New Delhi: Confirming the statement made last week by the U.S. State Department spokesman that the separation of India's civilian and military nuclear facilities was a "precondition" for Congress being asked to relax its nuclear commerce rules, senior Bush administration officials said the Indian side would have to begin implementing this commitment before the administration would present any related legislative drafts to the Hill.

They also outlined a broad vision for the U.S.-India relationship of which civilian nuclear cooperation was just one part. Cooperation in the promotion of democracy in Central Asia and Myanmar, the sale of U.S. nuclear equipment and civil and military aircraft, and future Indian participation in U.S.-led military undertakings like the Proliferation Security Initiative were described as some of the strategic and economic benefits which would accrue to Washington once the proposed nuclear deal goes through.

But for the entire process to begin, India has to effect a separation between its civilian and military nuclear facilities, the officials stressed.

"Our judgment is that it would not be wise or fair to ask Congress to make such a consequential decision without evidence that the Indian Government was acting on what is arguably the most important of its commitments — the separation of its civilian and military nuclear facilities," Under-Secretary of State for Political Affairs Nicholas Burns told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on November 2. He said during his visit to New Delhi in October, he had told the Indian leadership "that it must craft a credible and transparent plan and have begun to implement it before the Administration would request Congressional action." He added that Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran has "assured me that the Indian Government will produce such a plan."

Both Mr. Burns and Robert G. Joseph, the Under-Secretary of State for Arms Control, favourably cited Mr. Saran's October 24 speech on non-proliferation where he stated — contrary to what Department of Atomic Energy chairman Anil Kakodkar had said earlier — that "it makes no sense for India to deliberately keep some of its civilian facilities out of its declaration for safeguards purposes, if it is really interested in obtaining international cooperation on as wide a scale as possible."

Both the "separation and the resultant safeguards must contribute to our non-proliferation goals," Mr. Joseph stressed. On his part, Mr. Burns said "as India begins to meet its commitments under our agreement, we will propose appropriate [legislative] language that would be India-specific and would demonstrate our dedication to a robust and permanent partnership."

Providing details of the issues raised by Mr. Burns during his last visit to Delhi, Mr. Joseph said the U.S. side had laid out "some straightforward principles." "I will not enumerate them fully here since the negotiations remain ongoing, but would like to underscore just a couple of these. For example, to ensure that the United States and other potential suppliers can confidently supply to India and meet our obligations under the NPT, safeguards must be applied in perpetuity. Further, the separation plan must ensure — and the safeguards must confirm — that cooperation does not "in any way assist" in the development or production of nuclear weapons. In this context, nuclear materials in the civil sector should not be transferred out of the civil sector."

Mr Joseph said that "several countries" had told the U.S. that India must not be granted "de jure or de facto status as a nuclear weapon State under the NPT." This was the reason, he said, "a `voluntary offer' arrangement of the type in place in the five internationally-recognised nuclear weapon States would not be acceptable for India." The U.S., he said, agreed with this argument. Only if New Delhi put forward a "credible and defensible plan" of separation would many States "become more steadfast in their support" of the plan to allow nuclear commerce with India.

Once India comes up with a "credible, transparent, and defensible separation plan," the U.S. "will be ready to engage with our NSG partners in developing a formal proposal to allow the shipment of Trigger List items and related technology to India, Mr. Joseph said. "Obviously, the number of facilities and activities that India places under IAEA safeguards, and the method and speed with which it does so, will directly affect the degree to which we will be able to build support for full civil nuclear cooperation."

Saying that he hoped India would "also take additional non-proliferation-related actions beyond those specifically outlined in the Joint Statement," Mr. Joseph noted "with satisfaction" the Manmohan Singh Government's vote against Iran at the IAEA in September. Turning to the commercial benefits, he said: "As a result of our involvement in India's civil nuclear industry, U.S. companies will be able to enter India's lucrative and growing energy market, potentially providing jobs for thousands of Americans."

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