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Another Musharraf charm offensive

B. Muralidhar Reddy

Pervez Musharraf ... image conscious. — Photo: AP

ON FRIDAY last, Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf held forth for over two hours with 80-odd foreign correspondents, some based in the country and some visiting it. It was a charm offensive by the General. Highlighting the latest crackdown against fundamentalist elements within his country, he sounded determined to eliminate the menace.

Conscious of the scepticism on the latest crackdown, Gen. Musharraf offered a host of reasons why he could not take the campaign against the fundamentalists to its logical conclusion post-9/11.

"It is a totally different environment today. Please do not look at 2005 from eyes of 2002," he stressed in an obvious reference to the unfulfilled pledges of his speech of January 12, 2002. However, the reasons given by Gen. Musharraf for his inability to take on the fundamentalists raise more questions than they answer.

He listed four distinct factors that came in the way of his campaign in 2002: a pro-Taliban wave across Pakistan; the poor economic situation; his shaky standing in the eyes of the world because of his military background; and the eyeball-to-eyeball confrontation with India then. On the face of it, the list seems credible but an objective analysis would show that barring the military standoff with India, none of the other factors could have restrained the General.

It is incredible that Gen. Musharraf should claim that a million Taliban would have poured into the streets of Pakistan had he gone ahead with measures to curb militancy. The American-led alliance commenced operations in Afghanistan in the first week of October 2001 and the Taliban was ousted within the next six weeks. Barring a demonstration here and there, Pakistan remained by and large peaceful. The reports in the Western media about a backlash in Pakistan to the developments in Afghanistan proved to be just hype.

The Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA), a conglomerate of pro-Taliban parties which came into existence weeks before the October 2002 general election, not only took part in the election but for the first time in Pakistan's history emerged as a credible political force. It took the North West Frontier Province with a two-thirds majority and in Balochistan formed the government in alliance with the military-backed Muslim League.

Part of the MMA's success was attributed to the prevailing anti-American sentiment post-9/11. But no less important was the generous help it reportedly got from several intelligence agencies. Also, the new election rules framed by Gen. Musharraf virtually knocked out from the poll fray the regional parties in the NWFP and Balochistan.

Going by Gen. Musharraf's argument on the pro-Taliban sentiment prevalent in 2002, one wonders where the one million Taliban have disappeared in 2005? Have they left Pakistan? Or has the mindset of a majority of the million Taliban, who were ready to march on to the streets, changed on account of the government policies in the last four years? Or is the government now in a position to challenge the might of the million Taliban?

Next, Gen. Musharraf's claim that the "instable" economic situation did not give him much leeway in dealing with the radicals belies his repeated assertions that his regime's major achievement after the October 1999 military coup was effecting an economic turnaround. Weeks after the coup, Gen. Musharraf requisitioned the services of Shaukat Aziz, then a top manager with Citibank in New York, and gave him a single task: halt the downslide and turn around the economy. Before 9/11, Mr. Aziz had succeeded in persuading at least the World Bank for a fresh loan on the basis of his "performance."

After the twin towers of New York came tumbling down and Islamabad joined the "international war against terrorism," Pakistan's economy experienced a major boost thanks to grants, new loans and re-scheduling of old loans by the U.S. and its allies. From less than $1 billion before 9/11, the foreign exchange reserves today stand at over $15 billion.

Gen. Musharraf maintains that his military man image in the eyes of the international community, read the U.S., was a stumbling block in the path of confrontation with the extremists. Far from it. The U.S. and its allies for the very reason embraced him. It was Zia-ul-Haq in the reverse.

In 1979, the then dictator emerged as the chief ally of the West in its proxy war against the erstwhile Soviet Union in Afghanistan and his military background was forgotten.

In similar fashion, Gen. Musharraf's uniform ceased to be an issue for the U.S. and the West virtually hours after 9/11. In less than a week after September 11, the then U.S. Secretary of State, Colin Powell, telephoned Gen. Musharraf conveying the famous line of President Bush "either you are with us or them" albeit in a polite manner.

The call actually signalled the end of any American objections to the General's military background.

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