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France casts shadows across the Bosphorous

M.K. Bhadrakumar

A sense of unease prevails that Turkey will have to settle for a vastly different European Union than it may have sought.

BY A coincidence, the fateful Sunday of May 29, when the rejection of the European Constitution in the referendum in France came to be known in Turkey, also happened to be the 552nd anniversary of the conquest of the Byzantine capital of Constantinople (present day Istanbul) by Fathi Sultan Mehmet. The event in 1453 marked Ottoman entry into "Europe." Does the French vote presage difficulty for Turkey's "re-entry" into Europe?

Large swathes of Eurasia — Ukraine, Moldova, the Balkans, and the Caucasus — face similar predicaments. The post-velvet revolution regimes in the Ukraine and Georgia come under stress. The European Union should have spearheaded their painful "integration" into the Western world. Their induction into NATO is predicated on a EU underpinning of some sort. Their ability to disengage from Russia significantly depends on their "EU option."

The Balkans and Black Sea regions — Bulgaria, Romania, Moldova, Kosovo, Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia-Montenegro, Croatia — face uncertainty as regards their prospects of gaining entry into the EU. The broken parts of former Yugoslavia may begin to drift if they are deprived of the dream of a possible EU membership at some point. Meanwhile, the EU is poised somewhat awkwardly in the Balkans — a guide, guardian and philosopher, but not yet an assured long-term benefactor.

The impact on the geopolitics of the region remains to be seen. Will the "Balkan question" reappear? Unresolved issues of ethnicity, blood feuds, pogroms, religious extremism, and sub-nationalism lurk below the surface. To prevent a breakdown, what sort of interim ties could the EU offer? Will the drive toward making Black Sea an American lake be sustainable without the region's comprehensive integration?

For Turkey, the French referendum result came as a double shock within the week. German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder's announcement of early elections was already a matter of disquiet. The prospect of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) headed by Angela Merkel winning the German election worries Turkey. Last October, she proposed that all that Turkey could aspire for was a "privileged partnership" with Europe that allowed increased economic cooperation between Turkey and the EU but would leave Turkey outside EU, looking in. Last Thursday, she repeated that the EU "cannot simply return to business as usual" but must reconsider its plans for Turkey. CDU foreign affairs spokesman Friedbert Pfluger elaborated that "Europe is in crisis" because of "overstretching" of the EU's political capacities, and that a CDU-led government would seek a temporary halt to EU enlargement, in particular by seeking the option of a privileged partnership with Turkey.

The Gallic opinion is equally set against Turkey's EU membership. "The two most important factors behind the French reaction are perhaps Europe's economic stagnation and its ever-rising unemployment ... The Europeans have started to see both Brussels and the enlargement process as a threat to their own welfare," Faik Oztrak wrote in Milliyet.

Even ardent supporters of EU membership sombrely take note that the ground beneath their feet has shifted. Prominent Turkish commentator Sami Kohen wrote: "Now the EU will turn inwards, and take care of its own problems, but while dealing with these problems, it will slow down the enlargement process ... there is [also] a phobia against Turkey." While Turkish intellectuals rationalise, popular perception is one of injured pride — that Turkey faces deep-rooted European cultural prejudices.

Samuel Huntington (author of The Clash of Civilisations) plunged deep into these searing Turkish debates by stating in Istanbul last week: "Turkey's history, culture, religion and economy are so different from those of the EU that its chances of being accepted into the EU are virtually non-existent." According to the Harvard professor, Turkey should either aspire to lead the Islamic world, or focus on nationalism. He added that if Turkey opted for the latter path, it should concentrate on its security and development without being distracted by EU ambitions or the Islamic world.

But the choices are not that straightforward. The EU means different things to different layers of Turkish society. For the influential, flashy corporate world in Istanbul with well-established trans-national ties with European business and industry, EU membership is a natural progression in life. But, for the intelligentsia or the established political elite that grew up in the shadows of "Ataturkism", if the EU is appealing it is for a different reason — EU membership is Turkey's tryst with destiny as Mustafa Kemal had charted out Turkey's farewell to its entanglement with the Muslim world.

The "pro-EU" impetus in Turkey's secular course is acceptable to the Turkish military too, but as the self-appointed guardians of the Turkish state, the military would be cautious about excessive surrender of Turkish sovereignty to Brussels. Thus the French and Dutch votes as regards their antipathy towards a centralised Europe under a Brussels-based bureaucracy would, arguably, be a matter of quiet satisfaction for the Turkish military.

But for the silent majority in the Anatolian heartlands, EU membership means something entirely different. They share neither the corporate world's passion for neo-liberalism nor the intelligentsia's cultivated attraction to European Enlightenment. They are devoutly Muslim and are deeply rooted in Turkey's Islamic heritage. For them, EU membership offers neither apparels of "prestige" (which they do not need, given their sense of belonging to their traditions and culture) nor the prospect of a "European home" in an intellectual or emotive sense (with which they have no real interest in claiming affinities), but, simply, plainly, EU is a means of improving their quality of life.

Furthermore, the stark existential choices as Professor Huntington made out for the country's political elite and intelligentsia aside, cutting across Turkish society, EU membership was also a democracy project, given the pervasive public disenchantment with the functioning of democracy in Turkey. (In the parliamentary elections in 2002, the Turkish public resorted to wholesale rejection of the established political elite.) Turkey is undertaking an extraordinary reform programme in terms of fulfilling the criteria for EU membership. There is potential risk of reform losing steam in the face of a quiet despondency that the EU is shifting the goalposts. Despite affirmation that Turkey needed reform — EU or no EU — it is unclear whether an intrinsic commitment to reform is indeed inherent to the order of priority of the political elite.

Regional implications

Turkey's orientations would have regional implications. It cannot be otherwise as Turkey is far too important a power. But Turkey has a tough neighbourhood too — that includes one nuclear power, or allegedly two in a non-too-distant future. Some of Turkey's neighbours would wish that Ankara did not take seriously Professor Huntington's advice to become a regional power. Greek Deputy Foreign Minister Evripidis Stylianidis said, "If Turkey feels rejected by Europe, it might return to its past wish to become a regional power. This might have a negative impact on Turkish-Greek relations." Teheran, Damascus, Yerevan, Baghdad, or Nicosia too would keenly watch.

As the French referendum results were getting known, British Foreign Secretary phoned his Turkish counterpart to convey Britain's continued support for Turkey. (No such calls came from Paris, Berlin or The Hague.) It so happened that the IMF agreed on a $10 billion standby credit for Turkey. As the IMF put it, "Turkey's economic performance is at its strongest in a generation." The first tranche of $837 million was promptly disbursed. The IMF also agreed to the postponement of Turkey's debt repayment of nearly $4 billion in 2006.

For the first time since Turkey's intervention in northern Cyprus in 1974, a U.S. Congressional delegation visited the region last week. Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan visited Washington on President George W. Bush's invitation. U.S. Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice counselled Europe to "include" Turkey. These are meaningful gestures. But U.S.-Turkey relations are delicately poised. Kurdish nationalism in Iraq remains a grave issue. Turkey's frustrations over a U.S.-Kurdish axis boil over from time to time — adding to the vast reservoir of "anti-Americanism" in public opinion. Yet the U.S. would like Turkey, an important NATO ally, to play certain defined roles in the American regional policy. Ankara would draw a careful line between where American interests ended and its interests began. Turkey has been harmonising with EU's regional policy — and the EU does not view former Soviet republics ("Turkestan") with missionary zeal. Moreover, Turkey's cooperation with Russia and China is expanding rapidly.

Equally so, Turkey has been reticent about the U.S.' Middle East Initiative and unresponsive to American promptings to project itself as a role model in the Muslim world. Turkey has a complex legacy with Muslim world, borne out of its tumultuous Ottoman history.

Besides, the Islamic world is getting crowded with state and non-state actors — Saudi Arabia, Iran, Pakistan, Hamas, Hezbollah, Muslim Brotherhood, Jemaah Islamiyah, and the ubiquitous Al-Qaeda. After almost a century's absence, Turkey would have to "fit in." And an overarching question always remains: what is it that the Islamic world can offer Turkey that Turkey lacks?

Turkey's options are thus ultimately narrowing — though that alone does not quell its angst. A sense of unease prevails that Turkey will have to look for a place within Europe but settle for a vastly different EU than it may have sought.

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