The Hindu : Opinion / News Analysis : An almost irreversible process

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Friday, May 06, 2005

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Opinion - News Analysis

An almost irreversible process

Najam Sethi, Editor-in-Chief ofThe Friday TimesandThe Daily Times, and his wife Jugnu Mohsin, Publisher and Managing Editor of the weekly newspaper, represent the independent and courageous face of Pakistani journalism. They have been described as "equal opportunity offenders" because they have boldly fought corruption and ineptitude by governments whether elected or unelected. Ardent advocates of détente and friendship with India, Najam and Jugnu were in Chennai recently. An interview with Najam Sethi byKesava MenonandNirupama Subramanian:

- Photo: S.R. Raghunathan

Najam Sethi ... pushing for peace.

How do you read General Musharraf's statement that the peace process is "almost irreversible"?

Najam Sethi: When General Musharraf says the process is almost irreversible, it is a very important statement coming from a military general who has been seen as the biggest hawk in Pakistan. Musharraf has given two reasons. One is that the world has changed since 9/11. The second thing is that the people of India and Pakistan have become stakeholders in peace. We have seen civil society movements in India and Pakistan starting in the 1990s and now catching momentum.

9/11 had a profound impact on the way India and Pakistan see each other and also see their own position in the world. Pakistan, in particular, has changed dramatically after 9/11. The abandoning of the Taliban meant abandoning the Deobandi support base of the Taliban in Pakistan. But when you put the lid on one element of political Islam, you inextricably encroach on the domains of other elements of political Islam. Al Qaeda, sectarian Islam, political Islam that seeks to capture state power and jihadi Islam are also elements of the same paradigm.

Musharraf could not carry on the jihad in Kashmir because he was hitting at one element of the recruitment base, which was linked to Afghanistan. Al Qaeda and the jihadis began to see Musharraf as an obstacle to their development.

Musharraf took some time to realise that there was a nexus between all this. When there were two assassination attempts, it dawned on him that you could not continue to fuel the Kashmir jihad and have an alliance with the religious parties and also crack down on them as far as their anti-American and pro-Taliban sentiment was concerned.

Internationally, the very idea of conflict between India and Pakistan has become very, very problematic because both are now nuclear armed and may actually use those weapons. The fact that Al Qaeda and political Islam are hovering in the region meant that they could lay their hands on these weapons. The Indians too came to realise how the world has changed when they thought they could put their armies on the border and intimidate Musharraf. They thought that they too would exploit the doctrine of pre-emption. But they found they could not do it.

So what has happened is that Pakistan tried jihad for 15 years and failed to achieve its objective. India tried to browbeat Pakistan and tried to crush the resistance in Kashmir and, to a large extent, did not succeed. What they [Pakistan and India] have understood is that those methods of dealing with each other don't work any more and the new world requires them to deal with the situation in a different way. Both have also been under enormous pressure from the United States. The United States has been telling India "we will get Pakistan off your back," and it has been telling Pakistan "you need to make peace with India in order to get your act together."

Why almost? Two reasons. One is the weight of history. Our history is that we have made many false starts and if we go back it becomes worse. The other factor is when a conflict is born out of an injustice or perceived injustice, unless you tackle the roots of that conflict it can resurface at some stage or the other.

To make sure that this movement is irreversible, it is important that India tackle Kashmir and what Musharraf is now saying is that the way to tackle Kashmir is not proactively in terms of terrorism. That is a fundamental change in the Pakistani position.

This used to be a territorial issue between India and Pakistan. Musharraf has made it a people's issue. This is the proposal he has given: India does not want a change in borders, we don't accept the LoC, so let's start with soft borders and take it from there and see what happens.

The second important point that he has made is that until now Pakistan has been talking only of the Hurriyat — that they are the only ones who represent Kashmir whereas the fact of the matter is that they are not the only ones. They may now be only one of three forces that represent the aspirations of the Kashmiris, the others being Omar Abdullah and Mufti Saab and his daughter, Mehbooba. Now the Hurriyat will have not only to talk to New Delhi and New Delhi to the Hurriyat. The Hurriyat will have to get its act together first to demonstrate unity and then talk to the other forces.

How strong is the backlash?

There is a backlash. Musharraf has changed course very rapidly. When you change course rapidly after a long period of brainwashing people into doing something else, there are all sorts of vested interests. In Pakistan the vested interests are in the armed forces, the jihadi forces, in political Islam, the media and the civil services. These are people who have been fed on a particular diet for fifteen years. Overnight for you to change them is going to create a backlash. Right now the backlash is that Musharraf is "selling out... surrendering." This is dangerous because he has moved without creating a consensus at home.

Which is more powerful? Those forces pushing for peace or those opposed to it?

Musharraf is all-powerful and the armed forces are with him. That is how the army runs. But that is at the higher level. Musharraf has brought in corps commanders who share his view. That's what he has been doing for the last five years. The old "jihadi war with India" framework-oriented officer corps has now been shunted. Now he has handpicked his team. I think most of them agree with what he is doing.

Isn't there a contradiction between Musharraf the peacemaker and Musharraf the dictator?

He is technically a military dictator but everything he has done has shown that his dictatorship is not of the standard variety. For example, he has held an election that was no less free and fair than elections held anywhere. Musharraf has a system of governance in place with a lot of devolution of power at the local level.

Thirdly, the press is a little free to criticise and be itself. The business community is solidly on board. Large sections of the secular urban middle classes are with him.

So Musharraf has a small but important support base. But he does not have a popular support base. The popular support base still rests with the mainstream political parties.

The fact that he has not been able to create a national consensus for his policy shift means this can only take place when he brings the mainstream political parties back on board. That is what he is trying to do. His agenda for the next two years is to bring the Pakistan People's Party back into the loop and take the Muttahida Majlis e-Amal out of the loop. He is bringing the PPP back in so that the liberal secular elements can give sustenance to his programme. I would call Pakistan a work in progress.

What should India do?

India has achieved quite a lot by getting the composite dialogue accepted by Pakistan. I think India needs to do two things immediately.

It needs to ensure that the fall-out against Musharraf in Pakistan is thwarted by movement on trying to resolve Kashmir. If there is no movement, then the allegations against Musharraf will ring true and he will be forced to stop the progress or backtrack. How should India make movement on Kashmir?

I think before India begins to make movement on Kashmir, it needs to make movement on at least the water issue. There is a lot of misunderstanding over this Baglihar dam in Pakistan. India's attitude until now has been bureaucratic, but after the recent talks I see progress. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's statement that India will honour the spirit and letter of the Indus Waters Treaty is significant.

Secondly, I think it is very important that before India can demilitarise Kashmir, India and Pakistan must demilitarise Siachen. It is only confidence building in Siachen that will lead to confidence building in the Valley. The talks on Siachen that were abandoned first in 1989 and then in 1992 ought to be picked up. In theory it should not take long, with goodwill on both sides. We already have an agreement to revert to the pre-1984 positions.

On the political side, India needs to talk to the Hurriyat and facilitate their trip to Pakistan. The Hurriyat can be persuaded by Pakistan and persuade the Pakistanis that a better way of resolving Kashmir is to let them deal with India. The Hurriyat, once it gets its act together, can then talk to the other groups in Kashmir. That would be a prelude to the demilitarisation of Kashmir and the onset of soft borders.

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