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Trading charges in the midst of drift

Amit Baruah

The India-Pakistan peace process has taken some knocks recently. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and President Pervez Musharraf need to engage directly.

DRIFT HAS taken hold of India-Pakistan relations. After missing an opportunity for real cooperation in the wake of the October 2005 earthquake, a lack of direction in bilateral ties between the two countries seems evident from the developments in the past few weeks.

There has also been a partial return to what was considered "normal" for decades between India and Pakistan — trading charges and blaming the other for anything that goes wrong domestically. In the bargain, some of the sheen has been rubbed off the peace process.

Yes, the process of dialogue and contacts has been going on; yes, some tiny steps for cooperation were taken after one of the worst natural disasters that struck Pakistan and India. But the fact remains that the Indian and Pakistani establishments remain deeply suspicious of each other.

A day before the December 28 terrorist strike in Bangalore, India decided to go on a verbal offensive against Islamabad, saying it had been watching with concern the spiralling violence in Balochistan and the heavy military action, including the use of helicopter gunships and jet fighters, by Pakistan.

Given New Delhi's defensive posture on human rights issues and its disinclination to confront the Western consensus on a vital issue like Abdul Qadeer Khan and his nuclear industry, the External Affairs Ministry took a surprisingly proactive stand on human rights violations in Balochistan.

With the Ministry under the direct charge of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, there is little doubt where the approval for the December 27 statement from.

India's "concern" at the situation in Balochistan goes against the grain of mature and statesman-like remarks made by Dr. Singh himself in Dhaka on November 13, 2005. Asked by an Indian correspondent whether the Pakistani state or "rogue elements" were responsible for recent terrorist incidents, Dr. Singh emphasised he had said many a time that India did not have the liberty of choosing its neighbours.

"We have to do business with governments that are in power [in Pakistan] ... therefore, using harsh language in public is not the best way, I think, to promote dialogue and understanding. If we have any concerns, we do discuss with the governments concerned. I do not believe anything great is achieved by conducting this dialogue in full [public] glare," the Prime Minister said.

So where does the Balochistan statement fit in? Certainly not in the paradigm proposed by the Prime Minister. Yet a provocative statement was made by New Delhi. Its consequences for the peace process were obvious given that "follow-up" from the Pakistani Foreign Ministry spokeswoman and President Pervez Musharraf was only to be expected.

In a recent interview to CNN-IBN, the General blamed India for providing "lots of financial support" and support in kind to anti-government elements in Balochistan. To my mind, the General only accused India of fishing in Balochistan's troubled waters since New Delhi had expressed concern about the record of the Pakistani state in that province.

He also conveyed an invitation of sorts to Dr. Manmohan Singh to visit Pakistan for a cricket game. "Now if he comes here and we do nothing about the peace process, I am afraid we are just wasting our time," the General said bluntly.

In a return to punch-bag diplomacy, ably aided by the kind of questions that were put to him in the television interview, the General expressed a sense of frustration at the lack of response from India to his proposals on self-governance in Jammu & Kashmir, something between autonomy and independence. At the same time, President Musharraf said India-Pakistan relations had never been better.

From the interview, it would appear that the General is frustrated with India's attitude and approach — unhappy, perhaps, that New Delhi hadn't given him the importance he wanted. He added another "bombshell" on television when he called for the withdrawal of Indian troops from Srinagar, Baramulla, and Kupwara towns.

India's response to the interview was quick and sharp. At 10 p.m. on January 7, India flatly rejected any Pakistan role in the withdrawal of troops from Jammu & Kashmir. "I would like to say ... that any demilitarisation or redeployment of security forces within the territory of India is a sovereign decision of the Government of India and cannot be dictated by any foreign government," the External Affairs Ministry spokesman stated.

India, through the Ministry spokesman, cut at the root of hopes that some creative thinking on approaching the Kashmir issue was possible. Using a description for Jammu & Kashmir that traditionally irritates Pakistan, he added, "... It ought to be clear that concepts such as joint control or joint management over Jammu and Kashmir, which is an integral part of India, cannot be the basis of a settlement of the issue of Jammu and Kashmir."

Let us rewind to April 2005 when the General and the Prime Minister concluded that the peace process between India and Pakistan was "now irreversible." In this spirit, the two leaders addressed the Kashmir issue and agreed to continue their discussions towards a final settlement of the problem.

Obviously, the peace process has taken a hit with all these potshots being taken by India and Pakistan. Mercifully, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh refused to comment on the General's demilitarisation proposals. A UNI report quoted him as saying on January 10: "I simply do not want to make any comment on this issue."

Since it is still at the level of the spokesman on the Indian side, the Prime Minister has given himself the space to engage with Gen. Musharraf on another occasion to inject positive atmospherics into a vitiated environment.

One thing definite about India-Pakistan relations is they never remain the same — they are forever changing, always throwing up a new surprise. If the leaders remain serious about the peace process being irreversible, they need to take charge of what is happening under its umbrella.

Solemn commitments contained in the very bilateral joint statement issued on April 18, 2005, have not been implemented yet. A specific case in point is that of the Indian and Pakistani consulates in Karachi and Mumbai, which, according to the joint statement, were to be opened "before the end of the current year".

Role of babudom

Let us now look at babudom in India and Pakistan. There was a long window between April 18 and December 31, 2005. However, the babus showed little urgency in meeting the deadline in the bilateral agreement, which has now passed. Essentially, the two sides remain suspicious of each other and neither is willing to accommodate the other.

New Delhi rightly remains suspicious of Pakistani terrorist groups and their actions in India. At the same time, Jaish-e-Muhammad, responsible for several major terrorist strikes in India, has also been found culpable in the assassination attempts on Gen. Musharraf himself in December 2003.

The Lashkar-e-Taiba, on the other hand, is a different cup of tea and information suggests it is still being used by Pakistani intelligence agencies. There cannot be any tolerance for residual support from the Pakistani establishment to terrorist outfits. At the same time, India needs to recognise that some anti-India groups are also a problem for the Pakistani state.

Of course, the partial action taken against the terrorist groups became necessary for Islamabad after the September 11, 2001 terrorist strikes. The United States remains important for Pakistan and Islamabad continues to bask in the glory of Washington's complimentary reference to its role in the "war" against terrorism.

It also needs to be acknowledged that the U.S. has become an important player in South Asia. Washington's goal has been to ensure that India-Pakistani histrionics do not detract from its larger goal of taking on Al-Qaeda and Taliban terrorists in Pakistan.

Given the importance of the U.S. to both Pakistan and India, it would not come as a surprise if Islamabad and New Delhi have upped the ante ahead of President George W. Bush's visit to both countries some time in February-March.

If Pakistan wants to express a sense of frustration about the lack of progress on Kashmir (and the need for Mr. Bush to push India), India wants to stress that Islamabad continues to support terrorist actions in its territory (and the need for Mr. Bush to push Pakistan) prior to the U.S. President's arrival in the region.

Though the peace process has taken some knocks in the past few weeks, it will weather these verbal assaults. The need to eschew the public route in India-Pakistan relations is obvious from what has happened after India's Balochistan comment and the General's response.

The Prime Minister and the General need to engage directly and confidentially if the health of the peace process is to be restored. Trading charges will not promote peace.

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