The Hindu : Opinion / News Analysis : India's Nepal policy: dangerous flip-flop

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Tuesday, May 10, 2005

Opinion

Opinion - News Analysis

India's Nepal policy: dangerous flip-flop

Satish Chandra

New Delhi would be ill-advised to resume military supplies to the regime in Kathmandu.

AFTER WEEKS of hanging tough on Nepal, characterised by the suspension of military supplies and exhortations to the King to revert to democratic norms, following his assumption of absolute power on February 1, 2005, India now seems to be on the verge of reversing its position and resuming military supplies to Nepal. Such a flip flop is unwarranted. It will have unfortunate consequences for us, not only in Nepal but elsewhere as well, as it will confirm the belief amongst many, particularly in our neighbourhood, that we are the ultimate soft state which can be easily pushed around.

India's suspension of military supplies to the Nepalese Army, so astutely and promptly put in place by the Ministry of External Affairs immediately after the King's dismissal of the Deuba government, was the perfect response. It was predicated on the well established principle that stability in Nepal rests on the twin pillars of constitutional monarchy and parliamentary democracy and on the belief that the effective management of the Maoist problem demands that the King and the political parties work together in a cooperative mode. The King's assumption of absolute power, by declaring an emergency and dismissing the government, undermined both the foundations of Nepalese polity and the possibility of finding a lasting solution to the Maoist problem. In these circumstances, and taking into account the fact that the King's actions were regressive and unpopular, our initial moves cannot be faulted and were appropriate.

Regrettably, instead of seeing reason, the King not only continued on his authoritarian path but also chose to thumb his nose at India. Accordingly, our advice was not heeded, our Ambassador in Kathmandu was denied access; our radio stations were taken off Nepal's airwaves, arms were sought from both China and Pakistan etc. In the light of these distinctly unfriendly actions it is astonishing that, rather than further tightening the screws on the King, we are contemplating the resumption of military supplies to Nepal. The lifting of the emergency cannot be regarded as an indicator of the King's reverting to democratic norms and, therefore, as a justification for this move, as it is no more than an eyewash. Most of the obnoxious restraints imposed under the emergency remain in place and, above all, the democratic forces continue to be denied their rightful space in Nepalese polity. In this backdrop it would, therefore, be instructive to analyse as to what is it that has induced us to contemplate changing tack on our Nepal policy?

Flawed arguments

It is no secret that the Armed Forces are against our suspension of military supplies to the Nepalese Army. This opposition is based, in part, on the concern that the suspension of military supplies would lead to a Maoist takeover of Nepal, and, in part, on the apprehension that it would adversely affect the institutional ties between the Armed Forces of the two countries. Both arguments are to an extent flawed and in any case should not carry much weight. It may, at the outset, be pointed out that the Maoist threat has been somewhat attenuated by the dissensions between Prachanda and Bhattarai.

Thus, while a cut-off in military supplies will, over time, lead to a serious weakening of the Nepalese Army, a consequent Maoist takeover would not happen overnight and could occur only several months down the line. The King would, hopefully, blink well before that occurs and there would be the possibility of re-establishing the status quo ante. In case, however, he has a death wish, and does not blink, and there is a Maoist take over at some point in time, then so be it. In such an eventuality we should be prepared to accept it as the lesser of the two evils.

The assumption of power by the Maoists in these circumstances may not turn out to be such a bad thing. Should they come to power as a result of our denial of arms to the King they are unlikely to be unfriendly to us. Moreover, to come to power, and to retain it, they would be compelled to resolve their internal differences and mainstream which will demand a moderation of their policies. As regards the Army-to-Army ties, while suspension of military supplies would, no doubt, disrupt them this would only be a temporary phenomenon. Once links between the two countries are normalised Army-to-Army ties would also revert to their normal pattern. In any case, an institution's interest must not be placed above the national interest.

There are, in addition, a number of other factors that militate against our rushing to resume arms supplies to Nepal. The King is ambitious, authoritarian and determined to greatly enhance the powers of the monarchy beyond those envisaged in the Constitution. Cohabitation between him and the democratic forces in Nepal is, in the best of times, going to be difficult and a conflictual relationship is on the cards. He, and more so his son, are not held in high esteem in Nepal and, in any case, do not evoke the same reverence as did their predecessors.

In these circumstance, our resumption of military supplies to Nepal today will be viewed with disfavour, not only by the Maoists but also by the democratic forces, who are likely to react adversely against our nationals and business interests in Nepal. We need to keep in mind that, in the long run, it will be the popular forces that will prevail in Nepal with, or without, the King. As a matter of realpolitik it would be a mistake to be out of sync with these forces. If the King remains obdurate, and does not reach a modus vivendi with the democratic forces, he is in danger of being brushed aside by the rising tide of republicanism.

It has sometimes been argued that in case we do not support the King, others like Pakistan and China, will quickly move in to fill the vacuum. This is too simplistic. Few will venture into Nepal in support of the King knowing that the tide of history is against him and that both the Maoists and the political parties will be opposed to it. Should they do so they risk ruining their future in that country. In any case, China has shown little interest of embarking in this direction and Pakistan, after an initial flicker of interest, has made a public disavowal of the same through its newly appointed Ambassador.

It would be evident from the foregoing that the suspension of military supplies to Nepal was, ab initio, prompted neither by mawkish sentimentality in support of democracy, nor by any lack of concern on how to effectively defuse the Maoist problem, but, on the contrary, by hard-nosed considerations of what is in our best national interests taking into account all relevant factors.

We need to not only stay firm on the suspension of military supplies but, in addition, to put in place further restrictions such as an embargo on POL supplies for the Army and such other measures which will compel the King to heed the voice of reason.

(The writer is a former Deputy National Security Adviser to the Government of India.)

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