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Wednesday, Feb 22, 2006

Opinion

Opinion - Leader Page Articles

Is breeder needed for strategic purposes?

R. Ramachandran

In effect, a breeder reactor functions as a "laundry" for dirty plutonium. This assumes importance in the effort for parity with Pakistan vis-à-vis a minimum credible deterrent.

IN THE context of the Indo-U.S. nuclear agreement of July 18, 2005, and the related "civil-military separation" of nuclear facilities of the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE), the nuclear breeder programme has become the chief contentious issue. The U.S. would like to bring the breeder programme — which at present comprises the 40 MWth (13 MWe) Fast Breeder Test Reactor (FBTR) and the upcoming 500 MWe Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor (PFBR) and the associated reprocessing facilities at Kalpakkam — under the safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). These are meant to ensure that nuclear materials from safeguarded facilities are not diverted for military purposes. The Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) chairman, Anil Kakodkar, has, however, maintained, right from the beginning, that the breeder programme cannot be put under safeguards.

In an interview soon after the agreement (see The Hindu , August 12, 2005), he had said that since breeder programme is in the R&D phase, it would not be placed under safeguards. From this perspective, his main concern seems to have to do with the intangibles that come with the inspection regime. Many DAE scientists believe — apparently from past experience in the safeguarded facilities in the country — that proprietary information regarding the breeder technology, in which India is quite advanced, that may have to be shared with the IAEA would invariably be leaked to the U.S.

More recently, however, he added another intriguing dimension to his argument that the breeder was also essential for our strategic programme. In an interview to The Indian Express he said: "Both, from the point of view of maintaining long-term energy security and for maintaining the `minimum credible deterrent,' the fast breeder programme just cannot be put on the civilian list. This would amount to getting shackled and India certainly cannot compromise one [security] for the other." That is, in Dr. Kakodkar's opinion, the breeder reactors have military utility as well though, unfortunately, he did not elaborate how this situation obtains. But is there a conceivable scenario in which fissile material from the breeder would be needed for the weapons programme?

The size of our `minimum credible deterrent' (MCD) has never been articulated officially. Nor has a credible estimate emerged from any of the strategists or the various think tanks in the country. Of course, given the premise of the Indian Nuclear Doctrine, this is not a constant quantity and, therefore, will never get stated. It says: "In this policy of `retaliation only', the survivability of our arsenal is critical. This is a dynamic concept related to the strategic environment, technological imperatives and the needs of national security. The actual size components, deployment and employment of nuclear forces will be decided in the light of these factors." Parity with Pakistan's stockpile, at least in the short term, would probably be the minimum capacity the strategic establishment would desire. What are the sources of fissile material for weapons to fulfil this objective?

Till now, Indian weapons programme has been plutonium (Pu) based and Pu-239, the fissile isotope of plutonium, is the source of the released energy from a fission bomb. Pu-239 is produced in research reactors — such as the 40 MWth CIRUS and the 100 MWth Dhruva in Trombay — as well as in power reactors such as the 220 MWe/540 MWe pressurised heavy water reactors (PHWRs) of the DAE. The difference, however, is that plutonium from power reactors is contaminated with higher isotopes Pu-240, 241, and 242 (up to 20 per cent), which are difficult to separate in fuel reprocessing. Weapons made from such reactor grade plutonium (RGPu) are "dirty" and have uncertain yields and are, therefore, unreliable from a military standpoint. Research reactors can provide weapons grade plutonium (WGPu), containing less than 7 per cent of higher isotopes, by avoiding high burn-ups of the fuel so that higher isotopes do not build up.

Roughly, WGPu from CIRUS and Dhruva — accounting for their average operating efficiencies — would provide for three standard 12-15 kiloton weapons a year, assuming about 6-8 kg per weapon. CIRUS has been operating since 1960 and Dhruva effectively since 1988-89. After accounting for the plutonium consumed in Pokhran-1 and about 65 kg in the initial loading of the FBTR, the Indian WGPu stockpile at the time of Pokhran-2 in 1998 would have been equivalent to 35 bombs. Today, the stockpile would be in the region of 50-55 weapons. Is this good enough for MCD?

Pakistan's weapons programme is chiefly based on highly enriched uranium (HEU) for which it operates a uranium enrichment centrifuge plant at Kahuta since 1984 with an annual capacity equivalent to 5-6 weapons (based on Western estimates). But the plant faced a lot of problems in its early years and Pakistan also observed a moratorium on production of HEU during 1991-98. Western analysts have estimated Pakistan's stockpile at the time of the 1998 tests to be about 10 weapons.

In addition, a heavy water 50 MWth research reactor (like CIRUS) is believed to have become operational at Khushab since 1998, which can produce WGPu equivalent to one bomb a year. Pakistan's stockpile today would be, therefore, around 50. This implies that, even though India had a head start, Pakistan would have by now achieved parity with India. If Indian WGPu production remains limited to CIRUS and Dhruva, Pakistan's stockpile would clearly overtake it in the following years.

So what could be India's options? At the time of Pokhran-2 it was suggested that another Dhruva-like reactor would be required for achieving MCD. Given the present scenario, clearly a higher capacity (say, 200 MWth) would be required. Though a civil-military separation does not prohibit India from building additional military facilities, this would be an expensive option and also would involve a gestation period of 3-5 years.

Some analysts have argued that keeping about four power producing PHWRs out of safeguards, and operating them in low burn-ups, should take care of the requirement. The current level of fuel burn-ups in the 220 MWe PHWRs is 7000-8000 megawatt-days/tonne (MWd/t). Though this would produce about 100 kg of RGPu a year, it would not be acceptable to the military because of unreliability. Also the stockpile of RGPu (of which India at present has about 10 tonnes) is needed for loading the PFBR and the future 500 MWe breeder power reactors as fuel (3-4 tonnes per breeder). To extract WGPu from power reactors, however, burn-ups should not exceed about 2000 MWd/t. Under such an operation, the power output would scale down correspondingly. As a permanent solution, this would be obviously uneconomical and, therefore, would be unattractive.

Now what does a fast breeder (where fast refers to the neutron velocity and not to breeding) do? The fuel that is used in a breeder is a mixture of depleted uranium (mostly non-fissileU-238) and RGPu in the ratio of 7:3 or more. The core could be surrounded by a blanket of U-238 and/or thorium (Th-232). Neutrons from the plutonium fission (which produces energy) would be absorbed by U-238 (in the core and the blanket) to become Pu-239 and by Th-232 (in the blanket) to be come U-233. That is, it breeds more Pu-239 than it consumes and the ratio is a little over 1. The time taken to breed enough Pu-239 to fuel another breeder is called the `doubling time' and is quite long. It varies from 9 to 19 years depending upon whether the uranium-plutonium mixture is in metallic, nitride, carbide or oxide form. The PFBR under construction will use an oxide mix.

The U-233 that is produced in a breeder is also a fissile material suitable for use in next generation advanced heavy water reactors (AHWRs) as well as in weapons. None of the weapon states has developed a U-233 weapon though the U.S. did have a programme in the mid-1950s. Also, it does not make sense to go for a U-233 weapon when under the testing moratorium in place you cannot validate any new designs.

But the more significant aspect of a breeder is that, even though you start with RGPu, the plutonium that comes out is weapons grade. In a breeder, besides Pu-239, the contaminants too fission with fast neutrons (which is not the case with thermal neutrons in a PHWR). In effect, a breeder also functions as a "laundry" for dirty plutonium. However, since this bred plutonium is intended to fuel future breeders, it would be unwise to keep all of it for strategic use. But since the fissile material is growing, albeit by only 8 per cent or so a year, few tens of kg could always be withdrawn for weapon purposes to supplement the amount from CIRUS and Dhruva and achieve parity with Pakistan. In the case of the PFBR, which will become operational in 2011, you can, however, begin to withdraw only around 2014-15. This, of course, implies that MCD with respect to Pakistan would be achievable only 8-9 years hence. But this would not be acceptable to the strategic establishment.

Consider now the separation plan the DAE may be willing to accept because of the flexibility it affords from a strategic standpoint. The entire BARC complex at Trombay and the Kalpakkam complex — which includes the Indira Gandhi Centre for Atomic Research (IGCAR), the twin-PHWRs of the Madras Atomic Power Station (MAPP), the FBTR, the PFBR, the nuclear submarine project and the associated fuel reprocessing plants — would be off safeguards but all other power reactors (including future breeders) could be brought under safeguards. Till such time as breeder becomes the source of weapons material, MAPP could be operated on low burn-ups to keep pace with Pakistan (instead of running some PHWRs forever in this mode). Once the PFBR begins to discharge fuel, MAPP would be back on normal mode, and would from then on continue to provide RGPu for the PFBR.

This may well have been the underlying rationale for attributing a strategic dimension to the PFBR, and it is unlikely that Dr. Kakodkar's remarks were made without the inputs of the strategic establishment.

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