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Games LTTE plays

Every election in Sri Lanka has a non-contesting candidate, you know who. The November 17 presidential contest between Mahinda Rajapakse of the Sri Lanka Freedom Party and the United National Party's Ranil Wickremesinghe will be no different. The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam directs the political choice of Tamil voters in Northern Sri Lanka; it also influences Tamil voters, directly and indirectly, in other parts of the country. At times, the terrorist group will openly back a candidate or a political party. In 1994 it supported Chandrika Kumaratunga for President, and in 1999 Ranil Wickremesinghe. In both campaigns, it decided to liquidate the opposing candidate — and succeeded in its attempt in the case of Gamini Dissanayake, but failed narrowly in the case of President Kumaratunga, who lost an eye in the suicide attack. In parliamentary elections, the LTTE virtually determines the fate of candidates contesting in the North-East. In 2001, its cadres canvassed support for a spineless Tamil National Alliance. In 2004, it went a step further, killing and intimidating candidates opposing the TNA, and on voting day, broke all the rules to ensure its clients won. The tactics varied but the criterion for support remained the same: which candidate would better serve the long-term goal of establishing Eelam. This time, the LTTE has declared an absence of interest, claiming that neither candidate has the interests of Tamils at heart. Is this Morse for a Tamil boycott of the election?

Such a boycott in the North-East will greatly improve Mr. Rajapakse's chances of winning. The Prime Minister is on a strong footing among voters of the majority Sinhala-Buddhist community. His campaign has aimed at consolidating this with the help of the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna — a party with a radical, rural Sinhala identity — and sections of the Buddhist clergy. While Mr. Wickremesinghe has his share of the majority vote, he is depending on minority support to give him an edge in a close race. He sewed up alliances early with parties representing Muslims and Indian Tamils. What he is desperately looking for are the Tamil votes of the North-East, where he is well regarded for crafting, as Prime Minister, the February 2002 ceasefire. At first sight, it seems strange that the LTTE would want to hurt the prospects of one who gave it so many concessions, including lifting the ban on it. A boycott would mean the LTTE has made up its mind that a President Rajapakse will suit its secessionist cause better than a President Wickremesinghe. It is making capital of the Prime Minister's anti-federal posture to paint the peace process as a futile quest for Tamil aspirations within a unitary trap. It is quite possible that the LTTE, under the garb of indifference, continues to support Mr. Wickremesinghe but does not want to make that obvious for fear of eroding his Sinhala vote base. There is surely more to the LTTE's professed neutrality in this contest than meets the eye.

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