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The U.S.-India agreement: victory for whom?

Murli Manohar Joshi

"We will be sacrificing our national security by letting our nuclear weapons programme be controlled, confined, and contained under international watch."

THE INDIA-U.S. civil nuclear energy cooperation agreement, signed by United States President George Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in Washington on July 19, has been publicly dubbed as "a historical watershed." The negotiators told their respective media their side gave up little or nothing to win a great deal. If that is true, it is indeed the most historic agreement between the two democracies. However, one must ask: what actually was the agreement and whom does it benefit the most?

Let's examine the background. Since the Congress-led United Progressive Alliance Government came to power, it has been giving an impression that serious efforts are being made to secure for India a permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council. The Government has tried to woo every visiting head of state and sent emissaries to countries seeking their support for India's candidature. Foreign Minister Natwar Singh made a last-ditch effort during his New York visit before the beginning of the U.N. session, prior to the Prime Minister's Washington visit.

The single-minded focus on the U.N. Security Council seat or prestige in the international community should not surprise watchers of Indian foreign policy during 50 years of Congress Party rule. The party, beginning with Jawaharlal Nehru, was more interested in seeking global prestige than in pursuing vigorously the issues of vital national interest. It is nobody's case that India should not try to become a permanent member of the Security Council. But keeping this as the only agenda of our foreign policy and obfuscating other issues would certainly be poor diplomacy. In sharp contrast, the BJP-led National Democratic Alliance doggedly pursued India's "self-interest first" agenda, which began with the 1998 nuclear tests.

India also wanted access to dual use technology and fuel for under-productive Indian nuclear power plants built on U.S. and western assurances and supplies (which were discontinued after India's 1974 nuclear test).

Ironically, Dr. Manmohan Singh, who likes to be known as the father of India's economic reform among his western friends, went to the U.S. capital with little or no economic agenda for India. The CEO forum crafted by the Deputy Chairman of Planning Commission was an afterthought and had an agenda that had little to do with the country's economic growth. However, the CEOs from both sides wasted no time on pomp and show, and cut several one-to-one deals behind the scene.

While New Delhi was sending feeler upon feeler about its immense desire to get Washington's nod for the Security Council seat, how did the U.S. respond? The Bush administration simply used India's desire to whet the appetite of the Indian team through mixed messages. To American advantage, the Indian team, both political and bureaucratic, was so fixated on the Security Council seat that it failed to ask about, or see, the real U.S. agenda for the agreement.

What was the real U.S. agenda?

Unlike India, the United States administration is very pragmatic. It pursues only concrete and measurable goals and rarely discloses its real agenda in advance. The U.S. agenda does not always come from public sector needs. Most often, it is dictated by private sector needs to sell more goods and services or gain major concessions from foreign governments, especially when they are a guest. This is particularly true of Republican administrations. For the Bush administration, taking care of the business needs of American corporations comes first and last. All one has to do is to scan the list of CEOs from the U.S. side who attended either the CEO meeting or the White House dinner reception. The President's favourite corporations were Boeing and General Electric.

Aside from taking care of Boeing's $7.2 billion sale to India, the administration had a strategic agenda. This had to do with gaining India's acceptance to cap its nuclear programme through agreements to stop further testing, limit the production of fissile materials, and allow International Atomic Energy Agency inspections. With this agreement signed, India's decision to defend itself through "minimal deterrence" was permanently blocked. It seems that the U.S. was fully aware of India's thorium programme. Its non-proliferation lobby wanted the country stopped in its tracks. Washington rightly calculated that the chances of restraining India are better with an insecure leader guided by bureaucrats, who will do anything to get out of the nuclear doghouse. The United States has been using European governments to contain Iran's nuclear programme and the Chinese government to stop the advanced North Korean nuclear programme. In this pursuit, agreement with India does become very useful.

Today there are three nuclear weapon states in the world not recognised by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: India, Pakistan, and Israel. While the nuclear weapons of Pakistan and Israel are well controlled by the United States, India has been a wild card. In fact, Pakistan's nuclear weapons and programme are monitored and controlled not only by the U.S. but also by China. Contrary to popular belief, it is India's nuclear programme, not Pakistan's, that the U.S. wanted to get its arm around. Both Europeans and Chinese have leveraged it in resisting U.S. pressure to cajole Iran and North Korea too much. Finally, the Indian Prime Minister, who could not see the U.S. game and was overwhelmed by the American pomp and show, presented a golden opportunity for weakening India's regional power ambitions.

On July 18, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, led by bureaucrats, signed an agreement that committed India to:

(1) stop any further testing of nuclear weapons, notwithstanding the fact that the U.S. itself never ratified the CTBT;

(2) put its future nuclear research under American watch knowing fully well that it would take a long time and major expense to separate the civilian and defence nuclear programmes; and

(3) cap India's nuclear deterrent weapon programme to a point of making it ineffective.

The question remains: what did India gain in return for capping its nuclear deterrence? The often-quoted answer by the Congress-led Government is President Bush's commitment to persuade the U.S. Congress to change the law to allow the administration or other members of Nuclear Suppliers' Group to give India fuel rods. What happens if President Bush is unable to persuade Congress or the suppliers' group to provide India the nuclear fuel?

Can the country go back on the agreement, a notion advanced by Dr. Singh in Parliament? It is unlikely that India can go back on this highly publicised agreement. If the U.S. Congress does not change the law, President Bush can easily explain it away. When the U.S. Congress refused to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, President Clinton quickly explained this away to those whom he had persuaded to sign the treaty. The country must thank the wisdom of Prime Minister Vajpayee for foreseeing the situation and refusing to ink the agreement under Clinton-Talbott pressure.

On the day Dr. Singh was addressing the joint session of the U.S. Congress, the Energy Committee of the House of Representatives was discussing a motion to reject the administration's proposal to allow India to get nuclear fuel. President Bush's major problem may be time. Will he be able to pull it through Congress and persuade the Nuclear Suppliers Group to go along — before he leaves office in 2008?

What can India possibly gain?

Even if all conditions are met or the U.S. Congress modifies its laws to allow India to obtain nuclear fuel from the Nuclear Suppliers Group, it will take $7 billion to $10 billion of India's investment, and at least a decade, to add an additional 3 per cent of power (or a total of 6 per cent) from nuclear fuel provided by the agreement.

In return, we will be sacrificing our national security by letting our nuclear weapons programme be controlled, confined, and contained under international watch. As a result, the country will be deprived of effective nuclear deterrence, letting Pakistan and China enjoy their growing defence prowess. In consequence, India's emergence as a regional power will be severely curtailed — if not by design, then by default.

It is now well accepted that the 1998 nuclear tests ordered by Vajpayee Government brought respect and economic growth for the country. The Manmohan Singh Government is squandering the foreign policy gains of the NDA — slowly, but surely.

(The writer is a former president of the Bharatiya Janata Party. He was Human Resource Development Minister in the National Democratic Alliance Government.)

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