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New American moves in Asia

P.S. Suryanarayana

The partners in the Trilateral Strategic Dialogue — the U.S., Australia, and Japan — seek to checkmate China and also woo India at the same time.

AS ACTIVISTS rallied in Sydney on March 18 to protest against the entrenched occupation of Iraq by the United States, its Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, was crafting, in the same city, a new strategic forum. The latest coalition of the willing draws Australia and Japan into a closer orbit around the U.S. than at present. And, there is more to this entity than meets the eye.

The name — Trilateral Strategic Dialogue — is as innocuous as any grouping can clothe itself in. However, the partners in this Dialogue seek to checkmate China and also woo India at the same time. Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer, who hosted the inaugural meeting, has inadvertently amplified these objectives. He did so, at the post-meeting interaction with the media, by disclaiming any negative attitude towards China and by identifying India as the emerging power that must be engaged.

Unquestioned leader

As with all U.S.-led coalitions, Washington is the unquestioned dominant partner in this Dialogue too. But U.S. diplomatic calculations are more complex as regards major countries such as China and India.

Moreover, it is not dramatically new that the U.S. is now engaging its long-time lieutenants — Japan and Australia — in a more intensive fashion. In fact, the new ministerial-level forum has been in the making for some time, with the senior officials having held preparatory talks since 2002.

The inevitable question is about the need for this new grouping. The networks of connections between Washington, on one side, and Tokyo as also Canberra, on the other, were indeed strong prior to the launch of the Sydney forum.

In Mr. Downer's presentation, the new entity "is a very natural relationship" and it "should not be interpreted as an act of conspiracy against China." Australia, for its part, does not pursue a policy of containment of China, while the larger forum should, in his view, be seen in the same category as the East Asia Summit (EAS) or the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) grouping.

Glossed over, though, is the fact that China, a member of both EAS and APEC, is not in the new Sydney forum. India is a participant in just the EAS.This diminishes Mr. Downer's argument that "it is not for China to feel that we are ganging up on China" now. There are other reasons as well to dispute the stated objectives of the Sydney forum.

Japan and Australia have now joined the U.S. in describing themselves as "long-standing democracies and developed economies." While this is not a false representation, the three are seeking to build an overarching strategic architecture over this foundation of politics and economics. They say the group's political-economic complexion dictates a "common cause."

The "cause" is defined as "working to maintain stability and security globally, with a particular focus on the Asia Pacific region." Also emphasised is the importance of "greater trilateral cooperation in addressing contemporary security issues."

Unstated is that the U.S. sees China through the prism of "contemporary security issues" in the Asia Pacific region.

Fears over China's rise

For a number of years now, Washington has made no secret of its concern about the current rise of China as an economic power and a potential military force. More tellingly, Ms. Rice had voiced concerns about China's military profile. And, the new update on the U.S. security doctrine is illustrative of similar concerns about China.

So, Australia's burgeoning economic linkages with China are seen by U.S. strategic planners as requiring careful management, if Beijing is to be prevented from becoming a superpower.

For Australia, given its geopolitical location as a Western outpost in the Asian neighbourhood, the rise of China is both an opportunity and a challenge. This explains why the U.S. has drawn Australia in. The U.S. is keen that Canberra remains mindful of the current rise of China as a challenge to Washington's strategic interests and not just as an opportunity for Australia's economy.

Equally obvious is the China-angle of another key aspect of the joint statement that Ms. Rice, Mr. Downer, and Japanese Foreign Minister Taro Aso issued in Sydney on March 18. "A particular focus" of their attention was the issue of "supporting the emergence and consolidation of democracies and strengthening cooperative frameworks in the Asia Pacific region."

What cannot be missed is the coded reference to the U.S. goal of seeing the emergence of "democracy" in China. U.S. President George W. Bush made this known, even if only tentatively, during his last visit to China in 2005. Somewhat hesitantly, Mr. Bush had then held out Taiwan's "democracy" as a model for China to emulate. Given Washington's other strategic preoccupations of the moment, which required Beijing's cooperation, he was mindful of not going the whole hog and pressing the Chinese leaders hard on the "democracy" issue.

As for Japan as a player in the Sydney forum, Tokyo's strained relationship with Beijing, over a wide array of issues, is a factor that suits Washington. Remarkably, the subtle reference to China in the Sydney forum's joint statement is reminiscent of the coded mention of Beijing in the updated U.S.-Japan security consensus, which was outlined in October and November last year.

The security consensus, now sought to be fine-tuned by the U.S. and Japan by March-end, had emphasised the importance of paying attention to the ongoing "modernisation of military capabilities" in the Asia Pacific. And, China, by its own pronouncements, is at present engaged in modernising its military capabilities.

Such aspects of big-power politics explain the coded references to China as the external player that the Sydney forum would like to monitor and checkmate, if deemed necessary.

And, it is as part of this evolving game of power politics in the Asia Pacific zone that the new Dialogue group has significantly sought to woo India.

While welcoming "China's constructive engagement in the region," especially over ways to resolve the issues arising out of North Korea's nuclear weapons programme, the partners in the Sydney forum "recognised the importance of reinforcing our global partnership with India." This refers to the dialogue processes that the U.S., Australia, and Japan have, independently of each other, initiated with India, in recent years, over a wide array of global issues.

The recent visits to New Delhi by Mr. Bush and Australian Prime Minister John Howard have provided the backdrop for their upbeat desire to enhance their "global partnership" with India. More importantly, the forum has hailed India's latest civilian nuclear energy accord with the U.S. as "a positive step towards expansion of the reach of the international non-proliferation regime."

India's unique position

It can, therefore, be argued that the Sydney forum has acknowledged India's unique position as a meticulous practitioner of non-proliferation outside the framework of the relevant international treaty. A finer point is that Japan and Australia, two hawks on non-proliferation, have now joined the U.S. in exploring ways of moving towards accepting India as a responsible nuclear-armed state.

The final outcome of this exploratory process is not certain at this stage, given that the issue will need to be addressed by the U.S. Congress as also and, if at all, by the Nuclear Suppliers Group at the next stage. But the Sydney forum is evidently eager to befriend India as an informal dialogue-partner over issues concerning the Asia Pacific region. To be sure, there is no formal way in which India could be associated with the Sydney forum, whose membership norms go beyond "long-standing democracy" and include the status of a "developed economy." Also, Japan and Australia are U.S. military allies.

However, as the Sydney forum has hardly concealed its agenda of managing the ascendance of China by zeroing in on its military profile and political system, New Delhi should, therefore, tread carefully and avoid any non-proliferation trap that might, in addition, complicate its improving relations with Beijing.

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