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A case of peace talks through the press?

B. Muralidhar Reddy

Pakistan has time and again gone public with new proposals for a resolution of the dispute over Kashmir even as negotiations were going on with India.

FOR SOME time now, the Pakistani establishment and large sections of the media have been taken with "de-militarisation and self-governance" as major steps towards resolving the dispute with India over Jammu and Kashmir. The issue caught the attention of Pakistan's media after its Prime Minister, Shaukat Aziz, spoke on November 20 about the "proposals" to Minister of State for External Affairs E. Ahamed. This was during a courtesy call by Mr. Ahamed after the international donors' conference in Islamabad to raise funds for the earthquake affected. The next day it was the main story in most of the Pakistani papers.

The Pakistan Foreign Office spokesperson, Tasleem Aslam, who holds a briefing every Monday, further surprised journalists with her assertion that Mr. Aziz had outlined the proposals to Prime Minister Manmohan Singh on the sidelines of the SAARC Summit in Dhaka in the second week of November. Ms. Aslam claimed Dr. Singh had "taken note" of the proposals but declined to spell out details.

The categorical assertion by the External Affairs Ministry spokesperson in New Delhi the following day that no such proposals were made has done little to dampen the enthusiasm of either Pakistan's Foreign Office or the media in debating their merits.

India said it was just a reference that Mr. Aziz had made "in passing." Prime Minister Manmohan Singh had, at the same time, according to an official spokesman, asserted that Jammu and Kashmir "already enjoyed autonomy under the Indian Constitution and has in place a popular government elected through free and fair elections." He had also told Mr. Aziz that there was "clearly a lack of autonomy in the Pakistan-occupied Kashmir and there has been no popular elections at all in Gilgit and Baltistan to determine the wishes and aspirations of the people there."

Far from answering the Indian contention that the two proposals were not discussed at Dhaka, the Pakistan Foreign Office complained about the `evasive' attitude of New Delhi in the quest for resolution of the Kashmir issue and spoke of the need for `flexibility' on both sides.

Exactly a week later, on November 28, Ms. Aslam closed further questions on the proposals with the plea that issues relating to the settlement of the Kashmir dispute could not be discussed "in the glare of media." Then why did Pakistan go public with the proposals in the first instance? What could be the motives?

Pakistan's latest claims are a reflection of President Pervez Musharraf's pro-active approach to improving ties with India. This has been the case ever since the peace process gained momentum in January 2004 after the parleys between him and Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee on the sidelines of the SAARC Summit in Islamabad. To Gen. Musharraf's credit, it must be said that days before the 2004 Summit he indicated a major shift in policy when he told an international news agency that his country was ready to set aside the United Nations resolutions, envisaging a plebiscite to ascertain whether the people of Jammu and Kashmir wished to be part of India or Pakistan.

Of course his offer came with the rider that Pakistan was willing to be flexible only if India was ready to reciprocate. Nonetheless, it was no ordinary offer considering that the whole edifice of Pakistan's case on Kashmir rested on the U.N. resolutions. Domestically, he came under vicious attack from the right-wing elements that accused him of sacrificing the cause of Kashmir on America's orders.

It was this new approach coupled with the General's categorical assurance that Pakistan would not allow its soil to be used for anti-India activities that paved the way for the historic meeting between him and Mr. Vajpayee on the sidelines of the SAARC Summit.

Gen. Musharraf continued with his bold approach, sometimes to the extent of antagonising the `Kashmiri' groups, for example Syed Ali Shah Geelani. Again, his concept of division of Jammu and Kashmir into seven regions, presented as food for thought during the 2004 Ramzan, did not go down well with Kashmiris.

But the moot question is whether such an approach can help in resolving the Kashmir issue or in fostering better ties with India in the absence of a clear direction from Pakistan.

Two major flaws

Gen. Musharraf's strategy suffers from two major flaws. Firstly, the Pakistani establishment does not appear to have done sufficient homework on the proposals before going public with them. Reports in the Pakistani media suggest the Foreign Office is burning the proverbial midnight oil in a bid to concretise the proposals. All the proposals emanate from one individual. True, he is the most powerful individual presiding over one of the largest armies of the world. But is it feasible for one individual, however influential, to execute on the ground major policy shifts? The developments in Pakistan in the last two years clearly show it is not possible.

The result is disconnect between the top and other layers of the establishment. In other words, let alone a consensus, there is little clarity in Pakistan on what Gen. Musharraf has in mind on Kashmir. Take, for example, the proposal on self-governance. The Pakistan Foreign Office spokesperson had a tough time fielding questions from the media on whether it meant PoK is being governed from Islamabad and what would be the fate of the government there if the proposal firmed up.

Secondly, Gen. Musharraf and his managers appear oblivious to the Indian concerns vis-à-vis settlement of all outstanding issues with Pakistan. The de-militarisation proposal best illustrates the point. It fails to take note of the ground realities in the light of stepped up violence in Jammu and Kashmir by militant outfits. It ignores heightened Indian concerns after the serial Delhi blasts.

Harping on the de-militarisation theme by Islamabad is ill-timed, if not ill-conceived. Yes, Gen. Musharraf has not missed a single opportunity to make a passionate appeal to various sections in the Indian Government and society for help on arriving at a solution to the Kashmir issue. But he has been fighting shy of addressing or appealing to the militant outfits.

He used the opportunity provided by the international donors' conference organised by Pakistan on November 19 to devote attention to Kashmir and ask virtually every section of Indian society to contribute to the resolution of the issue. In his inimitable style, Gen. Musharraf said it would be India's `donation' and for the first time recognised the Government of Jammu and Kashmir.

But he left out the militant outfits and militants. Gen. Musharraf himself acknowledged in May this year, in his address to the SAFMA Parliamentarians Conference, the linkage between de-militarisation and militancy and the need to tackle both the issues together.

Terming human rights violations `incidental' to the presence of large forces in Kashmir, the Pakistan President said these would have to be dealt with along with militancy to move towards demilitarisation. "India says demilitarisation is not possible without stopping militancy. It is a chicken and egg situation. Both [human rights issue and militancy] need to be addressed in some form."

The grievance of Gen. Musharraf's managers vis-à-vis New Delhi is that the latter has done precious little even in terms of coming out with innovative ideas on resolution of Kashmir. They accuse India of going back to the theme of cross-border infiltration and terrorism infrastructure across the border every time the Kashmir issue crops up in the dialogue process.

Fair enough. But why does Gen. Musharraf not extend his pro-active approach to helping India take on the militants, aided by a section of the Pakistani establishment, who are hell bent on wrecking the peace process?

Given Gen. Musharraf's understanding of the complexity of the issue and various dimensions, why is Pakistan rushing with proposals at a time when it is engaged in dialogue with India? What purpose does it serve other than giving a wrong impression of some dramatic progress on Kashmir when there is no such indication?

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