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Another attempt to bring peace in Sri Lanka

V.S. Sambandan

IT WAS the news that Sri Lanka's peace process was waiting for. On Wednesday, the Government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam agreed to hold direct talks on the implementation of the ceasefire agreement in Switzerland. This marks a revival of negotiations that have remained stalled for nearly three years.

To all appearances, it was a make-or-break situation for the peace process when Norway's Minister for International Development, Erik Solheim, who is also a key facilitator, arrived in the country earlier this week.

It was a different Sri Lanka that Mr. Solheim flew into in January 2006 compared to his early days as facilitator in the late 1990s. Now, the big guns are silent; there is no full-fledged war between the Government and the LTTE. As the tattered ceasefire agreement — signed in February 2002 — continues to hold, the biggest challenge for the facilitators and the Government is in coaxing the Tigers to get back to the negotiating table.

This, it was hoped, would end the cycle of killings in the north and the east. The key challenge for the facilitators was to translate into action the agreement between Colombo and the LTTE to discuss the "implementation aspects of the ceasefire agreement." A ceasefire agreement marred by continued killings since December sent an edgy nation into a war psychosis. Since December, over 130 persons have been killed in the renewed violence. According to Army statistics, these include 77 from the security forces, 42 civilians and 15 LTTE cadres.

The proposal to discuss the implementation aspects of the ceasefire has been hanging fire since last August, when the then President, Chandrika Kumaratunga, wanted talks held in the immediate aftermath of the assassination of Foreign Minister Lakshman Kadirgamar by a suspected LTTE sniper.

Despite an agreement between the Government and the LTTE on the need for such talks, differences persisted over the venue. Colombo proposed that the talks be held within government-held Sri Lanka or in the no-man's land in the north. The LTTE said the talks should be held either in the rebel-controlled areas or in Norway, preferably Oslo.

The deadlock continued till the end of the Chandrika Kumaratunga Presidency. Mahinda Rajapakse, who was sworn in on November 18, did not have the normal political honeymoon a democratically elected leader enjoys. LTTE chief V. Prabakaran sent him a vaguely-worded message, barely 10 days after his election, giving a year's time to come up with a "practical" solution to the conflict, failing which, he said,the Tigers would intensify their struggle.

The escalation in violence followed. The killings began barely a fortnight after Sri Lanka elected Mr. Rajapakse Executive President, backed by the unitarist Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) and the Jathika Hela Urumaya (JHU).

And the LTTE's demand for a separate state remained unchanged. It is this that fashioned the LTTE-inspired "poll-boycott" in the north and the east and influenced the electoral outcome.

Though the stalemate over the venue for talks has ended, there are substantive matters to be addressed. For the LTTE, there are two key issues — disarming of "paramilitaries" in the eastern districts and de-escalation in the northern Jaffna peninsula. Significantly, both relate directly to the hold the LTTE will exercise on the ground in two critical areas of the northeast. It is unlikely the rebels will compromise on either of the issues as they relate directly to turf control.

The paramilitaries are a euphemistic reference to supporters of the former LTTE special commander, V. Muralitharan (`Col.' Karuna) operating in the eastern districts. The continued internecine fighting in the east has eroded the Tigers' free run in the region. It is also a serious challenge to their claim — one that is to an extent endorsed by default by successive governments — that they are the "sole representatives" of the island's Tamils.

The Army's presence in the Tamil-dominated Jaffna has also meant that the LTTE's claim to govern its homeland is at stake.

What then made the LTTE agree to a venue other than Oslo? The answer lies in external factors. An international community — that had already isolated the LTTE — stepped up pressure on the Government and the Tigers to resume negotiations. Be it New Delhi, Oslo, Washington or Brussels, the message was the same: there should be a resumption of dialogue.

Yet another critical factor is the impending Assembly elections in Tamil Nadu. If indeed the LTTE intends a military blitzkrieg it will see itself better off after an attempt at negotiations. This also gives it the time for an effective propaganda setting.

The question behind all these tactical shifts, however, is: has the LTTE abandoned its separatist end-game? No, it has not. Against that backdrop, the decision by Colombo and the LTTE to go to Switzerland has two implications.

At best, it could result in a reduction of violence in the northeast. At worst, it would go down in history as yet another time-buying tactic. The outcome entirely depends on how close the Government and the LTTE remain close to the negotiating table..

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