The Hindu : Opinion / News Analysis : Warning signals from Jehanabad

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Thursday, Nov 17, 2005

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Opinion - News Analysis

Warning signals from Jehanabad

K. Srinivas Reddy

The Jehanabad type of raid is significant because the Maoists laid siege to the town with the help of people who are not hardcore cadres.

JEHANABAD MAY be a turning point for the naxalite movement in the country on two counts. For one, the Maoists have proved beyond doubt that they can mobilise civilians in their struggle areas. Secondly, the November 13 raids indicate that the guerrilla war waged by the Maoists has reached a decisive stage — of `mobile warfare.' Coming as they do after the unification of the naxalite forces barely 14 months ago, the developments are certainly cause for concern.

Leave aside the attacks on security forces, mine blasts, and attacks on police stations, where hardcore rebel fighters are involved. The Jehanabad type of raid is significant because the Maoists laid siege to the town with about 1000 people, only one third of whom could be People's Liberation Guerrilla Army (PLGA) fighters. Jehanabad was not the lone incident.

The November 11 attack on a Home Guard training centre in Giridh of Bihar also saw more than 300 people participating in the raid that fetched the PLGA 185 rifles and countless numbers of bullets. Or take the case of Madhuban attack, also in Bihar, on June 23. More than 200 Maoists attacked a police station and a block office to loot arms after killing five people. In all these cases, the guerrilla forces were actively assisted by civilians called the People's Militia or the Base Force.

Such incidents involving civilian population may be few for now, but they do point to the capabilities of the Maoist leadership in mobilising the masses and coordinating the movement of assault teams. More such actions can be anticipated. The Central Committee has called for another round of the Tactical Counter Offensive Campaign (TCOC). The success of each raid will strengthen the Maoists and expose the state.

The killings of 24 CRPF personnel in an ambush in the Bastar forests of Chhattisgarh, the gunning down of IPS office K.C. Surendra Babu in Munger of Bihar, seizure of arms in Gadchiroli and Gondia, killing of a sub-inspector in Mahabubnagar, an abortive attempt on the life of Mahesh Chandra Laddah, SP of Prakasam district in Andhra Pradesh, the attack on an armed outpost in Sambalpur and near the house of a Minister in Malkangiri of Orissa are part of the TCOC. This campaign the Maoists say is an answer to the `encirclement-suppression campaigns' launched by the security forces.

Faced with such intensified guerrilla activity, the official line is that such attacks are always repulsed. At most scapegoats are found, like Jehanabad Superintendent of Police Sunil Kumar.

The Jehanabad `politico-military' raid served three purposes for the Maoist party. It managed to free its State committee leader Ajay Kanu. Secondly, a powerful message was sent to Ranvir Sena activists that the Maoists can attack anyone and anywhere. Thirdly, the Maoist guerrillas managed to snatch weapons and ammunition. The State Government has not yet conceded losing weapons; the Maoists maintain that hundreds of rifles and thousands of rounds were seized.

More dangerous is employing of the "mobile warfare tactics" in these raids. Mobile warfare is a decisive stage in guerrilla war and if allowed to continue, Maoists will in a short time `liberate' pockets of influence. Mobile warfare is a stage where the guerrilla force is in a commanding position and the State forces find themselves on the defensive.

The importance of mobile warfare, sometimes called positional warfare in Maoist terminology, can be better gauged if one were to take a macroscopic look at the revolutionary movement. The Maoist presence is felt in almost 125 districts of 13 States.

In some areas, it would be in the `Organisation' stage, where the revolutionary would only organise partial struggles on local issues and try to mobilise people. Self-Defence is of top priority for the revolutionary and violence is only `need-based' in such areas. This is the situation in Kerala, parts of Karnataka, Haryana, Delhi, Uttar Pradesh, Tamil Nadu or Madhya Pradesh. The revolutionary movement is in a nascent stage and, typically, the law enforcement agencies underestimate the impact without realising that the organisation stage soon develops into `guerrilla warfare' stage.

This stage, according to Maoist strategies, is the one where the revolutionary and the State are on an equal footing and whoever fights will have the areas brought under their domination. In this stage of revolution, `shoot and scoot' guerrilla attacks are focussed on security forces. By the time the forces react, the small guerrilla bands would have melted into forests. The Government would typically dump forces in these `critical' areas only to find the guerrilla vanishing. Attacks would then be stepped up in `non-critical' areas leaving the security forces confused and tired.

As battle fatigue sets in among the security forces, the guerrilla forces would be further emboldened. Then the civilian population, which would have been neutral hitherto, would swing towards the guerrillas and this is where the `mobile warfare' stage begins.

This is the current scenario that is being witnessed in some pockets under the influence of Maoists.

If this is the field situation in at least 13 States, the response from the Central and State Governments is far from satisfactory. More often, solutions are being tried out on a trial and error basis in the face of area specific strategies employed by the Maoists. Incorrect application of counter strategies, especially when the Maoists know what they are doing, can only spell doom for the democratic institutions and that is what is happening now.

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