The Hindu : Opinion / News Analysis : Indo-U.S. space cooperation adrift

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Saturday, Feb 11, 2006

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Opinion - News Analysis

Indo-U.S. space cooperation adrift

R. Ramachandran

If the U.S. is unwilling to relax controls in the arena of space technology, where ISRO stands to gain in commercial terms, why should India yield on the nuclear front?

THE FOCUS of much of the ongoing discussions and debate on the Indo-U.S. agreement of July 18 has, unfortunately, been only on one part of it — the nuclear sector. The other important component of cooperation in space technology and commerce, negotiated earlier under the Next Steps in Strategic Partnership (NSSP) and currently under the Indo-U.S. Working Group on Civil Space Cooperation, has not received the attention it deserves. Only some motivated news reports, peddling wrong information, have appeared.

Compared to the nuclear field, forging cooperation in space technology with the U.S. should be simpler in principle. In the nuclear sector, there are the issues of the safeguards regime of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), adjustments in the restrictive U.S. non-proliferation laws, and the overarching guidelines of the multilateral 44-member Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). From the Indian side, there are the apparently inextricable linkages of the civil and military programmes.

In the case of space, besides changes in the licensing policies of the U.S. Department of State that govern the export of satellites and subsystems, there are no such overarching global controls to contend with. Though on the Indian side there are informal linkages between the civil and military uses of space technology (like common facilities for tests and diagnostics), they are not inextricable like in the nuclear field. The two operations are controlled by separate organisations: the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) and the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) respectively.

In addition, self-imposed firewalls have been erected by ISRO in recent years, much to the discomfiture of the DRDO.

And yet, Indo-U.S. space cooperation is yet to make tangible progress even though the negotiations began much earlier. In fact, there is much more to gain from cooperation in space than in the nuclear field. So, why is no one complaining? Why are there no screaming headlines? That is because the Indo-U.S. nuclear deal has become the totem of the newly defined directions and goals of India's foreign policy.

The French connection

On February 1, the Paris-based European satellite operator Eutelsat Communications selected the newly formed alliance between ISRO and EADS Astrium, a wing of the company European Aerospace Defence and Space (EADS), for the fabrication of its telecommunication satellite called W2M. The final contract will be signed in Delhi on February 20 in the presence of French President Jacques Chirac. This is the immediate consequence of the memorandum of understanding (MoU) signed last June in Le Bourget, France, between ISRO and EADS Astrium for cooperation in communication satellites. This significant development has not got the publicity it deserves. Especially because it stands in contrast with what was held out as the big promise of Indo-U.S. space cooperation, which did not materialise largely due to Washington's intransigence.

To recall, following the NSSP initiative of President George W. Bush in January 2004, Boeing showed interest in ISRO's Insat 2K and 3K buses (satellite platforms) for its payloads and to cater to the small but significant segment of 2-3 tonne satellites in the international market for which it did not have an appropriate bus. For ISRO too, it was a good opportunity to enter the international satellite market riding on Boeing's market reach and brand value. As required under the U.S. International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) Act, which regulates the export of satellites and related systems and components, a Technology Assistance Agreement (TAA) was granted to Boeing "to engage in discussions and share data with ISRO on the division of responsibilities for possible joint cooperation in the development and marketing of communication satellites."

However, early last year, Boeing decided to drop the idea chiefly because of the cumbersome licensing and approval process involved. At every step, licence was required. Boeing had to obtain two more TAAs — one for "defence services" and another for marketing — to continue the negotiations. This would have had to be finally followed by a Technology Safeguards Agreement (TSA) when systems are transferred to ISRO, if integration is to be done here. With changes at its helm, Boeing felt the efforts were not worth the small market share it was seeking.

The point is regulatory procedures could have been simplified as part of the NSSP, if the U.S. had sincerely desired.

It is at this juncture that EADS stepped in and seized the opportunity to join hands with ISRO to fabricate the same class of satellites based on the Insat 2K and 3K platforms (with overall power less than 4.5 kW). The W2M satellite is a 3-tonne satellite with total payload power of 4 kW. Under the agreement EADS will provide the payloads and the integration would be done by ISRO in India to be delivered to Eutelsat in 28 months.

Of course, U.S. export regulations would come into play for American-made components in the payload and State Department licences for export by EADS to India would be required. However, according to ISRO chairman G. Madhavan Nair, the two sides have agreed not to use U.S. components to the maximum extent possible. Under the agreement, ISRO can also launch these satellites if there are no U.S. components.

Launch of U.S.-made satellites or those with U.S. components on ISRO's vehicles, however, would require a Launch Services Agreement (LSA) in addition to the TSA (for every launch or a fixed number of launches as the U.S. did with China). The LSA will permit exchange only of payload interface data and nothing more. An LSA is also being negotiated under the Indo-U.S. agreement. However, talks on this have just begun. According to ISRO sources, the U.S. insisted on a full-fledged TSA that included restrictive movement of the payload, constant overseeing presence of U.S. escorts, and impermeable firewalls between civil and military. This, however, was not acceptable to ISRO. A draft agreement has apparently been just exchanged and a U.S. response is awaited. Clearly, this other hyped aspect of Indo-U.S. space talks will take time to fructify.

In the meanwhile, the two sides have agreed on the modality for carrying the NASA payload — basically instrumentation weighing a few kg — on the Indian lunar mission. Even here there were initial problems as regards the TSA. However, according to Dr. Nair, "in totality a mutually acceptable solution has been arrived at for Chandrayaan and the agreement will formalised soon."

In sum, if the U.S. is unwilling to relax its controls in the simpler arena of space technology, where ISRO stands to gain in commercial terms, it is not clear why India should bend over backwards and yield on the nuclear front.

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