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The nuclear issue and Iran's domestic debate

Atul Aneja

While there is a consensus in Iran on acquiring nuclear know-how, there are deep differences on whether to go in for weapons capability. But the threat of aggression by the U.S. or Israel could prove a rallying factor.

OVER A million Iranians poured into the streets of Teheran on February 11 to commemorate the 27th anniversary of the Islamic Revolution. The turnout evoked memories of the Revolution's early days, when Ayatollah Khomeini drew heady crowds into the capital's streets soon after the fall of the Pahlavi dynasty in 1979.

Then revolutionary zeal was the mobilising force. Last Saturday, it appeared a combination of national pride and, most importantly, a deep-seated anxiety that motivated people to emerge in such large numbers. As expected, Iran's nuclear standoff with the United States and the European Union, and the decision of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) board to "report" its case to the United Nations Security Council was the underlying theme of the march, which ended at the capital's Azadi Square.

The English language daily Teheran described the outpouring of humanity as a "referendum" on the nuclear issue. Another prominent newspaper, Iran News, said the present situation was comparable to 1951 when, despite opposition from colonial powers, Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadegh nationalised the Iranian oil industry, triggering a tidal wave of mass support.

The threat of a possible war with the U.S. and Israel has pulled all sections of the Iranians into the ongoing nuclear debate. There is a clear realisation that their nuclear facility in Natanz, where gas centrifuges for enriching uranium have been positioned, is only 1,700 kilometres from Israel. This is well within the reach of Israeli F-15 fighter jets, which can fly 4,500 km without refuelling. There is also the precedent of 1981 when Israel used these U.S.-built planes to destroy Iraq's Osirak reactor, thereby upsetting Baghdad's plans on nuclear energy permanently.

The situation has become alarming as 140,000 U.S. troops are on Iran's doorstep in Iraq. Hawkish statements by the Bush administration have further fuelled anxieties. In an interview to a German newspaper earlier this month, U.S. Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld did not rule out the use of military force against Iran.

The Iranian establishment is also fully aware of CONPLAN 8022-02, a directive signed by U.S. President George W. Bush in January 2003. This plan envisages the use of air power, and does not preclude the deployment of earth penetrating "mini-nukes" to target underground sites as in Iran. It does not provide for the commitment of ground troops, and is therefore radically different from the Iraqi war plan. The Bush administration has been alluding to a "full spectrum global strike," which includes the use of precision bombs — both nuclear and conventional.

In the summer of 2005, Mr. Rumsfeld approved a top secret "Interim Global Strike Alert Order," under which the U.S. Strategic Command, which at one time focussed on nuclear forces alone, has been ordered to maintain round-the-clock readiness. The Bush administration is well aware that it is the threat of an attack that has been the driving force behind the Iranian nuclear programme. In his recent article "U.S. fuels Iran's nuclear policy," historian Gareth Porter quotes two former Central Intelligence Agency officials who have maintained that the Iranian nuclear programme was, to a considerable extent, the result of the perceived threat from the U.S. In the words of Paul Pillar, who wrote the CIA assessment reports on Iran between 2000 and 2005, the dominant view in the intelligence community over the past three years has been that Iran would seek nuclear weapons capability because the threat from the U.S. and Israel was a major consideration, though not the only one. The reports concluded that Washington's willingness to allay Iran's security fears would have a significant impact on Iranian policy. Ellen Laipson, who is now president of the Henry L. Stimson Center in Washington and had worked on Iran as national intelligence officer in the early 1990s and later as Vice Chair of the National Intelligence Council, also agrees that there has been a linkage between Iran's threat perception and its nuclear programme.

The U.S. invasion of Iraq in 1990, the categorisation of Iran as part of an "axis of evil," and the refusal of the Bush administration to respond to Iran's overtures in May 2003 to open a dialogue on its nuclear programme as well as anti-Israeli groups over which it exercises considerable influence, has contributed significantly towards heightening Iranian threat perceptions.

While there is a consensus in Iran that the country must acquire nuclear know-how, there are deep differences on whether to translate capability into weapons. A large section of the Iranian intelligentsia believes acquisition of nuclear capability for civilian use alone would provide sufficient deterrence. "Mastering the full nuclear fuel cycle will give Iran the benefit of ambiguity about its programme, which is enough to serve as a deterrent," Arshin Adib-Moghaddam, an Iran specialist at Oxford, told The Hindu . However, there is another school of thought that recommends weaponisation citing the examples of India and Pakistan with whom the U.S.' rules of engagement were re-defined after they became full-fledged nuclear weapon powers in 1998.

Aware of their concerns, the Russians have already started hinting that in order to make progress on the nuclear issue, Iran should be made to feel more secure. There are now discussions within the Russian establishment and academic circles that the format of the dialogue between Iran and western countries needs to be altered drastically. Instead of three European Union countries (EU-3) — Britain, France, and Germany — which have been holding talks, Russia, China, and the U.S. must become essential participants. Recommending a new dialogue architecture, Vladimir Yevseyev, a specialist at the International Security Centre of the Russian Academy of Sciences, says the American role in shaping a positive Iranian response would be crucial, provided it can issue concrete security guarantees to the Iranians.

The Russian establishment also appears to be giving considerable thought to quickly involving China in its diplomacy on Iran. In an interview to the Italian daily La Stampa, Russian Defence Minister Sergei Ivanov said he was hopeful that talks with Iran in the future would be held "with probable participation by the Chinese." He also warned that Russia would not "allow for a confrontation [with Iran] which could lead to conflict," adding that "any attempt to push Iran to a show of force could have irreversible consequences."

Contrary to the popular impression that the Iranian leadership, after Mahmoud Ahmedinejad assumed the Presidency, has been tactlessly confrontationist, there is evidence to suggest that Teheran has been making conciliatory moves behind the scenes. The Iranian Persian language daily Keyhan reported that Teheran had made a six-point proposal that could guarantee the peaceful orientation of the nuclear programme. The offer included a promise to begin the ratification process of the Additional Protocol of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty that allows U.N. inspectors to carry out short-notice inspections of its nuclear facilities. Besides, it signalled its willingness to accept the Russian offer of undertaking uranium enrichment on its soil. The Iranians also said they were ready to continue their nuclear dialogue with the EU-3 for another two years. Iran-based journalists have reported that Javad Veidi, Iran's top nuclear negotiator, submitted the proposal to the EU-3 on January 30.

Some Iranian commentators have also been saying that a new group of decision makers has emerged in Iran with the backing of the Supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. It has drawn members from the political, military, and economic fields and has the support of some members of the elite Revolutionary Guards. The group has reportedly been formed in the wake of a number of government studies that showed that Iran, at the present juncture, was ill prepared to face economic sanctions.

Iran's former President and present head of the Expediency Council, Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, is apparently behind this initiative. The move could undercut the influence of Iran's National Security Council, which is a parliamentary body packed with supporters of President Ahmedinejad.

Interestingly, Mr. Rafsanjani went on a highly publicised visit on January 29 to Iran's spiritual headquarters of Qom, where he met 11 of Iran's 14 Grand Ayatollahs. The Aftabnews website, which is known to be close to Mr. Rafsanjani, said the "nuclear problem" was the centrepiece of their discussions. While it has become clear that there are powerful vested interests in Washington that are clamouring for a war against Iran, there is still a window of hope that conflict can be avoided. Much would depend on a meeting in Moscow, scheduled for February 20 and the IAEA board meeting on March 6, on whether after the Iraq misadventure, another catastrophe, in which tactical nuclear weapons could come into play, can be averted.

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