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Fuelling a needless controversy?

R. Ramachandran

It makes little logical or diplomatic sense to get Russian fuel for Tarapur bypassing the Indo-U.S. nuclear agreement and violating Nuclear Suppliers Group Guidelines.

AHEAD OF the U.S. Congressional decision on the Indo-U.S. Civilian Nuclear Cooperation Agreement and the meeting of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) in May-end to consider India-specific changes in its Guidelines, India has signed an agreement with Russia for the supply of fuel for the safeguarded 2x160 MWe Boiling (Light) Water Reactors (BWRs) at the Tarapur Atomic Power Station (TAPS). According to the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) spokesperson, at India's request, Russia has agreed to supply 60 tonnes of low enriched uranium (LEU) under the `safety exception clause' of the NSG Guidelines. Normally, the Guidelines require application of Full Scope Safeguards (FSS) for transfer of nuclear material, equipment and technology — the so-called Trigger List items — to a non-nuclear weapon state (NNWS). The shipment of fuel is expected to arrive by March-end. The move is most baffling, to say the least.

In this regard, the MEA made the following statements on March 14 and 15:

The Russian fuel supply "really has no connection to our nuclear deal with the U.S."

"There is no violation of the NSG guidelines as Russia has approached the Group under the safety exception clause."

"The shortage of fuel for Tarapur would have affected its continued operations under reliable and safe conditions."

All these statements are patently false. And precisely for that reason the move defies all logic and runs the risk of putting the Indo-U.S. deal in jeopardy. Not unexpectedly, the U.S. State Department has objected. There has been opposition from other quarters as well.

Let us consider these one by one.

The first is, in fact, a reiteration of what Prime Minister Manmohan Singh stated in December 2005 during his visit to Russia. It is true that, with the imminent exhaustion of the earlier supply of 51 tonnes of Russian fuel in January 2001, India had been seeking fuel from Moscow even before the Indo-U.S. agreement of July 18, 2005. However, having been heavily reprimanded then by the other NSG members, in particular the U.S., for violating NSG Guidelines, Russia had categorically ruled out any further supplies when the issue was raised during President Vladimir Putin's visit in December 2004. It is in this context that fuel for Tarapur became an integral part of the George W. Bush-Manmohan Singh Joint Statement of July 18, 2005.

To recall, the Statement said the U.S. would seek to adjust its laws and policies and also seek a change in the NSG guidelines to enable full civil nuclear cooperation with India, including fuel supplies to the safeguarded reactors at Tarapur. "In the meantime," the Statement added, "the U.S. will encourage its partners to also consider this request expeditiously."

Emphasising the phrase `In the meantime,' Indian negotiators have made much of the sentence. It is highly ambiguous and reflects a badly drafted statement. The phrase can at best be interpreted to mean "till full civil cooperation with the U.S. is enabled." But it cannot be interpreted to mean before NSG guidelines, which prohibit such transfers, are changed, and that is what the Indo-U.S. deal promises to achieve. The MEA cannot have it both ways — that the Russian supply has nothing to do with the Indo-U.S. deal and at the same time defend it by recourse to this ambiguous phrase.

In any case, the U.S. is supposed to "encourage its [NSG] partners" to supply fuel, and the proposed Russian supply is not at all at the U.S.' behest. In fact, strangely enough, Mr. Bush was not even informed that a fuel deal was being negotiated with Russia when he was here. The U.S., like other NSG members, came to know of the proposed supply after Mr. Bush's return to Washington when Russia intimated its intent.

Consider MEA's second assertion that, because the "safety exception clause" has been invoked, there is no violation of NSG Guidelines. The relevant guideline that imposes on FSS is clause 4(a). The Safety Exception Clause 4 (b) states: "Transfers covered by paragraph (a) to an NNWS without such an [FSS] agreement should only be authorised in exceptional cases when they are deemed essential for the safe operation of existing facilities ... Suppliers should inform and, if appropriate, consult in the event that they intend to authorise or to deny such transfers."

It could be argued that since the supplier is only required to inform NSG members, and Russia has done so, there is no violation. The moot point, however, is whether an "exceptional case" has arisen to invoke 4 (b). In 2001, when Russia cited the safety criterion for fuel supply, the argument was rejected. In turn, Russia assured the NSG that it was making a one-time supply. So this time around, a consultation before shipment, as required by the Clause, would seem "appropriate". Russia, however, seems to have decided that it was not necessary.

Now what constitutes an "exceptional case"? The Guidelines invoking FSS were adopted in April 1992 but were formalised only in October 1995. At the 1994 Plenary, the NSG Working Group identified a definition that would restrict the interpretation of "exceptional cases " from being very general. It defined "exceptional cases" as "those when a transfer of a trigger list item is deemed to be essential in order to prevent or correct a radiological hazard posing a significant danger to public health and safety and which cannot be realistically met by other means." Though the Plenary endorsed this definition as a "common understanding", it decided not to incorporate it into the Guidelines. It, however, emphasised the importance of the information and consultation provisions of 4 (b).

At the December 2000 inter-session NSG Plenary, called to discuss Russia's shipment of fuel for Tarapur, the U.S. held that the term "exceptional cases" meant cases of "imminent" — as against "potential" — radiological hazards. And that if the NSG were to accept the Russian interpretation of the safety exemption, it would make literally any export to a reactor eligible. New fuel, the U.S. said, did not alleviate an imminent radiological hazard and, therefore, supplying fuel was not justified under the safety exemption.

Russia had then stated that fuel at TAPS was being burned well beyond the design burn-up levels posing a danger to the integrity of fuel cladding. The U.S. countered this saying that burning fuel well beyond design levels was not possible, and burning fuel beyond the level at which cladding is expected to maintain its integrity had no practical value. It further added that operating the reactor at maximum possible fuel burn-up did not present either significant or imminent radiological safety concerns since the reactors were designed and built to operate under these conditions.

No radiation hazard

Indeed, when a reactor is operated at a burn-up higher than its design levels, fission products build up and the reactivity (neutron availability) needed to maintain criticality in the reactor drops quickly. Soon the reactor becomes unable to sustain the chain reaction and it would automatically shut down. So there is no likelihood of TAPS reactors operating beyond their design burn-up levels, let alone pose a radiation hazard. But this time round too, as was reported in Financial Times of March 16, Russia has made the same untenable argument as in 2000 that the Tarapur reactors are now operating at burn-ups higher than the projected levels. Clearly, just as in 2001, the present Russian supply would also be in violation of NSG Guidelines.

Given the above, the MEA's third contention is also wrong. In fact, after a five-month shutdown for safety upgrades in October 2005, TAPS was cleared by the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB) to run at full power only last month. According to the Nuclear Power Corporation (NPC), there is currently enough fuel to run one unit for 6-8 months and the other, which has been only recently loaded, till mid-2007. So, there is no safety risk whatsoever for lack of fuel, as the MEA has claimed.

Of course, a lead time of a few months would be required for the fabrication of fuel elements from the imported fuel at the Nuclear Fuel Complex (NFC) in Hyderabad. But given the current operational status of TAPS there is no urgent need to import it immediately contravening NSG Guidelines.

The perception within government circles that India's firm stand on civil-military separation was unlikely to be accepted by the U.S. was apparently the motive for engaging in parallel negotiations with Russia. But, even if negotiations had been concluded in parallel, it was highly undiplomatic to firm up a supply contract before Mr. Bush's visit, and not inform him on top of it. The Government could have waited till the U.S.' response to India's separation offer became clear and proceeded accordingly. With a favourable U.S. response, and Mr. Bush's apparent keenness to see changes in U.S. laws and NSG Guidelines through, it would have made more sense to wait till the NSG Plenary in May.

If there was no evidence of positive development at the NSG, Russia could have done exactly what it has done now two months later. But in the event of the NSG taking a favourable stand, Russia could have shipped the fuel immediately without recourse to the untenable safety argument. Why did Russia want to up the ante? The Indian act could be perceived as a double game on Capitol Hill and by the non-proliferation lobby in the U.S., as well as by some members of the NSG. And this could backfire on the Indo-U.S. deal. Why did India want to force the issue?

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