Opinion - News Analysis   

Countering the naxalites

K. Srinivas Reddy

The Government announced in Parliament that it has a national policy on dealing with naxalites. But what do we make of the continued violence?

THE ATTACKS by naxalites on government institutions in R. Udayagiri town of Orissa and on tribals in Kanker district of Chhattisgarh in the last two days do not point to a corresponding increase in their military capabilities. At best, the violence highlights the total lack of coordination and preparedness on part of governments.

Simultaneous coordinated attacks are the new strategy the Maoists introduced with their strikes in Koraput, Orissa, in February 2004. In addition, they have unleashed a ruthless campaign against those who oppose them and support the state, as evident in the violence against tribals supporting the Salwa Judum (peace initiative) in Chhattisgarh.

There is no apparent counter-strategy. But the United Progressive Alliance Government begs to differ. When there was trenchant criticism on this point in the Lok Sabha, Union Home Minister Shivraj Patil sprang a surprise on March 13 when he tabled a document detailing the Centre's policy on the naxalite problem.

Surprise it was because despite the spatial spread of the naxal movement assuming alarming levels, the Centre had not before this come up with a policy to deal with the problem. In fact, formulating a policy on the naxalite problem was one of the foremost demands of Chief Ministers of the affected different States.

Raman Singh, Chief Minister of Chhattisgarh, had repeatedly been underlining the need for a national policy so that States did not work at cross-purposes. During the experiment in Andhra Pradesh of holding negotiations with the Maoists and after the failure of the talks, the demand for a national policy reached a crescendo.

"Every now and then this point [of not having a policy] was made. We were told that neither the Government of India nor the State Governments have any policy to deal with the naxalite movement. We were telling them that we do have the policy and we are following the directions given in that policy," Mr. Patil said in Parliament.

How was the policy formulated without involving the affected States? The Centre had been periodically convening meetings of Chief Ministers of affected States, Directors-General of Police, and Chief Secretaries but a national approach had not evolved. The policy, it appears, was confined only to files in the corridors of power. (While replying to a question in the Rajya Sabha on March 1, 2006, Minister of State for Home, Sriprakash Jaiswal, asserted that the Centre had a "well-defined policy to deal with the naxalite problem.") It was the secrecy that surrounded the policy that left the individual States in confusion. Whenever the Maoists succeeded in pulling off a spectacular strike, States took refuge in saying this showed the `desperation' of the Maoists. There was no explanation why the policy was not discussed by the intelligentsia, political parties, security experts, elected representatives, and people in general.

None would disagree that the field tactics in dealing with the naxalites should be kept a secret. But surely a policy should be in the public realm, as should the effort to frame it? For, counter-revolutionary strategies can be successful only when they are backed by a policy. A policy can be evolved when the decision makers thoroughly understand the problem. A thorough understanding would be possible only when an unbiased study is done. In the present case, the discussions and brainstorming seem to have taken place behind closed doors.

The most worrisome aspect is that the Centre has now very categorically announced that it would make efforts to promote local resistance groups against naxalites. Such an effort would be taken up "in a manner that the villagers are provided adequate security cover and the area is effectively dominated by the security forces."

What then of the onslaught of the Maoists on Salwa Judum activists in Chhattisgarh? Though Salwa Judum was launched by Congress legislator Mahendra Karma in Dantewada district, the BJP Government in Chhattisgarh has been extending full support to the movement. Despite this, more than 60 tribals have been killed in the last two months alone by the Maoists in reprisals against Salwa Judum activists. This raises questions about the Centre's idea of promoting local resistance groups.

Andhra Pradesh's successful programme of `peaceful resistance' to Maoists in the forest areas of North Telangana, especially in Adilabad district with the maximum population of tribals, could have been suggested for replication elsewhere. In Andhra Pradesh, the police won the confidence of tribals by a rather unconventional but highly effective strategy. They made a conscious bid to shed their aggressive behaviour and began honouring the tribal traditions like leaving footwear outside while entering a hut or greeting the village elders with folded hands. The campaign was so effective that within a year, tribals in more than 360 villages vowed not to support Maoists, and in 26 villages, people revolted against Maoists.

Before formulating the national policy, such experiments and a draft plan could have been discussed. After all, every section of society should help to tackle one of the most serious problems India is facing.

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