Opinion - News Analysis   

Nuclear separation scenarios

R. Ramachandran

The moot question is, whatever the plan, will it be acceptable to the U.S.

IN HIS suo motu statement on the Indo-U.S. nuclear deal, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh revealed the following important detail about the civil-military separation plan. "Our proposed Separation Plan," he said, "entails identifying in phases, a number of our thermal reactors as civilian facilities to be placed under IAEA safeguards amounting to roughly 65 % of the total installed thermal nuclear power capacity, by the end of the separation plan [emphasis added]". It is important to note that Dr. Singh has spoken of 65 per cent of installed (thermal) nuclear power capacity, and not facilities as some reports have interpreted.

Now, significantly, the phrase "end of the separation plan" has been left undefined. Also, by specifying that only thermal nuclear reactors (as against "fast reactors") would be placed under safeguards, the Prime Minister has ruled out bringing breeders too under safeguards till such period. So it is not clear what facilities are being offered for bringing under safeguards. In particular, it is not clear how one should interpret his statement that "We cannot accept safeguards on our indigenous Fast Breeder Programme" — whether this would hold in perpetuity or till it creates "opportunities for international cooperation." The moot question is, whatever the plan is, whether it would be acceptable to the U.S.?

Currently, the installed capacity is 3,310 MWe comprising 15 thermal reactors of which four are under safeguards — the two light water reactors (LWRs) at Tarapur (TAPS 1 & 2) and two pressurised heavy water reactors (PHWRs) at Rawatbhata, Rajasthan (RAPS 1 & 2). The remaining 11 PHWRs are not under safeguards. These include, five plants of 2 x 220 MWe reactors at Narora (NAPS 1 & 2), Kalpakkam (MAPS 1 & 2), Kakrapar (KAPS 1 & 2), Kaiga 1 & 2, and RAPS 3 & 4, and one 540 MWe reactor — TAPS 4.

Seven plants are under different stages of construction. These include the 540 MWe TAPS 3, two plants of 2 x 220 MWe PHWRs Kaiga 3 & 4, and RAPS 5 & 6. These together would add another 3,420 MWe to the total installed capacity.

If we assume "end of separation plan" to mean the time when all the five plants under construction too become operational — around December 2008 — we can conceive the following scenario of separation judging from the remarks made by the various former scientists and officials of the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) at various times.

Sixty-five per cent of 6,730 (3310 + 3420) MWe works out to about 4,375 MWe. This much of capacity will be brought under safeguards. Now, already TAPS 1&2, RAPS 1 & 2, and KK 1 & 2 are under safeguards, which account for 2,620 MWe.

Four plants of 2 x 220 MWe could provide the additional 1,760 MWe to be brought under safeguards. Equivalently, the 35 per cent of capacity outside safeguards (about 2,355 MWe) would then be accounted for by the 2 x 540 MWe reactors and three operating plants of 2 x 220 MWe capacity.

A conceivable plan

A conceivable separation plan for power producing plants would then be as follows. Besides TAPS 1 & 2, RAPS 1& 2, and KK 1& 2 already under safeguards, the DAE would opt for placing the currently operational NAPS 1 & 2 and RAPS 3 & 4 plants together with the upcoming Kaiga 3 & 4 and RAPS 5 & 6 under safeguards, leaving the operational 2 x 220 MWe plants of MAPS 1 & 2, KAPS 1 & 2, and Kaiga 1 & 2 and 2 x 540 MWe plant of TAPS 3 & 4 out of safeguards.

This would fit with the views expressed by DAE scientists that the Kalpakkam complex and entirely indigenously developed PHWR systems should be off safeguards as far as possible. Now NAPS is virtually in the heritage of RAPS 1 & 2; that is, of Canadian design and could be offered for safeguards. RAPS 3, 4, 5 & 6, on the other hand, constitute reactors that are of mature and stabilised indigenous designs of 220 MWe PHWRs and also could be placed under safeguards. TAPS 3 & 4 represent evolving designs of indigenous 540 MWe reactors and so cannot be placed under safeguards.

Whether this logic would be acceptable to the U.S. or not remains to be seen. Because if these are not on the civilian list, it implies that they are militarily significant.

And that may be hard to justify given the amount of unsafeguarded plutonium that these off-safeguards PHWRs would generate. That would seem to be much more than what would be required to fuel the unsafeguarded breeder programme.

Printer friendly page  
Send this article to Friends by E-Mail

Stories in this Section

When silence speaks just as loud
From Eisenhower to Clinton to Bush
Was Bush speech a warning on separation?
For mature, strong bonds
Back to the villages in China
Nuclear separation scenarios
Bush is not welcome
Why not?
Manmohan's assurance
Welcome ruling

Copyright © 2006, The Hindu. Republication or redissemination of the contents of this screen are expressly prohibited without the written consent of The Hindu