappropriate to address the situation with the U.S. presence in Iraq here, but it is worth mentioning that America, loyal to its "vision of democracy," helped the democratic opposition in Kyrgyzstan. However, it could hardly have expected that the democratic revolution would turn into violence, looting and plunder. Fortunately, the authorities have managed to take the situation under control, for now, but the Kyrgyz opposition remains weak and fragmented.

Meanwhile, the desire for political reforms affects regional specifics and intensifies clan confrontation and ethnic antagonisms.

In an attempt to provide assistance to the democratic opposition without knowing the regional specifics of the country, the U.S. inadvertently helped bolster the positions of radical Islamic circles, which is hardly in its interests. Therefore, it is certainly in the interests of both Washington and Moscow to conduct common and coordinated policies on post-Soviet territory, in accordance with the principle formulated by Ms. Rice: "My message... will be that a democratic and vibrant and prosperous Russia is in everyone's interests...Our relationship with Russia holds enormous potential." — RIA Novosti

(The writer is President of the Russian Institute for Strategic Assessments.)

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