NEW DELHI: The civilian nuclear deal between India and the United States should be "allowed to lapse" because of the "onerous new conditions" the Americans were trying to impose on the July 18 agreement. Strategic analyst, Matin Zuberi, however, argued that India and the U.S. should continue cooperation in other areas of mutual benefit.

In a paper written for the Observer Research Foundation, Prof. Zuberi raised several questions about the nuclear deal. Would India's declaration to be filed with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) only contain a list of civilian nuclear facilities? Or would it also include the amount of nuclear material produced in them?

If, the latter were included, then India would be going in for full-scope safeguards, he argued.

"According to American sources, Indian purchase of natural uranium would be under IAEA safeguards. Because of (the) shortage of uranium, the introduction of safeguarded uranium in our civilian programme — power reactors, reprocessing plants, research reactors, prototype fast breeder reactor, and even future indigenously produced power plants — would be brought under safeguards; and they will be in perpetuity," he said.

Prof. Zuberi, formerly with the Jawaharlal Nehru University, felt that American interpretations of the July 18 joint statement should be treated as "pressure tactics" to obtain non-proliferation objectives.

"As a democracy, India cannot build a consensus around these extraordinarily escalating demands. Indian negotiators should firmly assert that we stick to the solemn assurances that Prime Minister Manmohan Singh gave (in Parliament) ...," he said.

The strategic analyst said that in 1980 the U.S. had gone back on an international commitment to supply enriched fuel to the Tarapur plant till 1993, citing its domestic laws. "Indian applications for supply that required long and acrimonious Congressional hearings were used to discipline it. The same process is now being repeated at the Congressional hearings on the (July 18) joint statement," the paper said.

Prof. Zuberi quoted American author, Selig Harrison, as observing that India had 31 per cent of the world's known deposits of thorium, allowing it to rapidly expand its civilian nuclear programme and shifting progressively to thorium-based fast-breeder reactors, thereby achieving energy independence. This meant that India could also dramatically increase its inventory of fissile material. Therefore, Mr. Harrison felt that it was necessary to bind India to the non-proliferation regime.

According to Mr. Harrison, India had made an important concession by agreeing to place "all its existing and future civilian reactors under IAEA safeguards." The alternative to the new arrangement could have been the "emergence over time of a Gaullist India that could play an unpredictable, freewheeling role in Asia."

Prof. Zuberi also pointed out that of the 915 nuclear facilities under safeguards worldwide, only 11 were in the five countries recognised as nuclear powers in the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty. Of these, six were in the U.S., three in China, one each in France and Britain and none in Russia.

It should be emphasised that India had reciprocally assumed, under the July 18 deal, the same responsibilities and practices and acquire the same benefits and advantages as other leading countries with advanced nuclear technology, such as the United States.

"Therefore, the question of India offering all civilian nuclear facilities under safeguards simply does not arise," the paper said.

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