Washington: Three prominent non-proliferation experts want the Bush administration to impose strict conditions on India before giving the green signal to the India-United States civilian nuclear technology deal.

Two weeks ahead of U.S. President George Bush's visit to India to seal the deal, the experts said India should be asked to present a "permanent, facility-specific list" of its nuclear reactors to bring them under international safeguards. New Delhi should also be asked to agree to a "cut-off of Indian fissile material production for weapons," which had been adopted by the five original nuclear weapons states.

The experts, David Albright, Leonard Weiss and Daryl G. Kimball, said this in a letter to the House of Representatives and at a press briefing at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace here on Wednesday.

International safeguards

Under the July 18, 2005 agreement signed by Mr. Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, the U.S. promised India full cooperation in developing its civilian atomic power industry in return for New Delhi's commitment to international non-proliferation standards by separating its civilian and military nuclear facilities and placing them under international safeguards.

The deal, which would lift a 30-year ban on nuclear commerce between the countries, must be approved by the U.S. Congress to bring about changes in U.S. non-proliferation laws and also changes in the rules of the 45-nation Nuclear Suppliers Group.

The experts said India's separation plan did not justify changes in U.S. non-proliferation laws or international norms to make far-reaching exceptions to allow transfer of sensitive civilian nuclear technology. "However, building upon the already strong U.S.-Indian partnership is an important goal, and we remain convinced that it can be achieved without undermining U.S. leadership efforts to prevent proliferation of the world's most dangerous weapons."

The experts feared that India's reluctance to place all its reactors under permanent inspections smacked of a clandestine effort to increase weapons production, and also belied the Bush administration's contention that the deal would bring India into compliance with the non-proliferation regime.

Supply of fuel

Even if India's civilian-military separation plan was deemed "credible," and all its facilities were placed under safeguards, the supply of nuclear fuel would still free up its existing capacity to produce plutonium and highly enriched uranium for weapons, and allow for the rapid expansion of its nuclear arsenal.

"It is of course up to India to choose whether it wants to keep its nuclear weapons options open or whether it wants to expand its energy output with nuclear technology. But it is the responsibility of the President and [the U.S.] Congress not to aid and abet any other state's nuclear bomb program."

They also said the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty commitments forbade the U.S. from assisting another State's weapons programme in any way. — UNI

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